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Terrorist groups do not operate in isolation. To survive in the face of counter-
pressures from their opponents, the group must establish a beneficial relationship with 
a targeted audience, a presumed constituency, in order to generate the sympathy and 
support necessary for maintaining operational viability. Existing studies of terrorism, 
however, offer few insights into how this might be done. The most common approach 
revolves around assessments of terrorist messages, yet typically treats those messages 
as self-serving propaganda or media manipulation. This study takes a different 
approach, suggesting that terrorists use statements and communiqués in an effort to 
gain and maintain a supportive audience. Further, the intended audience for the 
messages infer meaning in terrorist violence, thus augmenting or reducing the impact 
of persuasive messaging by the terrorist. Understanding this process, in turn, may 
yield new insights into the dynamic processes of terrorism, offering new opportunities 
  
to assess a terrorist group’s potential for positive evolutionary growth or greater 
relative fitness. 
Using Grunig’s situational theory of publics, this study creates and evaluates a 
new metric, called expected affinity, for examining the terrorist group’s effort to 
establish and strengthen bonds between itself and its targeted and presumptively 
supportive audience. Expected affinity combines sub-measures addressing problem 
recognition, expected and desired levels of involvement, and constraint recognition, 
coupled with an inferred meaning in the symbolism of violent acts in order to 
evaluate terrorist messages and attacks. The results suggest utility in the expected 
affinity metric and point to opportunities for making the measure more directly 
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Chapter 1: At an Impasse 
 Without a radical change in perspective, terrorism studies, as a discipline, may 
have few insights and little analytic progress left to offer. The field has approached 
the limits of what it can say about the dynamics of terrorism. Maintaining present 
analytic and methodological perspectives leaves the field with little more than 
opportunities to fine-tune the present state of knowledge, limited largely to a strict 
focus on selected subelements of the phenomenon. These fine-tuning opportunities, 
further, are generally limited to specific terrorist groups or to very narrowly defined 
terrorist group types. As analyses get more detailed and specific with respect to 
terrorism subelements, the larger focus is lost, leaving behind a field in which inquiry 
nibbles at the edges rather than offering generalizable explanations and predictive 
analyses.  
 As a result of this limited perspective, the typical approach taken in terrorism 
studies places severe limits, if not outright barriers, to the field’s ability to offer new 
knowledge and understanding of the process of terrorism. Restricting the field to 
select aspects does allow for the isolation and subsequent careful examination of a 
select element, both essential elements of inquiry. It also serves to curtail 
opportunities to generalize findings beyond the immediate subject entity, to 
understand the fundamental aspects of the phenomenon, and to offer broader and 
more accurate predictive forecasts. Rather than expand the field’s capabilities by 
venturing into the unknown, more examinations fall back on well documented, 
widely accepted, fully validated methodological practices centered around the 
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deconstruction of terrorism and terrorist groups into easily analytically isolated and 
quantifiable components. An understanding of the dynamics of terrorism, its 
processes, and its evolutionary tendencies born of interaction between terrorist, 
opponent, and audience is lost. 
 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 
commonly referred to as the 9-11 Commission, called this failure one of 
imagination.1
                                                 
1  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2002), The 9-11 
Commission Report. See especially Chapter 11, “Foresight – and Hindsight,” pp. 339-348, in which the 
Commission discusses failures of imagination in detail. 
  In applying that label, and by identifying this failure as one of the 
primary venues for corrective action, the Commission highlighted the narrow 
approach, firmly fixed in the here and now that characterizes the study of terrorism, 
both in academia and in government. It is, as the Commission suggests, an approach 
rooted in the reductive. Terrorism studies is a relatively new field, still considered 
immature by some, in search of recognition and legitimization as a mature discipline 
(Gordon 2004: 107). While this may explain and excuse the field’s failings for some, 
others are less charitable, with one observer arguing that a research community of 
scholars can remain active indefinitely while making no real contribution to the body 
of knowledge (Silke 2004a: 2). Andrew Silke continued his criticism by noting that 
“It seems relatively clear that terrorism research exists in such a state and that after 
over 30 years of inquiry, the field shows little evidence it is capable of making the 
leap to consistency producing research of genuine explanatory and predictive value.” 
(Silke 2004a: 2) Terrorism studies are, unfortunately, dominated by what have been 
dubbed “integrators of literature,” (Silke 2001: 5) where findings repackage 
arguments made previously by others, resulting in a conceptually incestuous field. 
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 Much of the difficulty encountered in the field stems from the nature of 
terrorism. It is a highly emotional phenomenon, igniting deeply held passions across a 
wide range of interpretive perspectives. It carried with it a fundamental sense of 
immediacy, if not urgency, sometimes bordering, sometimes giving in to panic. The 
heavy emotional context of terrorism provides a powerful attractor, and almost 
irresistible conceptual context, leading easily and almost naturally to research 
centered on immediate issues, symptoms, and solutions (Silke 2004b: 210-211). The 
imminent threat offered by terrorists, and at times by the fear of terrorism itself, quite 
naturally drive policy makers toward a simpler indications-and-warning perspective 
in which the reduction of the threat becomes the paramount concern. More time-
consuming inquiry into historical development and fundamental causal factors of 
terrorism, as well as its dynamics, are subordinated to immediate threat reduction and 
mitigation. Terrorism research in academia follows suit, providing products 
overwhelmingly focused on the present (Weinberg and Richardson 2004: 138; 
Crenshaw 2000: 410-411; Medd and Goldstein 1997: 281; and Rapoport 1997: 12 
among others).  
 Terrorism, by its very nature, is clandestine, further limiting opportunities for 
scholarly inquiry. Terrorists and the governments they oppose engage in a merciless, 
protracted, violent struggle, leading the terrorist to place organization or ideology, if 
not also the individual, at or near the pinnacle of their goals and objectives. Outside 
researchers seeking entry into the world of the terrorist risks violence from both 
directions – from the terrorist suspicious of researcher motive and governmental ties, 
to government equating real or presumed coziness with terrorists as support, alliance, 
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and assistance. Because of the inherent danger involved in accessing clandestine 
extra-legal organizations, most research is done from afar, with little or no contact 
between researchers and their subjects. This leaves few opportunities to gather 
unbiased, unmanipulated data, particularly with respect to terrorist motivations, goals, 
objectives, and perspectives. Research is left with often-questionable materials 
consciously manipulated by its originator to convey a desired message – a message 
that may have widely varying degrees of accuracy, completeness, and veracity. 
 The dearth of unbiased and complete data frequently forces the analyst to rely 
on the work of others, his or her own potentially biased interpretations,2 and familiar 
perceptual contexts. Terrorism is, by most definitions, abnormal or anti-social 
behavior,3
In explaining outcomes, we are prone to examine one side’s behavior 
and overlook the stance of the other with which it is interacting. Although 
deterrence theory is built on the idea of interdependent decisions, most 
explanations of why deterrence succeeds in some cases and fails in others 
focus on differences in what the defender did while ignoring variation in the 
power and motivation of the challenger, just as much policy analysis generally 
starts – and often ends – with the strengths and weaknesses of the policies 
contemplated and adopted. (Jervis 1998: 241) 
 yet researchers often seek to understand it within familiar behavioral 
contexts. By doing so, sight is lost of many of the critical elements of the process and 
dynamics of terrorism, the interactions that define the relationships between actors. 
Robert Jervis, discussing deterrence but in a way equally applicable to terrorism 
studies, notes that 
 
                                                 
2 Particularly in the case of research focused on terrorism prevention, mitigation, or 
counterterrorism, where the author is predisposed by focus to find the undesirable and hostile in their 
subject.  
3 Terrorism, as used in this paper, is taken to mean violence, or the threat of violence,  
Undertaken by non-state actors, designed to produce fear and change or modify behaviors, and targeted 
primarily against non-combatants for political and social purposes rather than for economic gain. The 
“audience” for terrorist violence is larger and distinct from the immediate victims, although the 
immediate victims can be part of the intended audience.  
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 The models used in the study of terrorism are much like the models used 
throughout the social sciences. These models disaggregate the subject of study and 
subject the components of the system to several conceptual limitations largely 
divorced from reality. These models assume, largely for ease of analysis, that the 
constituent actors have complete and unfettered access to all relevant information. 
Not only do the models typically used assume a degree on omniscience on the part of 
the actors involved, those actors are assumed to process that information with 
complete fidelity and to use exacting and generally infallible processes that drive the 
actor toward optimization. The models also assume that the actors act accordingly, 
avoiding to the extent possible those actions which lead away from situational 
optimization. The qualities are often considered to represent the essence of scientific 
modeling, taking the rich and varied reality found, identifying the essential elements, 
and crafting features and variables for use in the model to match those critical 
elements (Miller and Page 2007: 30-37).4
                                                 
4 Miller and Page (2007: 40) continue the thought, noting “A model requires choices of both 
the equivalence classes and the transitional function, and the art of modeling lies in judicious choices 
of both. For any given real-world problem, there are likely to be multiple equivalence mappings (and 
associated transition functions) that will result in homomorphisms. The value of any particular set of 
choices depends on the current needs of the modeler. Moreover, the difficulty of discovering the 
model’s transition function will be closely tied to the chosen equivalence mapping, and thus modelers 
must make trade-offs between the two elements. Choosing an overly broad set of equivalence classes 
simplifies the task of finding an appropriate transition function, f(s), leading to a homomorphism, but 
at the cost o lowering the model’s resolution and value.”   
 Unfortunately, that approach has prevented 
scholars from thoroughly exploring the richness and complexity of terrorism’s 
interactive nature since emphasis has remained firmly rooted on the actors and their 




 At present, terrorism studies are also much like deterrence studies, as 
portrayed by Jervis. A complex interactive phenomenon is disaggregated into selected 
constituent components as a strategy for analysis. Terrorism is reduced to isolated 
elements, with the study of those elements offered as substitutes or models for 
complex, interactive phenomena. Yet the essence of terrorism lies in the interaction 
between individuals and groups, revolving around violence or the threat of violence, 
firmly focused on the resulting emotional impact produced. The study of terrorism 
seeks to build an understanding of the whole phenomenon through an understanding 
of its constituent parts, even though this approach is demonstrably inadequate.5
                                                 
5 Evolutionary biologist Brian Goodwin offers an applicable analogy when stating that 
knowing the structure of water molecules offers no insight into the question of why it goes down the 
drain in a vortex. Intimate knowledge of the parts says nothing about behavior. Goodwin suggests that 
we reverse our thinking and argues “we need a concept of the whole organization . . .  as the 
fundamental entity . . .  and then understand how this generates parts that conform to its intrinsic 
order.” Quoted in Lewin (1999: 35).  
 The 
reductionist approach taken in most terrorism studies leads naturally to a 
conceptualization of terrorism as a zero-sum adversarial relationship between terrorist 
and opponent. Labeling in terrorist situations, for example, assumes a critical role 
between terrorist and adversary. Each seeks support, sympathy, and often assistance 
from a larger public, leading both sets of antagonists to claim, through labels applied, 
a moral and ethical high ground for their actions (Cordes 2001: 150). This war of 
labels is seen as a contest between the terrorist and his adversary for the affections of 
a static, finite public such that gains by one side necessarily equals a commensurate 
loss by the other. This conceptual framework is enhanced further by the black-and-
white exclusionary language used by both the government and the terrorist in 
discussing the conflict (see, for example Ilardi 2004: 216-218). 
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 Lacking an operative sense of fluid dynamics in terrorism’s interactive nature, 
terrorism studies are often predicated on an assumption of perfect or near-perfect 
agent rationality. Both terrorists and their opponents are commonly depicted as 
capable of effective cost-benefit analysis, resulting in decisions reflecting the greatest 
possible optimization of benefit at a given acceptable level of loss. Studies typically 
overlook, downplay, or ignore emotion and reflex as operative triggers for action. 
Unusual or unexpected actions are usually couched in terms of new strategic or 
tactical directions conceived and implemented to advance established goals, or 
effectively dismissed as single-occurrence anomalies.6
 
 Similarly, interaction between 
presumed rational actors dictates a follow-on assumption that the interaction between 
terrorist and their adversary is a rather simple cause-and-effect relationship. Actions 
by one antagonist produce reactions and counteractions by the other, which in turn 
directly generate more reactions and counteractions, ad nauseum. The results of such  
single factor focus, reductionist perspective, and assumption of agent rationality are, 
as Jervis (1997: 42-43) notes, frequent sources of analytic error. 
The Dilemma 
 
 Knowing the local rules of interaction and behavior is essential. Detailed 
knowledge limited to actors, their make-up, motivations, and capabilities offers little 
of universal application. Knowing these things – the products of the reductionist 
approach – is nevertheless critical to further development of the field. Put into a 
broader context, one moving beyond the strict spatial and temporal confines of the 
                                                 
6 For a more nuanced discussion in a larger, broader context, see Holland (1995: 85).  
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immediate, terrorism is a dynamical system in which local rules and behaviors 
generate a system level order not predictable from agent and environmental 
knowledge alone. Terrorism, like other dynamical systems, exhibits emergent 
properties, toward which and into the field needs to grow. Terrorism does not exist in 
a vacuum, and its study should “go beyond a concentration on current events or 
speculation about the future to develop systematic analyses of the development of the 
phenomenon over time. . . .” (Crenshaw 2000: 415).7
 
 Arguing for such a new 
approach in order to ward off stagnation, Ilardi suggests 
In addition to its apparent failure to achieve the primary objectives – and there 
is little evidence to indicate the contrary – the prescriptive focus of terrorism 
researchers has also diverted attention from other critical matters, not the least 
of which is the development of a sound theoretical understanding of the 
dynamics of terrorism. One can also add to this a continued tendency to 
produce research whose methods are questionable, no doubt largely due to the 
perceived need to produce ‘policy-relevant’ material in a timely fashion; and, 
perhaps for the same reason, a widespread inability to identify and exploit 
original information sources. . . . The result has been a spiralling [sic] of the 
literature that in the end adds little to our overall understanding of terrorism. 
. . . There exists a clear and present need for terrorism researchers to 
focus their collective energies upon the critical goal of understanding the 
dynamics of terrorism, including its root causes, taking into particular account 
the role of culture and history in explaining contemporary behavior and 
motivations. In other words, adopting an emphatic approach to the analysis of 
terrorism by acknowledging the interconnectedness and true complexity of 
events. This process calls for the addition, rather than the reduction, of 
variables in the study of terrorism. (Ilardi 2004: 215). 
  
 Taking development in the field too far in that direction, however, is equally 
problematic. Terrorism researchers could assume, for example, that terrorism’s 
interactive nature is essentially random, unpredictable, and chaotic. Were such an 
                                                 
7 Tololyan (2001: 227) makes a similar argument in writing “. . . it is reductive and finally 
inadequate to think of terrorist acts as only a political response to political facts, past or present. 
Neither political nor psychological explanations can compensate for a lack of analysis of the cultural 
milieu that provides the medium in which political facts are interpreted and engender new acts.” 
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assumption accurate, it would immediately give rise to a variety of analytic 
difficulties such as the apparent arbitrariness of outcomes, the inability to achieve 
problem resolution through disaggregation, an inability to address system instability, 
and a loss of opportunity to develop reasonable predictive assessments (Richards 
1997: 112-113). The problem, then, lies in finding a cognitive and paradigmatic 
balance between the reductionist and the chaotic. Approaches rooted in the simplistic 
cause-and-effect idealization and isolation of system components, firmly fixed in 
deterministic laws and processes, as Beyerchen (1998: 184) notes, offer the essence 
of good theory. Yet terrorism as a process is complex, ever-evolving, anything but 
static or linearly deterministic, leaving the field to either remain with solidly 
grounded, if uninspired and redundant work, or to push forward into newer 
applications and approaches, developing the theory and the methods along the way. 
 Terrorism, though, is neither truly linear nor chaotic. Rather, it lies on the 
border between the two, not in stasis but not yet over the line into the realm of chaos. 
The phenomenon occupies that transition space called complexity. To label terrorism 
a complex system, however, may be a bit of a misnomer unless it can be clearly 
articulated that complexity implies a system which is different from the sum of its 
parts, rather than simply being greater than that sum (Jervis 1997: 12-13).8
                                                 
8 See also Waldrup (1992: 293), especially Langston’s explanation of the difference between 
chaos, order, and complexity. 
 As a 
complex system, terrorism is not amenable to a reductionist approach, even if that 
forms the overwhelming majority of decades of scholarship in the field (Ilardi 2004: 
226). A new approach is needed, one which begins to nudge the field away from the 
reductionist perspective of today towards a more holistic, system- and function-
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focused approach that embraces the fluidity, adaptiveness, and interactive 
propensities of the process. 
 Terrorism is, in short, coevolutionary and adaptive. It is an open system in 
which resource or process inputs, generated internally or externally, offer the 
possibility and potential for inducing significant system-wide evolutionary change.9 
Major inputs can have little apparent impact on system dynamics, while minor or 
seemingly insignificant inputs can result in fundamental and far-reaching changes to 
structure, process, and trajectory. Component behaviors within the system are the 
products of interaction between components, and of interactions between components 
and their environments.10
                                                 
9 This lies in contrast to closed systems, which form the conceptual models for almost all 
terrorism work, particularly work rooted in a reductionist approach. Closed systems perspectives use 
the mental construct of isolation of the system or subsystem – conceptually assuming no interaction 
between examined system and its environment – in order to frame the research arena. While 
conceptually isolating a system for examination is essential for understanding the content and function 
of that being examined, it does so by constructing an artificial paradigm that can, at best, only attempt 
to mirror selected aspects of the system and its components. Conceptual isolation for examination has 
proven vital for reducing the “real world” to manageable proportions. 
 The impact of terrorism is often characterized by defining 
the methods of attack and the kinetic outcomes achieved, usually in terms of 
casualties and property damage. This, however, misses the essence of terrorism, 
which lies in the emotional impact which results from both violent action and the fear 
of future violence. Even though terrorist attacks cause tremendous physical 
destruction to persons and property, it is the associated emotional response and 
reaction which define the lasting phenomenological “damage” brought about by a 
terrorist act. Terrorism, as a result, is more appropriately characterized and defined by 
the perception of outcome. If terrorism is considered in terms of power alone, which 
is the typical approach, it is correctly characterized only with the understanding that 




the amount of power exhibited is determined not by those who are seen as wielding it, 
but by those seen as subject to its use. The recipient, in deciding what degree to 
acquiesce, effectively determines how much power the other holds.11
 The analytic perspective of terrorism needs to shift away from the linear. 
Linearity assumes endpoints, times and conditions in which beginnings and ends can 
be authoritatively identified. Temporal timelines of specific terrorist groups can be, 
and often are, used to illustrate and frame violent struggles. It is true that all terrorist 
groups have an identifiable beginning, and that most so far have had an identifiable 
end, but the focus on temporality overlooks the miasma of emotions, hatreds, fears, 
and grievances that give rise to violent struggle and often characterize the varying 
degrees of outcomes. Behavior, and the emotions that dictate their direction, have no 
endpoints. Rather, behavior is a manifestation of reciprocity and dynamism (Taylor 
and Horgan 2001: 53), an on-going process that constantly evolves with behavior 
changing both structure and environment and both environment and structure 
changing behavior (Jervis 1997). It is this interactive interplay, informed by emotions 
and perceptions, which constitutes the real interactive space of terrorism. 
 
 Terrorism is best described as a complex interactive system – one subject to 
changes stemming from both internal and external inputs, significantly different from 
the sum of its parts, characterized by on-going interactive evolution. Linearity and 
reductionism cannot adequately address the interactive process, which explains to a 
significant degree the inadequacy of present-day terrorism scholarship. This study, in 
                                                 
11 Jervis notes “power is a function not only of the relative strengths of the actors and the 
relationship between them, but also in the existing and possible relations between each of them and 
third parties.” Jervis (1997: 193). In noting power as a function of the possible, Jervis is 
acknowledging a perceptual basis for power, one in which each actor and observer may hold unique 
views. Power, then, is transitive and subjective rather than absolute and universal.  
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contrast, seeks to step away from the older terrorism perspective with its focus on the 
constituent parts of the system, and emphasize instead the behavior resulting from the 
interactive and evolutionary nature of terrorism.12
 This study consequently chooses to view terrorism as a dynamic, interactive 
process, an open system defined not so much by its constituent parts as by the 
interactions between system components and between system components and the 
environment in which they exist. Terrorism, in this perspective, exhibits fundamental 
emergent properties in that the series of relationships between system agents, and the 
operative environment itself, changes in response to actions and inactions by all 
 Terrorism scholarship needs to 
begin embracing the principle of complimentarity, seeing terrorism in terms of 
interactions rather than simply as a collection of constituent “things.” (Zukav 1980: 
95).  Terrorism is a social system, a system of interactions, and as such offers a 
complex mosaic of dynamic patterns of interactions (Axelrod and Cohen 2000: 21-
26), leading to the notion that future scholarly advances will embrace and explore 
those patterns. This is what Chris Langton (in Lewin 1999: 189-190) characterizes as 
the never-ending feedback loop, where both vitalist voices, where structure informs 
components, and mechanist voices, where components inform structure, are 
important. 
                                                 
12 A few scholars, such as R. Hudson, et. al. (1999) advocate a focus on mindsets. Hudson 
argues that “knowing the mindset of a terrorist group would better enable the terrorism analyst to 
understand that organization’s behavior patterns and the active or potential threat that it poses. 
Knowing the mindsets, including methods of operations, of terrorist groups would also aid in 
identifying what group likely perpetrated an unclaimed terrorist action and in predicting the likely 
actions of a particular group under various circumstances.” (p. 74) While seeking to better incorporate 
the intangible aspects, Hudson seeks to evolve and advance terrorism analysis. His perspective, 
however, is still rooted in the reductionist in its isolation of mindset as a predictive value, offering no 
hint of how that mindset of the terrorist might interact with the terrorist’s perceptions of the 
environment and affect his thinking. Other notable advocates of the cognitive approach include Martha 
Crenshaw, Max Taylor, John Horgan, and Jerrold Post. 
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parties. Nevertheless, as Edwin Wilson astutely notes, “By itself, emergence can be 
no explanation at all if you don’t have any insight into the mechanics of the system. . . 
.” (quoted in Lewin 1999: 178). It is these mechanics, or the interconnectedness 
between agents in Jervis’s view (Jervis 1997: 17-18), that define not only the 
structure and extent of agent-to-agent relationships, but dictate the direction and 
speed of the evolutionary change which takes place among those agents. 
 Terrorism appears chaotic, especially given its often apparently random acts 
of violence and lack of either warning or apparent pattern of attacks. Yet terrorism is 
not chaotic, in the true sense of the word, nor can the interaction inherent in terrorism 
be described as a chaotic system. By definition, chaotic systems exhibit sensitive 
dependence to initial conditions, a level of indeterminacy associated with reactions to 
stochastic inputs, which renders long-rage forecasting an exercise in futility. A 
chaotic system is inherently unstable, with efforts to predict agent behavior stymied 
by the wide variation – and indeterminacy – of the system’s initial conditions (Rosser 
1997: 200-211). With respect to terrorism, appearances are misleading, since 
terrorism is less dependent on initial conditions than it is on the series of actions and 
reactions among and between agents that shape the environment and each agent’s 
expectations of the other. This distinction is crucial to making progress in 
understanding the dynamics of terrorism – terrorism is complex, not chaotic. It is 
purposive, goal-oriented behavior that not only shapes and modifies agents’ 
behaviors, but shapes and modifies the structure of the environment as well. Violence 
and threat of violence shape initial conditions, but terrorism is not sensitively 
dependent on those conditions. Above all, terrorism is a series of consciously chosen 
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actions undertaken by groups of individuals, not an inevitable outcome resulting from 
a set of conditions prevalent in some undefined past. Terrorism is a complex adaptive 
system, and by seeing it as such, we acknowledge a fundamental distinction from a 
chaotic system, appearances aside, and acknowledge a degree of complexity that 
transcends and outweighs simple measures of complication. 
 A complex system exhibits emergence, where well-defined aggregate 
behavior arises from the localized individual behaviors of the actors in the system. 
This gross aggregate behavior, moreover, is typically insulated from the effects of 
reasonable variations in behaviors among the individual actors. But emergence is 
more than a simple insulation from wide aggregate changes stemming from minor 
localized changes; emergence is characterized by unexpected aggregate behaviors 
arising from those localized changes. In short, emergence holds that the whole is 
more than just the sum of its parts, the whole is different from the sum of its parts 
(see, for example, Miller and Page 2007: 46). 
 Suggesting that terrorism is a complex system is not enough, since a 
distinction can be made between what Weaver (1958) termed disorganized 
complexity and what Miller and Page (2007) refer to as organized complexity. Within 
the former lie familiar theories such as the Theory of Large Numbers and the Central 
Limit Theorem, where the addition of new inputs nudges the aggregate towards an 
identifiable mean. The addition of more stochastic inputs drives the system closer to 
an identifiable mean, such that variance from the mean approaches theoretically 
derived limits. As the set of inputs increase, variations tend to cancel each other out. 
Organized complexity, on the other hand, is the hallmark of emergent systems. The 
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addition of more stochastic inputs has no predictable impact on the system or its mean 
and gives rise, instead, to statistically unexpected regularities. Focusing on the 
aggregate, disorganized complexity tends toward stability, whereas organized 
complexity tends away from stability. 
 As one agent in a dynamical, co-evolutionary system, a terrorist group uses 
inputs from its environment in addition to self-generated inputs, filtered through 
whatever operative rule system that exists for that group, to decide on and implement 
goal-oriented behavior. The effect is to drive the system away from stability by 
forcing change, modification, and adaptation. The actions undertaken by a terrorist 
group reflect a series of conscious decisions designed to achieve some group 
specified objective. Violent attacks, or the threat of violence, are the public 
manifestations of the group’s goal-oriented decision-making. Less obvious, perhaps, 
are the non-violent group actions – propaganda, rule setting, recruiting, fundraising, 
learning, social services13
 The interaction between terrorist and adversary, terrorist and audience, 
terrorist and environment, introduces a positive feedback loop into the system. 
Positive feedback, born of agent interaction, amplifies changes.
 -- that also serve the goal-oriented objectives of the group. 
By manipulating their operative environment in both violent and non-violent ways, 
these groups directly seek to modify and manipulate their environment in order to 
create a more favorable one for the achievement of their goals and objectives. 
14
                                                 
13 Most terrorist groups do not engage in what a neutral observer would consider a social 
service activity, such as the establishment of schools or medical clinics. The reasons are multiple and 
varied, although many can be tied to either the group’s goals and ideology or to the limited resources 
available to the group. Other groups, however, do engage in such activities, most notably today Hamas 
and Hizb’Allah.  
 A terrorist bombing 




creates a sense of fear and foreboding, for example, driving the citizenry to demand 
additional protections from the government. The government, in turn, may seek to 
meet that demand by imposing a series of restrictions on civilian movement, 
restricting access to weapons or the media, imposing curfews, engaging in preemptive 
mass arrests of known anti-government activists, declaring a state of emergency, 
increasing surveillance of the population, militarizing the police, or a host of other 
actions. These acts serve to change the environment in which both terrorist and 
audience exist and act, forcing each to change and adapt in an effort to maintain what 
each might see as normality or conducive to operations.  
 All terrorist groups share this purposive action orientation, whether the group 
is ideologically driven, locality or single issue oriented, or anarchist. The specific set 
of desired outcomes and goals, however, spans the vast range of human interests and 
desires. Even groups closely aligned in ideology, purpose, and stated goals offer 
significant programmatic differences, enough so to make most generalizations risky. 
 Taken to a more fundamental level, however, by conceptually aligning 
terrorist groups – and other agents with which they interact – with living organisms, 
allows the analysis to focus on universally shared dynamical processes inherent in the 
system of interactions. All terrorist groups, regardless of goal, locality, or ideological 
orientation share certain survival-oriented objectives. Each, in its own way, realizes 
the prospects of success are exceptionally slim, if they exist at all, if the organization 
cannot continue to function over time. Regardless of the degree to which it is 
consciously recognized by group leaders, all terrorist groups plan and act in ways 




Maximizing Robustness in the Face of an Ill-Defined Future 
 
 Similarly, most, if not all, terrorist groups engage in an organizational 
“reproductive process.” They propagandize and recruit, all in an effort to increase 
their numbers and influence in society. Their opponents, in turn, focus their efforts on 
programs designed to both mitigate the terrorists’ recruiting efforts and to reduce the 
group’s size and effectiveness. Arrests, deaths, woundings, and increased legal 
pressures inhibit and at times destroy the terrorists’ operational viability by forcing 
the group to expend a greater share of its available resources on basic organizational 
preservation activities. With less time and fewer resources available for growth-
promoting efforts, including violence intended to influence and inspire, a terrorist 
group on the defensive tends to find itself struggling simply to survive (Oots 1989: 
144; Sluka 1989: 65; Silke 2000:77-79). 
 To enhance survival prospects, even when enjoying operational advantage, 
terrorist groups tend to devote considerable time and energy to recruiting, 
propagandizing, and other reproductive activities designed to enhance the group’s 
standing and influence as well as to boost member morale and ensure organizational 
longevity. Leaders of terrorist groups realize achievement of their goals and 
objectives will take considerable time, especially given the counter-actions 
undertaken by the group’s opponents. Ensuring group survival through generational 
change, then, holds an important place in the overall ordering of group objectives. 
 Terrorist groups seek to “reproduce” through persuading potential 
sympathizers in society to support the group’s efforts and by persuading the more 
 18 
 
impassioned and daring among those sympathizers to act on their sympathies and join 
the group. Increasing organizational membership, either by application and initiation 
or by developing a cadre of individuals capable of replacing lost members as needed, 
serves as the terrorist’s “reproductive” process. Associated activities designed to 
make the larger societal environment more amenable to the terrorist group’s 
objectives also serve as part of the group’s reproductive effort in that such 
environmental modification makes reproductive efforts easier. The persuasive efforts, 
both violent and non-violent, target multiple audiences. The most apparent, the 
victims, are often characterized by the terrorist as somehow warranting punishment 
for some real or perceived transgression of their own or of others, for whom they 
serve as a surrogate representative (Drake 1998b: 57). The compliment, however, is 
that terrorist often sees some other collection of individuals as allies, would-be allies, 
or having some natural affinity or kinship. While the group’s ideological frames of 
reference and rhetoric seek to rationalize and justify violence against the “enemy”, 
messages intended for allies, allies-to-be, and presumed affinity groups – what Taylor 
and Horgan (2001, 2006) refer to as the terrorist’s supportive environment – seek to 
establish shared purpose and common cause. This being the case, a “successfully 
reproductive” terrorist group would be expected to show higher degrees of 
consistency between ideology and rhetoric, on the one hand, and target and weapon 
selection, on the other, such that the presumed allied or affinity group finds reason to 
support the terrorist’s activities. The degree to which a terrorist group can establish 
and maintain clear cohesion and correspondence between rhetoric and action, and the 
degree to which they can establish and maintain congruence between rhetoric, action, 
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and audience wants and expectations, the greater the likelihood the terrorist group 
will find success in its reproductive efforts.  
 
Resolving the Dilemma 
 
 If the current state of terrorist research is less than optimal for making 
insightful progress, what might be done to shift perspective? How are we to overcome 
the limitations imposed by the current reductionist, linear, zero-sum approach? The 
approach taken here is to attempt to overcome those limitations by redefining 
terrorism as a complex adaptive system. This approach allows for the integration of 
agent interaction, positive feedback loops, and emergence into a model of a system 
that exhibits continuous evolutionary change.15
                                                 






Chapter 2: Interpretations of Terrorism: A Literature Review 
 Despite the tremendous volume of literature on terrorism and terrorists, little 
work has been done directly addressing either the evolution of terrorist groups or the 
relationship between terrorist groups and their presumed audiences.  Studies focusing 
on organization history, structure, hierarchy, ideology, or activities of specific groups 
frequently offer considerable detail, but their scope rarely extends beyond a very 
narrow organization-specific treatment (see, for example, Dartnell’s 1990 
examination of France’s Action Directe; Kassimeris’s 2001 work on Greece’s 
November 17; Bell’s 2000 work on the Irish Republican Army; and Gunaratra’s 2002 
work on al-Qaida, among others). A few scholars have offered comparative studies of 
a selective, limited number of groups (for example, McClintock 1998; Alexander and 
Pluchinsky 1992a and 1992b), but retain significant focus on the structural and 
organizational aspects of those groups selected for study. A large portion of the 
literature appearing after the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and 
Washington similarly focus on al-Qaida and associated and similar groups, yet even 
as this body of work has evolved toward examinations of a loosely defined jihadi 
movement, focus remains severely constrained. Where the literature on terrorism 
treats evolutionary themes or life cycles of terrorist groups, overwhelming emphasis 
remains firmly fixed on structural and operational themes, such as the presumed 




 This body of work, as important as it is, leaves significant gaps in 
understanding the evolutionary dynamics of terrorism. How terrorist groups recruit, 
grow, expand, and adapt to their environment, environmental stressors, and the 
actions of their adversaries remain in large part ignored by students of terrorism. 
There are, however, a few notable exceptions but these works still tend to address the 
growth and development of insurgent groups, like that of McCormick and Giordano 
(2007), focusing almost exclusively on how insurgents address their own persistent 
free-rider and collective action problems16
                                                 
16 The free-rider problem is essentially one of fairness (or perceived fairness), in which the 
issue revolves around concerns that an actor consumes more than its fair share of a given resource or 
shoulders less than its fair share of an associated burden. The collective action problem concerns the 
provision of public goods through collaborative efforts and the impact of external factors on those 
actors. For the terrorist or insurgent group the free-rider and collective action problems, combined, 
yield a question in sharing in benefits of group membership – assuming goals are achieved – without 
sharing an equal degree of risk stemming from active membership in an armed extra-legal group. 
 through growth and retention strategies. 
The inquiry arena for these studies, as a result, lies not in the interactive dynamics 
between the group and its presumed constituency or audience, but rather on the group 
itself and its internal decision-making and problem solving processes. Those times the 
literature ventures towards group-audience interaction are generally limited to studies 
biased by an underlying perceptual and interpretive frame that can only see that 
interaction in terms of media manipulation, structural change, or propaganda. Where 
the literature does examine the role of dialogue between a terrorist organization and 
its constituency, whether real or presumed, it typically remains limited to 
considerations of recruiting (Weimann 1987 and 2006 and others), hostile attempts to 
manipulate opponents’ perceptions and will (Leeman 1991), or the benefit and 
efficacy of claiming responsibility for violent acts (B. Hoffman 1997; Rapoport 1997; 
and Pluchinsky 1997). 
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 The present effort seeks to expand treatment of terrorist communicative 
activities by explicitly focusing on the terrorists’ use of words and deeds in an effort 
to build and maintain a supportive audience. It further seeks to use that dynamic to 
assess the potential for organizational evolution, whether growth, decline, or 
stagnation. Not all terrorist groups find sufficient support within and among their 
target audience, despite the necessity of generating and maintaining some minimal 
level of support. Failure in this effort is believed to offer significant detrimental 
effects to the group’s ability to maintain operational viability over time. In one 
respect, “the history of terrorism is,” notes Abrahms (2005:536), “the history of 
miscommunication, with many groups understanding the need for effective 
communication with an audience but nevertheless unable to develop and implement a 
workable communications strategy.” The Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), for 
example, terrorized California in the early to mid-1970’s, culminating most notably in 
the abduction and assimilation of newspaper heiress Patricia Hearst and the shootout 
with members of the Los Angeles Police Department, which effectively ended the 
group’s operational existence. The SLA failed miserably in efforts to attract new 
members in sufficient numbers to keep pace with their own ambitions, the effective 
countermeasures of law enforcement authorities, and attrition stemming from 
members going further underground. As a result, the SLA had a relatively brief, if 
eventful, lifespan. Germany’s Red Army Faction (RAF), in contrast, offered a vision 
and ideology in some ways quite similar to that of the SLA, yet it was able to 
maintain operational viability for 30 years. Unlike the SLA, the RAF did not suffer 
ultimate defeat because of government action; rather, the end came when RAF 
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leaders concluded the German public was too intellectually stunted to understand and 
accept their proper role and responsibility in accordance with Marxist thought (Red 
Army Faction 1998). The lesson of communication’s importance is not lost on most 
terrorist groups.17
 The SLA and RAF offer but two examples of the variability of possible 
evolutionary outcomes for terrorist groups. Both operated in liberal Western 
democracies during the same period. Both groups claimed a Marxist-Leninist 
ideology that, on closer examination, appeared more anarchist than orthodox Marxist. 
Both claimed to seek the destruction of the capitalist system of exploitation that they 
saw operating in their country and in the West, and both faced state authorities well 
versed and capable in counter-terrorism and law enforcement. Yet one of the groups – 
the RAF – survived over an extended period despite active (and effective) state 
opposition and, by some measures, prospered, while the other group enjoyed only a 
very brief operational existence. Other than pointing out arguably minor differences 
in law enforcement capabilities and in social, cultural, and political environments, the 
literature on terrorism offers no real explanation for the differences. 
 Even religiously inspired terrorists recognize the operational 
importance of effective communications with a temporal, earthly audience. In 
November 2001, Osama bin Laden clearly indicated the 11 September attacks were 
“speeches” designed to relay messages to an intended audience (see Weimann 2006: 
39-40). 
 More recent contributions to the literature suggest the origins some 
differences may lie in the ideological groundings of the groups themselves. A wave of 
                                                 
17 The Weathermen, a violent offshoot of the Students for a Democratic Society, for example, 
noted that “Armed actions forward people’s consciousness . . . yet they must be clearly understandable 
to the people.” Quoted in Abrahms (2005: 536).  
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research on terrorist group motivations emphasizes the presumed religious imperative 
and suggests that religiously-inspired groups are fundamentally different from secular 
groups (see, for example, B. Hoffman 1995 and 1997; Laqueur 1999; and Stern 
1999), implying that those differences are so basic and so ingrained that the 
“religious” terrorist and the secular terrorist could be considered unique archetypes. 
Those supporting such a notion suggest that the ideological differences are so 
fundamental as to make meaningful comparisons no better than cursory ones. Yet a 
closer examination offers a series of quite similar evolutionary patterns, independent 
of group ideological influence. Others have questioned the religious-secular 
dichotomy, arguing that a more meaningful explanation of observed changes lies in a 
cyclic, or wave, pattern of type ascendency (Rapoport 2002), that the differences are 
more applicable in tactical and operational decision making (Rapoport 1977 and 
2001c), or more meaningful in understanding the terrorist perspective (Bell 1998; 
Taylor and Horgan 2001 and 2006; and Gressang 2000 and 2001). 
Evolutionary Literature 
 
 The literature on terrorism offers tremendous detail and considerable depth, 
but does so by addressing very small, select slices of the larger phenomenon. On 
some of the more easily understood aspects, like group histories and structures, the 
literature’s offerings can be overwhelming in their scope and breadth. Very few, if 
any, modern terrorist groups have been overlooked or ignored in the literature, and 
for some of the major groups like the Irish Republican Army, the Palestinian 
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Liberation Organization and its constituent groups,18
 That literature’s vast number of offerings, however, share remarkable 
similarities in their limitations. Most are reductionist, taking small, selected aspects of 
the phenomenon, its participants, its environment, or its impact, and examining each 
in isolation. The result is a body of literature remarkable for its ability to both address 
the minutiae of terrorism and miss the phenomenon’s interactive dynamics. The 
literature is also remarkable for its insistence on emphasizing temporal aspects. 
Terrorism studies address pre-modern groups, or modern groups, or 1970s leftist and 
anarchist groups, or jihadi groups of the past 20 years, but rarely look beyond and 
single type or era. As a result, very few offerings provide long-term contextual 
perspectives that could allow for a more nuanced understanding of origination 
factors.
 and, more recently al Qaida, 
hundreds, if not thousands, of offerings are available. Similarly, more contentious 
issues also generate a tremendous volume of literature, also running into the 
thousands. The debate over the potential for terrorist use of weapons of mass 
destruction, the role of informing group perspectives and decisions, the 
appropriateness of various counter- and anti-terrorism strategies, and the nature and 
causes of terrorism are clear examples of issues dominating significant portions of the 
terrorism literature. 
19
                                                 
18 Contrary to popular belief, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is an umbrella 
organization for a number of Palestinian groups spanning the ideological spectrum. Yasir Arafat, the 
man most associated with the PLO, owed his position and status to his leadership of al-Fatah, the 
dominant PLO constituent organization.  
 Because it is easier to conceptualize, gather data, and analyze the more 
19 Origination factors are those unique combinations of structure, environment, socio-political 
conditions, institutions, and actions identified as precursors to the emergence of an armed militant 
group. Considering origination factors, rather than causal factors, is preferred since causality cannot be 




concrete and more reducible aspects of terrorism, the literature also tends heavily 
towards the tangible. In the drive to explain terrorism, commonality is consequently 
elevated to a position of preeminence, leading to treatments that often disregard, 
ignore, overlook, or simply not consider unique cultural, emotional, and social 
aspects of terrorist group evolution. 
 Even when the literature tentatively seeks to address larger dynamical 
processes, cultural underpinnings, and interactive processes, results tend to be limited 
to classification, sorting, and generalization. In the sub-literature on terrorism’s 
communicative aspects, for example, focus remains limited to a small set of carefully 
parsed and delineated topics. A large portion of this literature points in various ways 
to analytic isolation of terrorist communications, where the authors seek to identify 
critical elements in dialogue that might offer clues of future group decisions and 
actions. Peter Suedfeld and Dana Leighton’s (2002) work on integrative complexity, 
leadership interpretations of environmental and situational factors, and the way in 
which each informs subsequent communicative signaling of decision-making, is a 
clear example. Similarly, Leonard Weinberg and Louise Richardson (2004) apply a 
conflict theory framework to link perceived adversarial strength and position to 
willingness to de-escalate, bargain, and negotiate. Others focus on the interpretation 
of specific messages, leading some to allow their own perceptual biases to creep into 
the assessments.20
                                                 
20 Yoram Schweitzer, quoted in Weimann (2006: 46), argues that “bin Laden typically selects 
a few historical incidents, takes them out of their context and twists their significance, and uses them 
as a rational and moral pretext. …”  
 Indeed, there is relatively little analysis of the language used by 
terrorists and their adversaries, and what little there is has been of a limited, largely 
descriptive nature (Wilson and Rose 1997:  54-56). Still others use the writings of 
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terrorists to turn analysis inward, leading to interpretive social constructs of the terms 
terrorism and terrorist (Fortin 1989 and Tuman 2003). A larger literature has been 
written on terrorist communications, but this literature treats communications as a 
mechanism of terror and offers little insight into whether that communication is 
effective and, if so, how and why. 
The Nature of Terrorism 
 
 Terrorism is a complex, highly fluid phenomenon that defies easy description 
and categorization. In an effort to understand it, however, the literature endeavors to 
classify terrorism as belonging to one type or another, allowing for both easier 
application of an understandable frame of reference and for application of and 
interpretation by accepted generalities. Terrorism has been studied, consequently, 
from multicausal, political, organizational, economic, socio-cultural, physiological, 
and psychological points of view.21
 For many authors, terrorism is a violent manifestation of behavioral 
tendencies, most notably goal-seeking behavior. One of the earliest, and arguably 
most influential, of such arguments is Martha Crenshaw’s (1985) exploration of 
terrorist motivations and decision-making. In this view, terrorist activity offers 
 Other fruitful approaches have focused on intra-
group dynamics and the interplay between opposing tendencies in group decision-
making, first demonstrated by Bion (1961), or on the internal group psychological 
climate, building on a foundation laid by Zawodny (1978). The resulting behaviorally 
oriented studies of terrorism are as instructive for what they offer as for what they 
leave out.  
                                                 




predictable patterns, which can be used to explain broad ranges of observed and 
inferred behaviors, trends in terrorist activities, and the specifics of attack activities. 
Within this broadly delineated interpretive perspective, the rational actor model 
achieved prominence as a framework for assessing and interpreting terrorism. 
Predicated on the notion that terrorists can, and probably do, weigh relative costs and 
benefits in ways designed to achieve some maximum utility, as defined by the 
terrorist, the application of the rational actor model has afforded scholars the 
opportunity to offer in-depth descriptions, insights, and explanations of terrorist 
activities. The “rational” terrorist has thus been shown to be quite responsive to 
incentives (Ginges 1997), to be amenable to considerations of alternative incentives 
when the preferred incentive was deemed unattainable (Islami and Shahin 2001), 
subject to deterrence when properly designed and applied (Sandler, Tschirhart, and 
Cauley 1983), to act in accordance with a definable cost-benefit calculus (Enders and 
Sandler 1999), and shown to act in accordance with predetermined goals and 
expected outcomes despite the apparent illogic of their acts (Rapoport 1984, Sprinzak 
2000b, and Hoffman and McCormick 2004). Other applications of a rational actor 
model have explored the interplay between rationality, norms, and conflict (Hafez 
2006), used the rational actor model in game theoretic and virtual reality simulations 
(Weaver, Silverman, Shin, and Dubois 2001), and modeled terrorist behavior in 
hostage incidents (M. Wilson 2000). Some scholars, however, like Chai (1993), have 
argued that the rational actor approach cannot be extended from state to sub-state and 
non-state actors, at least in the ways necessary to explain terrorism. The more 
prevalent view, however, holds that the rational actor model can be effectively 
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adapted to the realities of terrorism, at least to the extent that it allows for reasonable 
interpretation of low-level politically- and ideologically-driven violence. Caplan 
(2006), for example, argues that efforts to discard the rational actor model in 
terrorism studies are premature since terror represents a form of purposive behavior. 
The rational actor model of terrorism thus provides a useful and conceptually handy 
paradigm from which seemingly non-sensical behaviors can be explained. Much of 
the literature on suicide bombings (see, for example, Merari 2007; Juergensmeyer 
1997, 2000a, and 2000b, and others) adheres to the notion of rationally acting 
terrorists. 
 Others, however, continue to deny, denigrate, or disregard the notion that 
terrorists – particularly suicide bombers – can somehow be deemed rational. A large 
body of literature has consequently focused on psychological and/or spiritual aspects 
of actual, claimed, or presumed motivations of terrorists. For some, the question is 
not one of rationality or irrationality, but one of the psychological processes 
associated with involvement in terrorism. Horgan (2008), for example, outlines three 
predominant psychological processes – becoming involved, being involved, and 
disengagement – associated with terrorism involvement. Others, such as Khashan 
(2003) and Peleg (1997), see the interplay of frustration, grievance, situation, and 
belief as keys to understanding why some choose to join terrorist groups and why 
those groups choose to engage in violence. Still others, most notably Post (1984, 
1990, and 2000), Turco (1987), and Stern (1999), see the pernicious effects of mental 
illness and psychological maladjustment as the critical defining factors for explaining 
terrorist behavior. Similarly, numerous authors focus on ideologies and beliefs, 
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particularly religion, as critical motivating and driving factors. These authors offer 
perhaps the most widely varied set of assumptions and conclusions within a single 
interpretive framework. Scholars such as David Rapoport (1984, 1990, and 2002) and 
Taylor and Horgan (2001 and 2006) see religion as an operative and interpretive 
framework which colors the terrorists’ interpretation of the world, the motives which 
guide and inform his actions and the decisions he makes, from the strategic to the 
most mundane. For a majority of others (see, for example, Gavin Cameron 1999; 
Hudson et. al. 1999; B. Hoffman 1995; Pearce 2005; and Laqueur 1999) the 
religiously motivated terrorist is separate and quite distinct from his secular 
counterparts. This “new” terrorist is, as a result of religious beliefs and motivations, 
presumed to be more fanatical, more acceptant of mass casualties, less likely to 
accept responsibilities for his actions (transferring responsibility to whatever deity 
that is believed to be directing his actions), and more amenable to the use of weapons 
of mass destruction. While there is sufficient research suggesting greater intractability 
in conflicts involving religious differences (see, for example, Ellingsen 2005), 
significant doubts remain about the existence of modern terrorists with purely 
religious motivations.22
 The literature on terrorism in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks 
on New York and Washington shows an abrupt shift in emphasis, focusing more 
recently on counteraction, counter-strategy, and outcomes. Some authors have 
retained some of the more abstract aspects of pre-9/11inquiry, such as Andrews and 
 
                                                 
22 This is an on-going debate, much of which is tied to the question of whether or not terrorists 
will again use weapons of mass destruction. As a number of authors have pointed out, most modern 
terrorist labeled “religiously motivated” actually have a significant secular purpose and goal set. See, 
for example, Sprinzak (1998 and 2000b), Rapoport (1984 and 2002), and Gressang (2001).  
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Lewis’s (2004) discussion of complexity-based counter-terrorism ethics and Ginges, 
et. al’s. (2007) examination of religious values on reasoning, decision-making, and 
the consideration of material inducements to behavioral change.  Others have 
explored potential counter-terrorism strategies and tactics by designing and running 
simulations and models (for example, Jacobson and Kaplan 2007 and Ulmer, 
Sellnow, and Seegar 2006). The impact of the 9/11 attacks, as well as subsequent 
mass casualty attacks attributed to al Qaeda and its allies, coupled with the U.S. 
government’s “Global War on Terrorism,” has quite possibly triggered a fundamental 
shift in the literature culminating in an overwhelming number of offerings seeking to 
address tangible aspects of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism. There has been, as a 
result, no shortage of contributions offering solutions across a range of activities, 
from effective leveraging of expertise by organizational design (Sullivan 2005, 
Gressang and Baxter 2005), improved crisis command and control (Stephenson and 
Bonabeau 2007), systems engineering (Hari, Cropley, and Zonnenshain 2005), 
improved and expanded network security (Settings 2001), improved communications 
infrastructure, organization, or operations (Corman, Trethewey, and Goodall 2007; 
Boscarino, Adams, et. al. 2006; Freedman 2005; Kapucu 2006; Wray, Rivers, et. al. 
2006), or in more nuanced and effective data mining of open sources (Memon, Hicks, 
and Larsen 2007; and the Dark Web Project 2008). 
 Despite the apparent shift in literature focus, at its most fundamental level, 
terrorism is still subjected to a reductionist perspective. Despite the advances in the 
fields of network analysis and complexity, where focus shifts from the component 
pieces of a system to the interactions and relationships between those pieces, most 
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writings on terrorism continue time-honored traditions of deconstructing the 
phenomenon to individual agents and singular aspects of terrorism. Causal analysis of 
terrorism, for example, centers around efforts to explain why some people become or 
support terrorists (see Post, Ruby, and Shaw 2000), factors leading to increased small 
group radicalism, psychological factors, the factors that “cause” terrorism, and the 
tangible aspects of effectively countering the terrorist, as noted above. Unfortunately, 
as Victoroff (2005) notes, all psychological studies of terrorists are inherently 
speculative, since each must rely on subjective observational interpretations. As a 
result, he notes, we lack an understanding of terrorism’s heterogeneity. It is fair to 
say, the same generally holds for much of the rest of the terrorism literature.  
 Much of the reason for this is that the bulk of terrorism literature focuses on 
the individual terrorist, potential terrorist, or terrorism supporter. Examinations of the 
terrorist’s psychological make-up have provided and deep and rich body of literature 
over the last four decades. Pioneers in this field, such as Post (1987 and 1990), Lipset 
and Raab (1970), Gurr (1970), J.C. Davies (1962), Billing (1978), Peleg (1997), and 
Ferracuti (1982) have collectively offered a extraordinarily nuanced portrait of the 
terrorist mindset. Others have sought psychological explanations for the individual’s 
gravitation towards terrorism, leading in at least one instance to authorities 
conducting post-mortem examinations of terrorists’ brains (see P. Finn 2002). 
Explanations of terrorism thus include unrequited grievances and relative deprivation 
(Russett 1964, Gurr 1970, and Muller and Seligson 1987), assumptions of negative 
identity (Knutson 1981), narcissistic rage (Post 1984;  Crayton 1983; and Pearlstein 
1991), cultural impact on personality (Ferracuti 1982), mental illness or psychological 
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deficiencies (Post 1990), and “agitated tissue response” to stress (Hubbard 1983). 
Despite the literature offering physiological and psychological explanations of 
terrorism, there remain very broad and significant gaps in understanding – especially 
given the individual-centric approach adopted by most – leading to the continued 
emphasis on terrorists’ mental make-up and processes (see R. White 2000) or the 
rejection of psychological explanations, since these can be interpreted as absolving 
the terrorist of responsibility for his acts (Heskin 1984; Crenshaw 1981; Taylor 1988; 
and Spinzak 1990 and 2000a, among others). 
 Other contributions to the literature have moved analysis beyond the 
individual-as-self-contained system to include consideration of the transformative 
nature of life experiences (Duncan 1999), the cultural and social impact of terrorism 
(Oots and Wiegele 1985), the impact of culture on potential terrorists (Post, Ruby, 
and Shaw 2000), and the effect of social conditions on terrorist decision making (Ga. 
Cameron 1999). Duncan (1999) builds on earlier works on collective action group 
formation, suggesting the impact of disruptive events, particularly when coupled with 
an awareness of social stratum standing, helps determine a propensity toward 
activism. Muhlberger (2000) takes a similar approach when suggesting that the 
relative lack of sophistication in moral reasoning among the economically and 
socially disadvantaged makes them more easily mobilized into social movements. 
Mousseau (2002) sees the greater impact of globalization and its effect on the 
individual, arguing that terrorism is not so much rooted in poverty as it is in the 
beliefs and values arising in developing countries’ mixed economies as driven by 
globalization forces, which act to disrupt the traditional stability of location-specific 
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social and economic structures.  From a slightly different perspective, Feldman 
(2003) finds that support for counter-terrorism efforts reflects a complex interplay 
between actors rooted in perceptions of social conformity standards. Here, the degree 
to which those standards are challenged shapes the degree to which the affected 
public is willing to accept restrictions on civil liberties. To Taylor and Horgan (2001), 
ideology and rule-following behavior, within a social context, are intimately linked 
with contingency-controlled behavior and its tolerance and acceptance of deferred 
reward associated with religiously motivated terrorists. Sprinzak (2000a) also saw a 
dynamic process between individual, society, and group and developed a blend of 
factors specific to the organization, stemming from its interaction with society, to 
provide early warning of the transition from non-violent radicalism to violent terrorist 
group. 
 With the typical focus on individual motivations, one of the preeminent 
scholars in the field, Crenshaw (2000:409) deemed it appropriate to remind us that 
“[o]ne of the basic research findings of the field is that terrorism is primarily a group 
activity. It is typically not the result of psychopathology or a single personality type.” 
Nevertheless, when examinations of terrorism are elevated to the group level of 
analysis, the terrorist group is most often treated as a single, unitary actor. Decisions, 
acts, and behaviors are addressed as functions of the group, rather than as the 
outcome of some complex intra-group process. Observable outcomes, then, are not 
considered potentially variable, given the uncertainties of intra-group decision-
making dynamics. Any dissention, disagreement, discussion, or compromise within 
the group decision-making process is thus disregarded from the onset, despite the fact 
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that intra-group dynamics can have a significant impact on subsequent actions. In 
early studies, Oots (1986 and 1989) chose to see terrorist groups as a type of political 
interest group, with organizational considerations affecting group formation, activity, 
and decline. Applying individually-focused explanations to a collective further 
expanded the knowledge of terrorism, with Crenshaw (1990a: 9) asserting that an 
advantage “of approaching as a collectively rational strategic choice is that it permits 
the construction of a standard form from which deviations can be measured.” While 
such an understanding certainly allows for the recognition of new developments and 
adaptations, it does little for increasing understanding of the complex interplay of 
factors that push the phenomenon in one direction or another. Nevertheless, Gupta 
(2005), among others, seeks an integrative model by expanding rational choice theory 
to incorporate group motivations. Among more recent contributions, Crelinsten 
(2002) has perhaps done more to break the bonds of reductionist, unitary actor 
thinking in building a model of terrorism as political communication. His model 
focuses its analysis on a dynamic relationship, albeit between two unitary actors, the 
“controller” (i.e., state authorities) and the “controlled” (i.e., the sub-state protest 
group). Placing the terrorist-audience-adversary dynamic into such limited terms 
consequently focuses analysis into a zero-sum perspective in which gains by one 
equal losses by the other, that does not adequately capture or describe the 
phenomenon. 
Terrorism as a Dynamical System 
 
 Surveying the literature on political violence, in general, and terrorism, in 
particular, suggests the field either has reached or is very quickly approaching a 
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crossroads where scholars will have to re-examine many assumptions that have come 
to form the foundation of terrorism studies. One of the most basic assumptions 
subject to such re-examination is the pragmatic lens through which terrorism is 
studied. Is terrorism an unusual and generally unexpected anomaly in an otherwise 
largely ordered and stable system, or is the very ambiguity and uncertainty of 
terrorism indicative of a deeper, less understood systemic character? Does terrorism 
represent a sporadic variance in a reciprocating system where total losses equal total 
gains, or does it point to a more inherently unstable system driven by positive and 
negative feedback mechanisms arising from both endogenous and exogenous 
sources? Is social and political evolution, the context in which terrorism takes place, 
linear, or is it non-linear and less predictable than is typically thought? To this point, 
most of the literature ignores the possibility that terrorism embodies, not just 
represents, the non-linear, the uncertain, and the unpredictable.  
 Forty years ago, Barton (1968) challenged the social science community to 
recognize the limitations inherent in randomly sampling a human population, then 
seeking to generalize the beliefs and belief-driven behavior to a larger population: 
 
For the last thirty years, empirical social research has been dominated by the 
sample survey. But as usually practiced, using random sampling of 
individuals, the survey is a sociological meatgrinder, tearing the individual 
from his social context and guaranteeing that nobody in the study interacts 
with anyone else in it. It is a little like a biologist putting his experimental 
animals through a hamburger machine and looking at every hundredth cell 
through a microscope; anatomy and physiology get lost, structure and function 
disappear, and one is left with cell biology . . . . If our aim is to understand 
people’s behavior rather than simply to record it, we want to know about 
primary groups, neighborhoods, organizations, social circles, and 
communities; about interaction, communication, role expectations, and social 




Much progress has been made since 1968 to address Barton’s concerns, but few 
studies seem to have succeeded in moving beyond the constraints of a linear 
perspective. Linearity, and its close relative, simple cause-and-effect, remain the 
bedrock upon which much research continues to rest. Linear systems are relatively 
simple, easily comprehensible, easily modeled, and offer verifiable and reproducible 
results. Over the past few decades, however, new sciences developed primarily in the 
fields of biology and physics, have begun to claim a greater share of attention and 
have seen initial efforts, often tentative, to apply each to the social sciences.  These 
new fields, chaos and complexity in particular, may represent the future of social 
sciences inquiry. 
 There has been tremendous growth in the chaos and complexity literatures, 
leaving some to marvel at how cautious and uncertain efforts to apply each to the 
social sciences have been (Harvey and Reed 1997). Much of the tentativeness stems 
from the perceptual differences inherent in chaos and complexity. In sharp contrast to 
linear models, those built on chaos and complexity demand that instability and 
disorder remain essential elements of the system (Elliott and Kiel 1997), rather than 
marginalized as either randomness or error. This need to include instability and 
uncertainty as essential and inseparable elements of the system, required by the very 
interaction of system components, drives the resulting non-linear models away from 
the comfort of outcome predictability and replicatability (see Campbell and Mayer-
Kress 1997; Harvey and Reed 1997). Successful application of complex systems 
lessons also suggests the need to focus attention on the organizational level, rather 
than on the individual or state levels, since it is, in Fellman and Wright’s (2003: 3) 
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words, “a non-linear dynamical system characterized by a low-order chaotic 
attractor” exhibiting regularities but not periodicity. Terrorism, consequently, is not 
truly random despite appearances. 
 Even with non-linearity’s demands and the discomfort inherent instability and 
uncertainty appear to cause, a growing number of scholars have recognized social and 
political systems as dynamic, non-linear systems for which chaos and complexity 
offer more accurate modeling concepts than earlier linear, game-theoretic approaches. 
Chaos and chaotic models have been used to explore a growing number of system-
level questions. Diana Richards (1993), for example, uses the lessons of chaos to test 
for the presence of cyclic patterns in the concentration and distribution of 
international power, finding the system is chaotic rather than cyclic, with an 
underlying power transfer order producing non-determinant patterns over time. Such 
findings, according to Richards, suggest that depending on existing system 
conditions, multipolarity, bipolarity, and hegemony can all be stable configurations. 
Others have used the lessons of non-linear dynamics, chaos, and complexity to 
examine network technologies and their use in counter-terrorism command and 
control (Don, Frelinger, et. al. 2007), nation-state development and dissolution 
(Cederman 1997), terrorist attack frequencies and their scale-invariant characteristics 
(Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch 2007), differences between individual Islamist 
militants and the transnational Islamist militant phenomenon (Harrow 2008), 
intergovernmental relations (Comfort 2002), counter-terrorism structure and 
organization (Beech 2004 and Taipale 2005), complexity and predictability in 
international relations (Saperstein 1997), general political science applications 
 39 
 
(Harvey and Reed 1997), agent-based modeling of public policy development (Elliott 
and Kiel 2003), and rule-following among violent Islamists (Taylor and Horgan 
2001). Others have applied the same lessons and insights in a more focused way. 
Ahmed, Elgazzer, and Hegazi (2005), for example, apply complex adaptive systems 
lessons using a game theoretic approach to conclude terrorism is flexible and 
adaptable, mirroring the argument offered by Enders and Su (2007) that rational 
terrorists will challenge organizational and activity levels to adapt to adversarial 
counter-actions. 
 The potential for applying chaos and complexity to violent conflict studies, 
including terrorism, has been recognized, but not yet fully explored. Stohl and Stohl 
(2002) argue appropriate applications can generate new and useful insights on the 
ways terrorist groups are organized, offer valuable critiques of anti- and counter-
terrorist policies, and can help open new and more productive research avenues. 
Unfortunately, few have sought to use the new sciences of chaos and complexity to 
explore the dynamics of terrorism. One who has, Cetina (2005), argues that the new 
terrorist organization, the truly transnational organization of global reach, rises from 
global microstructures23
                                                 
23 Cetina defines global microstructures as “structures of connectivity and integration that are 
global in scope but micro-sociological in character,” with four defining characteristics: 1) lightness, or 
bottom-up organizational structures that are not tied to formal institutional processes; 2) microstructure 
effectiveness despite their non-conformance with rationalized systems, largely due to feedback 
mechanisms that exploit proportionalities between input and output; 3) scale-free with external 
influences and environment adding fundamentally important “texture” and depth, and; 4) they evolve 
to more effectively deal with structural and environmental irritants. See Cetina (2005:215-217).  
 whose scopic mechanism creates a transcendent time and 
context by serving as a mirroring device (Cetina 2005: 222). In effect, Cetina argues 
that al Qaeda, as the exemplar of the new terrorism, is not a mere network as others 
have characterized it, but that it has evolved into something more by virtue of its 
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creation of reality rather than simply mirroring and projecting an already existing 
reality. A closer examination of this argument shows incremental progress in 
adopting and applying complexity, building a greater depth of explanation than has 
been offered before (see, for example, Bell 1998 for an earlier application) rather than 
offering a more meaningful breakthrough. 
 One of the more promising avenues for incorporating the lessons of 
complexity and related sciences lies in exploring aspects of emergence as they apply 
to the beginnings, growth, evolution, and decline of terrorist groups. Emergence, a 
hallmark of complex systems is, in Steven Johnson’s (2002: 18) words, “the 
movement from low-level rules to hyper-level sophistication,” where the interaction 
between neighbors in the system is reciprocal, providing feedback to the system for 
growth and self-replication. Emergent systems are rule-governed systems; it is this set 
of rules that determines parameters of agent behavior and which provide regulatory 
feedback. Without parameter-defining rules, the system would cease functioning due 
to the resultant overwhelming positive feedback that would drive the system toward 
either true chaos or functional gridlock. 
As such, emergent properties are found at the micro and macro levels, or as 
Halley and Winkler (2008) assert: 
 
 Emergence is a phenomenon that can exist across many scales of 
organization. . . . It is therefore possible to envision a continuum of emergence 
spanning these scales, ranging from the simplest phenomenon that can be 
considered emergent to the most complex and esoteric processes in existence. 
(Halley and Winkler 2008:11) 
 
 Building on an understanding and appreciation of emergence, among many 
other insights and traditions, scholars of networks, particularly those engaged in 
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social network analysis and dynamic network analysis, have laid the necessary 
groundwork for advances in understanding terrorist group evolution. Using a 
perceptual and analytic framework borne of complexity science, the literature on 
social network analysis, dynamic network analysis, and netwar24
 The sense that terrorist change and adaptation, particularly in organizational 
structure, is exclusively dependent on a series of actions initiated and directed by a 
group’s opponents nevertheless remains, denying the possibility of change resulting 
from the terrorist group’s own initiative, defining group evolution solely in terms of 
action-reaction dynamics and external stimuli. Lost in this perspective is the sense 
that terrorist groups, as functional entities, can and do initiate change, consciously 
and unconsciously, for their own purposes. Social network analysis studies, on the 
other hand, recognize the importance of relationships between and among entities in a 
 offers viable 
avenues for developing a deeper appreciation of the newer, non-hierarchical terrorist 
organization. The newer organizational schemes employed by terrorist groups eschew 
more traditional hierarchical and cellular structures in favor of more fluid and 
adaptable polycentric networks of interactive semi-autonomous agents and associates. 
Largely unstated, but no less noteworthy, the evolutionary process leading to this shift 
suggests terrorist groups have adapted as their opponents’ capabilities for effective 
action have increased. Organizational evolution has consequently been portrayed as 
an adaptive reaction undertaken to enhance survivability, which it certainly is, yet the 
adaptive and evolutionary mechanisms remain unexamined. 
                                                 
24 According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999: 29) netwar is a situation in which “non-state 
actors employ networked rather than hierarchical organizational structure, relying on network forms of 
organization, doctrine, strategy, and communications to do battle in the information age.” 
 42 
 
system,25 focusing on relationships, the conditions under which they arise and 
change, and the consequences of both their existence and their evolution. In its 
consideration of the linkages between actors, or nodes, rather than considering the 
actors themselves, social network analysis uses a number of metrics to describe and 
evaluate the nature and strength of those relationships.26
 The social network analysis perspective has contributed a growing number of 
works describing the organizational and relational structures of terrorist 
organizations. Krebs (2002), for example, describes in detail the interactive patterns 
between 9/11 conspirators, showing both the central role of Mohammed Atta and the 
 Networks, however, are not 
all alike, leading Barabási (2002), Barabási and Albert (1999), and Barabási and 
Bonabeau (2003) to distinguish between random networks, in which the network 
consists of nodes randomly connected to others, and scale-free networks, in which 
there is an observable inequity in the distribution of linkages between nodes. In 
random networks, nodes tend to have roughly the same number of linkages, with 
distribution of linkages randomly determined. Scale-free networks, as their name 
implies, exhibit a much wider variance, with a significant proportion of linkages 
distributed among far fewer nodes, leading to the formation of hubs, with developed 
scale-free networks typically having several large hubs that define the topology of the 
network.  
                                                 
25 See Freeman (2004) for a detailed presentation of the history and development of the social 
network analysis field. Arising primarily from the sociological and anthropological disciplines, social 
network analysis is characterized by structural institutions that serve to link system actors, a reliance 
on graphic imagery, empiricism, and mathematical and computational models. 
26 Social network analysis metrics include betweenness (the extent to which a node is directly 
connected to other nodes), centrality (the number and extent of ties a node has to other nodes), 
centralization (extensiveness of connections, used to identify hubs), cohesion (strength of relationship 
linkages), and reach (the degree to which a given node can connect any other node in the network, used 
to determine extent to which a node may be isolated).  
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less-anticipated yet equally central role of Marwan al-Shehhi. Similarly, Fellman and 
Wright (2003) and Cetina (2005) have offered arguments in favor of using social 
network analysis for identifying and describing networks as the primary object of 
interest in current terrorism studies, while Houghton, et.al. (2006), like Krebs, offers a 
strong argument for using social network analysis to identify hubs and critical nodes 
and linkages in those networks. Goolsby (2006) examines al Qaeda’s evolution from 
a support organization for Afghan militants to a global terrorist threat to show such 
evolution resulted from selected endogenous and exogenous pressures rather than 
from random chance. Several, most notably Galam (2004), have tried to expand 
network analysis of terrorism to find a universal formula suitable for describing 
certain aspects of terrorism,27
                                                 
27 Galam (2004) uses Percolation Theory in an attempt to derive a “universal” formula for all 
percolation thresholds to explain spatial movement of extremists. Percolation Theory, as used by 
Galam, strives to explain the behavior of connected clusters in a network, here terrorists, identifying 
the conditions under which terrorists might physically “diffuse” through a defined spatial arena. Galam 
seeks to calculate a Galam-Mauger percolation threshold to describe the ease of diffusion in a society. 
For Galam, the greater the extent to which terrorists seek linkages in a population, the more interactive 
dimensions are present. Greater numbers of interaction dimensions, which Galam calls “flags,” equate 
to a lower Galam-Mauger percolation threshold, which in turn equates to a smaller percentage of the 
population needed as passive supporters for free percolation. In short, Galam argues that the more 
terrorists interact with a population, the more that group will be able to move through and among 
(percolate) that population, but does so without consideration of either interaction quality, which could 
be negative, or reciprocity.  
 but Galam’s ideas have met with considerable criticism 
(Wieman and Naor 2003). Other have turned the focus to internal group and network 
dynamics such as interpersonal influence within groups (Friedkin 2003), the impact 
of formal and informal social roles (Johnson, Palinkas, and Boster 2003), presence or 
absence of a relationship between degree distribution and network structural aspects 
(Snijders 2003), and polarization and self-organization of networks into antagonistic 
factions even without conscious direction or intent (Macy, Kitts, and Flache 2003). 
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 Taking the opposite approach, others have turned the analytic perspective 
outward, seeking to find effective applications of network analysis for counter-
terrorism. Kaempfer, Lowenberg, and Mertens (2005) address terrorism from an 
interest group perspective, examining the impact of violent acts on policy formulation 
and implementation as if those acts of violence were part of normal discourse. In such 
an examination, the object of analysis shifts away from the terrorist group to the 
group’s actions and treats those actions as inputs for a larger political interaction. 
While the possibility exists that such an approach could open avenues for analysis of 
the dynamical processes involved, most studies continue the tendency to fall back on 
agent-centric reductionist and mechanistic approaches. Matthew and Shambaugh 
(2005: 619), for example, envision scale-free networks not as something a terrorist 
group may be, but simply as a tool a terrorist group can use: “Because scale-free 
networks are easy to access and navigate, they are useful to terrorists in several ways. 
. . .” The resulting view is one of network-based terrorists and non-network based 
terrorists, leading Matthew and Shambaugh to assert that network utilization will 
require terrorist groups to become more centralized and hierarchical – a contradiction 
the authors are unable to avoid or resolve. 
 The literatures on complexity and networks are clear on the long-term survival 
needs of any network. Links between nodes must be continuously strengthened or 
reinforced, with unproductive links allowed to wither and fade. New nodes must be 
established or acquired, with sufficiently strong linkages established with pre-existing 
nodes. The network must continuously grow, adapt, and self-pare in order to remain 
healthy and functional. Given the existence of competing networks, the self-
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maintenance actions of growing, strengthening, and pruning are essential elements of 
an unstated survival strategy. The network must evolve. Static networks are absorbed 
by more aggressive and dynamic networks, wither away of their own accord, or are 
eliminated by stronger, more robust competing networks. It is the effective leveraging 
of emergence that provides the competitive organizational edge (see Halley and 
Winkler 2008:13). 
 The insights gained from viewing terrorism as a complex, adaptive, dynamical 
system raise important questions for understanding the process of terrorism. One of 
the most important questions involves the mechanisms by which terrorist groups 
grow, expand, and evolve. It seems intuitive that survival of the terrorist group rests, 
at least in part, on the extent to which the group can effectively counter personnel 
losses to adversarial action, attrition, and intra-group conflicts. Any number of studies 
answers this question by examining recruiting (Post 1984, 1987, 1990, and 2000 as 
well as Post, Ruby, and Shaw 2000), yet these studies fail to offer a complete and 
satisfying explanation since each examines recruiting efforts among those arguably 
predisposed to support and join the terrorist group. However, if a terrorist 
organization is to have a realistic chance of goal attainment, no matter how slim, it 
must not only address timely replacement of tactical and operational losses, it must 
also build a foundation of support that can help carry the group towards a larger 
presence and impact. This foundation, what Taylor and Horgan (2001 and 2006) call 
a supportive audience, is a necessary support element, providing logistics, funding, 
information, safe haven, and political capital in the on-going social dialogue as well 
as a ready pool of potential recruits. Without it, a terrorist group remains largely 
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isolated and marginalized, unable to rally support or stake an acceptable claim to 
legitimacy. In some manner, the terrorist group needs to reach out to the population, 
or some specified segment of the population, in an effort to build a functional support 
structure. One option is to use violence as a coercion and intimidation strategy – a 
tenuous proposition that must be carefully managed if it is to be sustained (Lichbach 
1995) – while another is to develop and implement a persuasive strategy leveraging 
carefully focused violence and combining it with more positive, non-violent words 
and deeds. The later strategy would appear to be a much more tenable option for the 
group over the long term. With persuasion perhaps the best sustainable option, an 
important question then centers on the role and nature of terrorist communications.  
 
A History of Miscommunications 
 
 Abrahms (2005) has referred to terrorism as a history of miscommunications. 
Indeed, much of the work done on terrorist communications has tended to focus on 
actual or perceived impact of those communications, rather than on the intent of the 
terrorist in engaging in a communicative effort.  Interpretations are grounded in the 
familiar, putting terrorist communications into an interpretive framework rather than 
considering them suasive efforts designed to serve longer-term organizational goals. 
Similarly, many authors attempt to infer intent, yet only cast rhetoric and violence in 
more familiar terms associated with social norms. This has remained the case for 
decades, despite clear indications from terrorists themselves that the importance of 
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successful message conveyance cannot be overlooked.28 Rather than explore the 
utility of terrorist-audience dialogue, scholars of terrorism gravitate towards an 
instrumental view of violence, often seeing violence as Gavin Cameron (1999) does:  
as an end in itself. Most hold to the notion that the terrorists’ greater goal is 
accomplished by triggering harsh government counter-action29
 One of the more interesting views of terrorist violence is that of Oots (1986 
and 1989), who wrote of “entrepreneurial leadership of terrorist groups.” As with any 
other political organization, Oots’ terrorists must find effective ways of overcoming 
their collective action and free rider problems, necessitating the careful selection of 
appropriate incentives for attracting and retaining membership. The selection of 
incentives can quickly get out of control, as the history of the Basque ETA, Italy’s 
Red Brigades, and Germany’s Red Army Faction illustrate. As ETA shifted targets 
from agents of Spanish control to increasing numbers of unarmed Basque nationalist 
politicians and innocent bystanders in the 1980s, popular support for ETA not only 
waned, but anti-ETA demonstrations drew thousands (Zirakzadeh 2002). The Red 
Brigades suffered a similar backlash after kidnapping and murdering popular 
politician Aldo Moro, as did the Red Army Faction following their kidnapping and 
execution of Hanns Martin Schleyer.  
 rather than seeing 
violence as but one part of a larger, more involved strategy. 
                                                 
28 Abrahms (2005), for example, cites the example of the Weather Underground and their 
awareness that the target audience must understand the terrorists’ stated demands if political violence 
was to work. 
29 Many cite Carlos Marighelli’s vision of revolutionary progress, in which terrorist violence 
provokes the regime into showing its “true colors” by overreacting,  provoking in turn growing 
discontent among the people. This discontent is then expected to lead to greater support for the 
terrorist, now seen as the potential liberator from government oppression, as government security 
measures become increasingly oppressive. 
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 When authors focus on communications by terrorists, especially since 2001, 
one significant theme has been understanding its potential and utility as a tool for 
counter- and anti-terrorism. Abbasi and Chen (2005), for example, endeavor to 
leverage a thorough syntactic analysis of terrorist communications to develop a better 
capability of correctly determining claim authorship, not simply by group but by 
individual speaker or correspondent, even when the communication has been written 
and relayed with the intent of deceiving message recipients. Similarly, the Dark Web 
Project at the University of Arizona (2008) uses a data-centric computational 
approach to assess jihadi presence on the Internet in order to help develop more 
effective counters to terrorist web presence. Similar efforts by Leeman (1991), Oots 
and Wiegele (1985), Weimann (2006), Dartnell (2003 and 2006), and Corman et. al. 
(2007) have presented terrorist communications by focusing on expanded utility for 
the group. 
 A few scholars have taken a broader, more theory oriented approach. 
Terrorism is, according to Abrahms (2005), a communications strategy, albeit one in 
which the primary intended audience is an inherently hostile audience – the targeted 
government. Tuman (2003) calls terrorism a “communicative process” which 
contains a rhetorical dimension beyond the simplicity of violent coercion. These 
authors hold fast to the idea that, as Tugwell (1990: 70) aptly phrased it, terrorists 
“are in the business of changing people’s minds.” This argument rests on the notion 
that violence is a communicative medium in and of itself, and that the dialogue of 
terrorism takes place in the public sphere (Ford and Gil 2001). Despite the valuable 
insights gained through such a perceptual and analytic approach, the terrorist 
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violence-as-communication literature too often focuses on its impact on society (see, 
for example, B. Miller 1987) or, like Tuman (2003), devolve into explorations of 
interpretive construction of the term terrorism. 
 Without specifically having terrorism in mind, Jervis (1970 and 1976) 
contributed to the subsequent literature on terrorism by showing that actors in the 
international system communicate demands through a process of signaling. Abrahms 
(2005) finds considerable utility in applying Jervis’s ideas in a terrorism context, 
although in doing so Abrahms replaces nation-states with single agents which 
exemplify and inform international-level actor behavior, in this case President George 
W. Bush and al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden. For Abrahms, signaling efforts by the 
two principal actors are ineffective in large part because perceptions and perceptual 
limitations prevent the effective transmission of signals. Others, such as Bhavnani 
and Ross (2003,) apply notions of signaling, arguing that violence, particularly 
against the state, is used by militant organizations to signal government weakness to a 
third party. Bruce Hoffman and McCormick (2004) offer yet another perspective in 
suggesting suicide terrorism is a form of strategic signaling meant to convey 
information about the group’s character and goals. 
 Frames, the interpretive context for messages, have also proven useful for 
understanding aspects of terrorism. Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) note that 
frames have a significant impact on opinions by making some considerations appear 
more important than others. By asking respondents to react to Ku Klux Klan speeches 
and rallies through either a public safety or civil liberties frame, Nelson et. al. 
demonstrate that interpretive context has a potentially important role in reaction to 
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uncomfortable or abhorrent messages. Along a similar track,  Druckman (2004) 
examined equivalency framing effects rather than issue framing effects, concluding 
that framing effects can be context sensitive as well as individual attribute sensitive. 
Brewer (2001: 49) further notes that framing effects depend on “how favorably one’s 
response to it is,” suggesting that the message content, whether rhetorical or violently 
kinetic, cannot stray too far from accepted societal norms without running significant 
risk of generating negative responses. 
 Considerable variance exists with respect to analyses of terrorist 
communications, despite widespread agreement that terrorist violence is intended to 
have an impact on social and political discourse. The rhetorical message’s intent and 
purpose, however, is subject to considerable debate. One of the most thoughtful and 
unique interpretations is offered by Cordes (2001), who argues that what appears to 
be the terrorists’ explanation and justification for acts of violence is actually an 
exercise in “autopropaganda,” in which the terrorists endeavor to convinced 
themselves of the justness of their actions. The majority of work on terrorist 
communications, however, can be broken down into five general thematic areas. 
 
Terrorist Communications as Violent Propaganda 
 
 Some of the earliest work on terrorism casts political terrorism as violent 
propaganda, violent political theater, or “propaganda of the deed.” First credited to 
French anti-parliamentarian Paul Brousse,30
                                                 
30 According to Martin (1985), the first reference to “propaganda of the deed” appeared in 
Brousse’s August 1877 article “Propaganda of the Deed” in the Swiss Bulletin de la Féderation 
Jurassiene.  
 the term “propaganda of the deed” has 
come to describe the way in which violence has been used, and been used by the 
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media, to publicize grievances, make demands, and raise political awareness of what 
the perpetrators of violence assert are pressing issues. Use of the term “propaganda of 
the deed” accurately reflects the purpose that some scholars, like Martin (1985), 
attach to terrorism, that of simple publicity. Fleming (1980) examined the use of 
violence for political purposes over time, and like Martin and a host of others, 
concluded that today’s terrorism often finds or has ascribed to it justifications rooted 
in anarchist theories of the 1800s.  Many authors have since adopted the phrase to 
describe the interaction between terrorists, their intended audience, their adversaries, 
and the neutral uninvolved public often caught in between. Today, much of the 
literature either refers to terrorism as a propaganda “war” between the government 
and a small group of disaffected individuals seeking violent change, or allude to 
terrorism’s propaganda value for its perpetrators.  
 To scholars such as Wilkinson (1990), terrorism is little more than a 
propaganda31
                                                 
31 Propaganda, as used here, follows the definition used by Jowett and O’Donnell (1999: 6) in 
which propaganda is “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, 
and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.” They 
also note that propaganda is a socially determined process in that it must generally fit within existing 
social, political, and cultural frames of reference if it is to have a chance of success. They also note that 
fear-based appeals are typically less effective, but their work has not included propaganda messages 
accompanied by terrorist violence or the threat of such violence. Choukas (1965) notes that 
propaganda takes two paths, exploitation of the limits of human reasoning and misdirection of thought, 
but the violence of terrorism may be seen as constituting a third path of exploitation of emotions. Most 
authors also note that when the propagandist is a non-state entity, he often starts at a disadvantage in 
that the most effective media sources are controlled by the state or those generally supportive of the 
state. Downing (2001), in his work on radical media, paints a portrait of the radical alternative media 
as a control-free venue for the dispossessed, but fails to consider the possibility that the radical media 
may be as controlled as state-run media, although with a far different political and social agenda. 
Nevertheless, Downing’s treatment of the radical media offers an intriguing look at alternatives 
available to groups like terrorists, their supporters, and their struggles to find a place among the more 
dominating state-run or state-friendly mainstream media. 
 war, in which the terrorist is so convinced of the justness of his cause, 
and so rigid in his denial of alternatives, that the resulting violence denies neutrality 
and consequently spares none.  He further argues that given the absolute nature of the 
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struggle, terrorists are able to use the propaganda of violence and rhetoric to shift 
blame and responsibility to their opponent.  These efforts to shift responsibility, and 
deny legitimacy to their adversaries, set up a contest of give-and-take, with each side 
seeking to convince a larger public it deserves support and assistance. In some 
respects, this constant interaction, which Tuman (2003) has noted is always 
bidirectional despite appearances, played out on televisions screens, in the papers, and 
in other mass media venues, begins to resemble theater (M. Wilson 2000).  
 Some authors extend the terrorism-as-propaganda and terrorism-as-theater 
analogies by casting it in marketing terms. Aaron Hoffman (2004), for example, 
considers terrorism from a situational competitiveness perspective, noting that much 
of today’s terrorist violence and rhetoric are directed as much at competing terrorists 
as they are against a specified state adversary. From this perspective, the ostensibly 
neutral public constitutes a potential pool of support over which competing terrorist 
groups and the government struggle for support and influence. Such a view is 
incorporated by other scholars, including Rapoport (1977 and 2001c) and Cordes 
(1987b and 2001) who note the critical need for terrorists to develop both internal and 
external constituencies. While development of such constituencies is considered 
critical to terrorist group survival, it carries with it the seeds of a potential backlash by 
the very individuals the terrorists seek to reach. Rapoport (1977) was one of the 
earliest to note this possibility in the event the terrorists fail to establish some form of 
moral or ethical compact with the population targeted as a constituency. Cordes 
(1987b and 2001) reinforces understanding of this need by also noting that the 
development and care of an internal constituency is just as important, leading her to 
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delve extensively into terrorist writings for a greater understanding of the 
“autopropaganda” role of terrorist rhetoric. Others, however, focus more on the 
kinetic conflict between terrorist and government and assert, as Bruce Hoffman 
(1997) does, that many terrorists deliberately hide their authorship of violence in 
order to avoid the expected counter-attack of their adversaries. Others terrorists, 
particularly those responsible for catastrophic acts of violence, do not claim credit, 
according to Hoffman, because they believe they have sufficient standing that their 
message is effectively delivered without the necessity of claiming responsibility.  
 Bruce Hoffman’s assertion of reasons for claim-less terrorism appears to be at 
odds with the work of other scholars, such as Rapoport and Cordes. A closer 
examination of terrorist acts over the past few decades, however, tends to offer 
confirmatory evidence for both perspectives. Many terrorist groups issue claims of 
credit for acts of violence, at times even asserting responsibility for those acts carried 
out by others. This may be a way for smaller, lesser-known groups or subgroups to 
begin the process of generating awareness and staking a claim to legitimacy. Larger, 
more established terrorist groups, on the other hand, may fall closer to Hoffman’s 
model and, because of an established pattern of actions over time, may feel that their 
message is understood by intended audiences despite the lack of a public claim of 
responsibility.  At times, too, some terrorist groups use a variety of names suggesting 
the existence of multiple terrorist groups where one or a few actually exist. In any of 
these cases, the terrorists seek to manipulate the media, and its propensity to focus 
attention on the extraordinary, the visually remarkable, and the emotional, in order to 
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achieve a desired effect while avoiding risk or increasing uncertainty among its 
adversaries. 
 
Terrorist Communication as Media Manipulation 
 
 Perhaps even more so than considerations of terrorism as propaganda of the 
deed and violent political theater, a media manipulation theme has dominated the 
literature on terrorism for decades. Most authors,32
                                                 
32 Some authors who have addressed the relationship between media and terrorists include 
Herman and Chomsky (1988); Curan, Gurevitch, and Woollacott (1981); Bandura (1986); Sloan 
(2000);  Shamir and Shikaki (2002); Alali (1994); Farnen (1990); and countless others.  
 like Martin (1985: 135), have 
been very blunt in stating that “[a]ll that terrorists want is a larger audience, and they 
have learned to exploit media’s own modus operandi to maximize their reach,” and 
arguing that terrorism is little more than a tool for media manipulation. He does note, 
however, that the manipulation is not unidirectional in that terrorists and the media 
exploit each other for their own purposes. Wilkinson (1997) echoes Martin, arguing 
that terrorists and the media have a symbiotic relationship, calling terrorists’ media 
manipulation cynical and opportunistic. Despite the long history of terrorist use of the 
media, their efforts are not always successful in achieving long-term goals and 
objectives. Nacos, Fan, and Young (1989) note that violent acts spread across the 
mass media offer terrorists tremendous possibilities for getting attention and airing 
grievances, but fail them more often than not when the terrorists’ goals of gaining 
legitimacy and earning respect are considered.  The work of Nacos and her colleagues 
highlights the media’s role in immediate representation of acts of violence, but 
suggests that longer-term sustainability and depth – needed to develop, establish, and 
reinforce respect and claims of legitimacy – are lacking in the media’s treatment of 
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terrorist violence. Indeed, Crelinsten’s (1989) work demonstrates that even initial 
media representations of terrorism are fundamentally flawed, from the terrorists’ 
perspective, in that they do not offer an accurate representation of the nature and 
extent of terrorism, terrorists, their demands and expectations, or their grievances. 
Coverage is, as Crelinsten (1989 and 1997), Nacos (1994 and 2000), Nacos, Fan, and 
Young (1989), and Abrahms (2005) note, highly selective and frequently incident-
oriented, particularly when the incident is accompanied by stunning visuals. 
 Some scholars, such as Irvine (1992), have examined the writings of terrorists 
and concluded that the issue of media manipulation is rarely as straight forward as it 
appears. Irvine argues for a more dynamic examination of terrorist writings, and 
suggests that such a treatment demonstrates terrorist use of the media changes over 
time. Initially, Irvine suggests, terrorists use the media to gain attention and to 
establish themselves as political actors that matter. As the group gains confidence and 
standing, media use shifts in an effort to redirect attention to the long-term goals and 
strategies of the group. Tuman (2003) takes a different track and notes that terrorist 
use of the media varies, depending on whether the terrorism is directed from above 
(i.e. state- or state-sponsored terrorism) or whether the terrorism comes from below. 
In this perspective, violence escalation is typically a manifestation of need, real or 
perceived, for greater publicity. By careful manipulation of the timing, 
destructiveness, and direction of violence, Tuman suggests that the terrorist group 
uses the media’s proclivities of coverage to adjust, as needed, media exposure in 
ways quite similar to more traditional political campaigns. 
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 Recent years, however, have witnessed a change in media manipulation, with 
terrorists and their supporters more in control of both content and distribution of their 
messages. By using the Internet, technology-savvy terrorists have been able to bypass 
the traditional mass media, with its attendant self- or government-imposed censorship 
and its limited attention span, and begin the creation of a new on-line community of 
interest more amenable to the terrorists’ message. Mexico’s Ejérsito Zapatista de 
Liberación (EZLN; the Zapatistas), for example, opened what Ford and Gil (2001: 
201) call “a new sphere of communicative action” in their struggle against Mexican 
authorities. For some observers (Ford and Gil 2001; Bob 2005), Zapatista use of the 
Internet was critical for not only the group’s successful struggle in Chiapas State, but 
critical for their very survival in the face of overwhelming Mexican monopolies of 
both force and media access. By directly addressing “subaltern counterpublics” 
around the world through the Internet, the EZLN built global communities of interest 
that allowed them to overcome the pressures applied by state authorities by 
generating both national and international attention in the struggle. In a similar 
fashion, the Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) has used 
the Internet to begin reshaping the social and cultural dialogue about the role of 
women in Afghan society (Dartnell 2003). While RAWA’s impact in Afghanistan 
remains limited due in part to the exceptionally low rate of Internet penetration, 
beginning a dialogue with outsiders who may have an indirect impact on Afghan 
society through their interactions with their governments offer the potential for 
significant social and cultural change. 
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 Terrorist organizations have begun to grasp fully the potential advantage of 
effective use of the Internet. According to Weimann (2006), less than half of 30 
terrorist groups surveyed in 1998 maintained a presence on the Internet. By the end of 
1999, almost all did and by the end of 2005, Weimann had counted over 4,300 
separate web sites serving terrorist groups or their supporters. As terrorist groups 
make greater use of cyber capabilities, most authors have worried about terrorists 
using interconnected computer technologies to attack critical government processes 
and infrastructures. Dubbed cyberterrorism, this literature explores and perpetuates a 
fear of terrorist transition from purely kinetic violence to violence that is virtual albeit 
with a significant kinetic outcome. Weimann (2006), and Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
(1999) are notable, however, for pointing to a much greater potentiality for terrorists 
tied to the use of cyberspace for recruiting, organizing, planning, and coordinating. 
Offering the most detailed examination of terrorist use of the Internet to date, 
Weimann (1987 and 2006) notes that terrorists most frequently target four key 
audiences for Internet enabled activities: their supporters, their presumed 
constituency, their adversaries, and international public opinion. For the terrorist 
organizations Weimann has observed, kinetic attacks appear not only counter-
productive, but also operationally risky. Rather than open themselves to effective 
countermeasures which could significantly impair group operational effectiveness, 
Weimann finds that Internet savvy terrorists see fundraising, rhetorical attacks against 
rival terrorist groups, implementation of scare campaigns designed to increase public 
anxiety, and displacement of responsibility for violence as primary productive outlets 
for Internet use. Other frequent uses recorded by Weimann include campaigns to 
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dehumanize and discredit targets and adversaries, data gathering, networking among 
like-minded groups and individuals, recruitment and mobilization, and operational 
command, control, and coordination. 
 
Terrorist Communications as Structural and Environmental 
Manipulation 
 
 For some scholars, media manipulation, while present, fails to capture the full 
range of efforts and intents that drive terrorist communications. For these authors, 
terrorists’ attempts to manipulate through word and deed extend to significant 
structural or environmental elements of their operational milieu, making for a much 
more pervasive and involved communications effort. For Crelinsten (2002), violence 
is a communicative effort that, intended or not, interacts with other forms of social 
and political dialogue, moving terrorism from an aberrant peripheral drama to a 
central role in national political and social life. As such, Crelinsten maintains, 
terrorist violence and communications have an inherent agenda-setting function that 
affects all actors, particularly with respect to the dynamic relationship between the 
controlled in society and the controllers. This agenda-setting function not only shapes 
political and social dialogue, but also defines and directs frames of reference for 
social interaction, thus bounding communications modes for the controllers and the 
controlled by the level and breadth of conflict. 
 Others, such as Tololyan (2001), Sant Cassia (1999), Downing (2001) and 
Taylor and Horgan (2001), examine a more fundamental structural and environmental 
impact by addressing cultural impact and myth building. In one view, dominant 
cultural narratives “overdetermine conditions that help produce terrorism and are in 
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turn reanimated by it” (Tololyan 2001: 32), helping terrorism produce “new heroes 
for old stories.” Hogenraad, et. al. (1995) agree, noting that the myth created by the 
act of terrorism persists beyond the immediate, helping reformulate an operative 
cultural narrative incorporating a new mythic frame of reference. Not only does 
terrorist action produce, at least for some, a new generation of heroes and role 
models, it also helps legitimize violence by referencing significant cultural and 
historic moments (Sant Cassia 1999). In leveraging the dominant cultural myth, some 
terrorist groups are seen as the new heroes of an old struggle. Ethnically based 
groups, such as the Irish Republican Army, Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation 
of Armenia, and ETA frequently attempt to consciously tap into the prevailing 
cultural myths in order to establish and maintain political and social standing and to 
achieve a degree of legitimacy. In more religious societies, the need to establish and 
maintain connections to cultural history and myth is of lesser importance due to the 
presumed or claimed divine endorsement of the struggle (Downing 2001). With the 
moral authority of the appropriate deity co-opted by a group engaged in violent 
struggle, resistance to calls for support is lowered, given the deity’s presumed 
acknowledgement of the “truth” of the struggle (see also Taylor and Horgan 2001, 
Ezekiel 1995, and Bjørno 1995a and 1995b). 
 Shaping the political reality of society, particular a secular society, is not as 
easy and is fraught with potential pitfalls. Several authors have examined terrorist 
communications in the context of intent to change the dominant political reality 
(Fortin 1989; Leeman 1991; B. Miller 1987; Barkun 1996a, 1996b, 1997, and 2000; 
and Van den Broek 2004) and find that change is particularly hard to affect without a 
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readily attentive and acceptant audience. Rather than reliance on “truth” or moral 
superiority of message, intent, and messenger, as is often seen in highly religious 
contexts, secular terrorists in non-religious environments tend to focus their 
persuasive efforts on undermining their adversary’s legitimacy (Kelly and Mitchell 
1981; Gerrits 1992). Establishing legitimacy is often seen as an essential precondition 
for success, even if only expressed in terms of public safety, since legitimization 
provides context and meaning for acts of violence (see especially Barkun 2000; B. 
Miller 1987; Shamir and Shikaki 2002; and O’Boyle 2002). Further, the effort to 
legitimize violent struggle, if done effectively, can still benefit the terrorist even if it 
fails to sway the intended audience: 
  The legitamation of struggle fought with methods which are not 
  approved of by the majority of the population may nonetheless be 
effective if it can be made plausible that this struggle does not just 
serve partisan goals but aims at defending more “universal” values. If 
a just cause is defended by the wrong people or with wrong methods, 
many observers feel reluctant to censure the means or those who 
employ them. (Van den Broek 2004: 729) 
 
 Some terrorists, however, appear to exhibit a greater need for self-expression 
and self-satisfaction, finding greater purpose in shaping their own perception of 
reality. To Gerrits (1992), terrorist publicity fulfills just such a role, soothing and 
empowering the terrorist to achieve his own psychological objectives. Success, 
however, can be troublesome, particularly given violent extremists who know of no 
other way of life (Bell 1998; Ezekiel 1995), leading Martin (1985) to suggest that 
some terrorists may change goals, tactics, and targets in order to avoid goal 
achievement, especially when goal achievement reduces or eliminates the group’s 
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previously stated raison d’être.33
Terrorist Communications as Rationalization and Justification 
 Other terrorist groups have used both violence and 
rhetoric in an effort to expand the boundaries of social and political dialogue, 
stretching the operative environment beyond the borders established by the original 
conditions and grievances that led the group to begin armed insurrection. Some 
terrorist groups, particularly secular groups in Europe in the 1960’s and 1970’s, failed 
to establish a domestic base, leading many to see joining the larger international 
revolutionary movement as the path to success. Others, such as Italy’s Red Brigades, 
had a stable domestic constituency but misjudgment or arrogance led them to 
embrace the internationalist cause to the detriment of maintaining their domestic 
constituent base (see Rapoport 2001c; Silke 2000; and Ginges 1997).  In other 
instances, changing cultural perspectives appear to have prompted perceptual changes 
among the terrorists and their recruits, with later joiners sometimes adopting much 
harsher and unyielding attitudes about the desirability of violence as a key component 
of the political dialogue (Zirakzaden 2002). 
 
 The psychological pressures associated with participation in terrorism, the 
dissonance stemming from deliberate violation of societal norms and expectations, 
and the constant and persistent fear borne of outlaw status argue powerfully for the 
development of effective cognitive coping strategies. Efforts to reduce levels of 
                                                 
33  Indeed, this criticism has been levied repeatedly against Hizb’Allah, which originally 
claimed to exist and act in order to force Israel to leave south Lebanon, which it occupied from 1982 to 
2000. Following a disastrous occupation, Israel withdrew its forces from south Lebanon in 2000. 
Rather than recognize the removal of its stated reason for existing, Hizb’Allah sought to redefine 
geographic realities. Despite agreement by the United Nations, and the governments of Lebanon, 
Syria, and Israel that a small parcel of land known as Sheeba Farms is properly Syrian territory but 




cognitive dissonance have been the subject of a rich and varied literature on terrorism. 
Decades ago, terrorist communications were frequently seen as rather simplistic 
efforts by terrorists to explain, rationalize, and justify their violent activities, going to 
great lengths as some have observed to deny they are terrorists (Wilkinson 1990 and 
1997; Bandura 1986; Cordes 1987b; and Leeman 1991). In recent years, the pressure 
to explain has increased, according to Cordes (2001), given the growth in 
participatory avenues for redressing grievances. As a result, she argues, some 
terrorists may feel so great a need to establish a claim to legitimacy that their own 
“autopropaganda” leads them to lose touch with reality (see also Zirakzaden 2002). 
 Rationalization and justification of terrorism would be expected to serve a 
critical role in the terrorists’ dialogue with both their adversaries as well as their 
presumed or potential constituencies. A number of authors, however, have offered 
compelling arguments that terrorist rationalization discourse is more often than not 
directed inward (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999; Van den Broek 2004), designed to 
assuage the terrorists’ own sense of guilt (Oots and Wiegele 1995, citing work by 
Murray S. Miron). Jowett and O’Donnell (1999: 378) go so far as to assert conscious 
intent arguing, “[e]xternal propaganda may be created for internal consumption. 
Displays of aggression toward an enemy may not faze the enemy, but they can bolster 
morale at home.” If Jowett and O’Donnell are right, it would mean that groups 
engaged in such behavior may be significantly undermining their own efforts to 
reshape the political and social landscape. 
 Most examinations that see terrorist communications as a rationalization or 
justification tool expect it to be directed outward from the group, intended to 
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establish, assert, or reinforce claims of moral standing. Muhlberger (2000) sees a 
strong rationalizing impact of moral reasoning, but notes that questions of morality 
have little influence on group recruiting or participation. Moral-reasoning based 
arguments by terrorists, therefore, may serve a greater purpose in legitimating 
terrorists and terrorist violence and in precluding possible counterclaims. Since 
terrorist violence engenders norm violation, terrorist rhetoric is also seen as an effort 
to redefine societal norms in such a way that the violence of the group is in some way 
tenable within the context of dominant normative values (Shannon 2000). Norm 
redefinition, or at least increasing norm ambiguity, offers the terrorist the opportunity 
to better shift responsibility for violence either to the group’s adversaries or to its 
victims. In shifting responsibility, terrorists address both internal and external needs, 
fitting violence into the existing political discourse and absolving the terrorist of both 
responsibility and guilt (Drake 1998a and 1998b). At its most successful, terrorists 
effectively link norm ambiguity and shifted responsibility to ethnic or cultural 
survival, leading to what are often more ferocious struggles (Rapoport 2002). 
 
Terrorist Communications as a Window on Mind and Moods 
 
 One segment of the terrorism literature emphasizes individual psychology in 
asking why the terrorist acts as he does. This work seeks to explain what is often 
characterized as the randomness, the senselessness of terrorist violence and searches 
for explanations from among the words of the terrorists. Many scholars are often 
reluctant to study the writings of terrorists (Rapoport 2001c), yet according to Cordes 
(2001) and forensic linguist Roger Shuy (Kovaleski and McCaffrey 2002), 
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examination of texts produced by terrorists opens a window on both their thinking 
and their mood, offering clues to better understand individual and group dynamics as 
well as self-perceptions. Probing the minds of terrorists through the poorly structured 
and presented medium of their statements and memoirs is difficult, particularly given 
the differences in beliefs found between the terrorist and both his audience and the 
scholar seeking to make sense of the texts (Hogenraad, et. al. 1995). The picture 
revealed, however, frequently reflects a single-dimensional view of the world, where 
there are stark differences between right and wrong, justice and injustice, as seen by 
the terrorist (Kassimeris 2001; Rapoport 2001c), reflecting a rigid view of morality 
which colors and frames the terrorist’s perceptual world view. 
 For others, the communicative elements of terrorism offer much needed 
insights into the thinking of the terrorist. While some terrorist communications are 
held to serve a primary purpose of propaganda and publicity and a secondary purpose 
of gratifying more personal psychological and emotional needs (Pluchinsky 1997), 
other communications are held to offer information insights into operational aspects 
of the terrorist decision making. Ideology plays a critical role in terrorist target 
selection, also finding expression in rhetoric and, when combined, offers an 
opportunity to examine and assess the terrorists’ interpretation of the world and 
associated behaviors (Drake 1998b). Taylor and Horgan (2001) also find value in 
examining the linkages between terrorists’ beliefs and interpretations, on the one 
hand, and their violent acts, on the other. This process of chaining, they argue, offers 
one of the best available windows to the terrorists’ internal logic and the way in 
which  that logic drives violent behavior. Calling ideology a “multifaceted force 
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influencing behavior,” Taylor and Horgan (2001: 48) assert that “the extent to which 
ideology controls and influences our behavior may be seen as something apart from 
particular ideologic [sic] prescriptions, which contain as it were the content of a 
particular ideology.” It stands to reason, though, that ideology may not play a critical 
role for secular terrorists, prompting scholars like Tessler (2003) to argue that 
attitudes toward politics, government, economics, and other political and economic 
factors are more relevant than other cultural predispositions or religious beliefs. 
Despite disagreements centered on differences between secular and religious groups, 
terrorist communications are held to offer otherwise difficult to divine insights into 
the perceptions and thought processes of terrorists. 
 
Finding the Gaps 
 
 Other than recruiting and establishing claims to legitimacy, most views of 
terrorist communications focus on what are presumed to be the manipulative uses to 
which they are put. Terrorist communications are seen as fulfilling a very limited role 
designed to artificially define “the struggle” while serving deep personal and 
organizational needs. What is not addressed is the use of communications to establish 
and maintain beneficially interactive relationships with a designated audience in order 
to build and service a supportive constituency. In the language of complex systems, 
the literature fails to address the emergent properties of terrorism, particularly the role 
played by communications. 
 When terrorist or insurgent communications are examined as an effort to sway 
a given audience, the focus tends to rest squarely on single examples and case studies. 
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William Miller (2000), for example, addresses the communicative needs of insurgent 
groups by the historical record of Shining Path, the Khmer Rouge, and the Viet Cong, 
emphasizing the role of communications as one of several tools to build a popular 
base of support. Rural and urban operational environments, he notes, pose unique 
challenges for insurgent groups, with the spatial openness of rural settings offering an 
easier path toward institution building success. Urban groups, lacking the opportunity 
to establish effective territorial control, resort to coercion through violence as a means 
of population control. The freedom to operate and establish both territorial control 
and administrative institutions offered by rural areas does not, however, offer 
necessary and sufficient conditions for non-coercive popular support, as the actions of 
the Khmer Rouge and Shining Path, and to a lesser extent the Viet Cong, amply 
illustrate. Audience ambivalence also complicates the situation, leading many groups 
to adopt a mixture of coercive and non-coercive tactics in an effort to win popular 
support. 
 While Miller’s work, and that of similarly oriented scholars, adds considerable 
depth to understanding some of the communicative choices made by terrorists and 
insurgents, it offers little to explain the mechanics of the communicative interaction 
between terrorist and population. One approach that has addressed communicative 
interaction is integrative complexity, most notably in terrorism studies by Suedfeld 
and Leighton (2002) and Liht, et. al. (2005). In both studies, integrative complexity, a 




 Like integrative complexity studies, communications studies have also offered 
some insights, although the marketing literature is more easily applied to the terrorist-
audience interactive dynamic since, unlike integrative complexity, it does not limit 
the number of participants to two directly interactive entities. Among this literature, 
Grunig’s (1976) situational theory of publics seems most applicable to an 
examination of terrorists’ efforts to build and maintain a supportive audience through 
verbal and symbolic speech. For Grunig, two dimensions of an individual’s 
recognition of situation stand out as critical components: the extent to which a 
problem is perceived and the degree to which constraints, or the expectation of 
constraints, serve to limit the individual’s subsequent behavior. The problem 
recognition dimension, in this context, is the necessary factor in altering an 
individual’s life trajectory. Without recognition of a problem, individuals would be 
 is used to examine the communications between two specified parties 
engaged in an interactive dialogue. With their focus on two-party interactions, 
integrative complexity studies offer interesting insights into negotiations between 
insurgents and their government opponents and into the exchanges of dialogue 
between leaders of parties in conflict. These studies do not, however, open many new 
vistas with respect to terrorist communications directed at a more ambiguous, ill-
defined group of often unwilling correspondents. In situations where there are 
multiple parties involved directly or tangentially, with participant fluidity, multi-
directionality of exchanges, and characterized by competitiveness, integrative 
complexity offers some intriguing possibilities which have yet to be explored.  
                                                 
34 Differentiation is taken as the presence of two or more perceived elements, dimensions, or 
points of view on a given subject, while integration is taken to mean the degree to which those 
elements are seen as related to each other. 
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expected to carry on with their lives without adaptive behavioral change driven by 
interpretation of external situations. Problem recognition changes the individual’s 
perception of his existence such that alteration or change in some form becomes a 
more desirable course of action. The recognition of constraints, however, provides a 
feedback mechanism such that the desirability of change may no longer carry 
sufficient weight to warrant action. Only when the desire or perceived need for 
change outweighs the expectation of constraints will action result. Extended to the 
organizational level, Grunig asserts that organizational behavior is affected by 
problem recognition and constraint recognition in much the same ways as individual 
behavior is responsive to perceptions of immediate and likely future situations. 
 Put into a terrorism context, Grunig’s situational theory of publics offers 
immediate application in examining terrorist group efforts to convince a population, 
or some segment of one, to set aside fears of negative incentives and risk and act in 
support of the group. For an audience targeted by a terrorist group’s communicative 
strategy, the decision to support or join the group is fraught with danger. Any action 
in support of a terrorist group can be expected to attract unwanted attention from the 
government and, if the activity constitutes enough of an irritant, subsequent 
retaliatory or law enforcement actions would be expected to place the individual in 
jeopardy. Convincing that targeted public to act on behalf of the terrorist group, 
therefore, would require the group to find a way to alter the targeted population’s 
perceptions of problems in need of redress and their expectation or recognition of 
constraint and risk. Using violence for this purpose, as Lichbach (1995) and others 
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have noted, is often either counterproductive or takes inordinate amounts of time and 
energy to maintain for too little benefit. 
 A terrorist group possessing a degree of marketing savvy, however, might 
recognize the potential for diffusing their operative ideologies and goals among a 
targeted population. Diffusion studies seem to offer potential applications given their 
emphasis on the transference of innovations through a population, yet researchers in 
the field have narrowed the scope of inquiry rather than seeking broader applications. 
As Rogers (2003: 39) puts it: 
 
Diffusion studies now display a kind of bland sameness as they pursue 
a small number of research ideas with rather stereotyped approaches. The 
narrow perspectives of diffusion scholars in an earlier era have been replaced 
by an unnecessary standardization in contemporary diffusion research 
approaches. Perhaps the old days of separate and varied research approaches 
were a richer intellectual activity than the present era of well-informed 
sameness. 
 
Pioneered by Rogers (1962), study of the diffusion of innovations offers a detailed 
exploration of the structures, institutions, and processes that help determine whether 
and at what speed new ideas, tools, and processes can spread throughout a social 
system.35
                                                 
35 Rogers (2003: 5) defines diffusion as “the process by which an innovation is communicated 
through certain channels over time among the members of a social system.” Rogers takes great pains to 
explore the conditions conducive to innovation diffusion, the characteristics of the agents spreading or 
receiving news of an innovation (and the likelihood of adoption), and the characteristics by which such 
innovations can be described. 
 As a “process of social construction,” Rogers further notes that the nature 
of the propagation medium – society – can either help or hinder the spread of an 
innovation. In decentralized systems, innovations that are seen as fitting more closely 
with a potential adoptee’s needs and concerns are more readily adopted, since the 
adoptees feel more in control of the change process. In a centralized system, where 
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individuals are likely to feel less in control, diffusing innovations tend to address 
more the system’s needs than their own local needs. While diffusion in a centralized 
system can be effectively promoted by social leaders, decentralized systems present a 
greater challenge since requisite technical expertise and coordination are more 
difficult to apply. In the terrorism context, this difficulty calls for the group seeking to 
spread its particular world-view to establish and maintain more effective and emotive 
communications practices.  
 While the diffusion of innovations literature tends to emphasize innovation’s 
effects on uncertainty,36
 
 a new political perspective, such as that offered by the 
terrorist, tends to increase uncertainty through its combination of radical change and 
violence. A successful “innovation-diffusion” campaign by a terrorist group, then, 
might be expected to address the uncertainty over the possibility of government 
reaction rather than that stemming from the terrorist’s program. Clifford Bob (2005), 
in his study of the marketing of rebellion, notes that at different scales, the successful 
diffusion of an innovation offers a critical key for a rebellion’s success. In Bob’s 
work, however, the focus shifts to indigenous rebels seeking to attract and win a 
supportive audience on a global scale, focusing primarily on non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) that might prove instrumental and providing resources and 
public relations advantage at the international level. As Bob (2005: 30-31) explains: 
 . . . savvy local insurgents begin their quest for aid by “segmenting” the 
market, directing their appeals to potential supporters whose identity and 
goals approximate their own. . . . Even then, movements must frame 
themselves to boost their chances of support. . . .  
                                                 
36  According to Rogers (2003: 165), “the innovation-diffusion process is essentially an 
information-seeking and information-processing activity in which the individual is motivated to reduce 
uncertainty about the advantages and disadvantages of an innovation.” 
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  As a first step, movement activists strip their conflicts of complexity 
and ambiguity, projecting a stark picture of virtuous struggle against a 
villainous foe . . . . They link their plight to well-known and emotionally 
charged events, hoping thereby to vanquish the indifference of distant 
audiences. . . . 
 
Bob’s work on the marketing of rebellion comes closest perhaps to exploring 
the mechanisms by which terrorist groups seek and maintain a supportive 
constituency. As such, his work offers tantalizing possibilities that seem to offer 
explanations, but its direct applicability to terrorism is necessarily limited due in large 
part to differences of scale and orientation. Bob’s insurgents look outward, to the 
much larger arena of global public opinion and to the operations and activities of 
NGOs which operate internationally. They seek, and are often afforded, a degree of 
legitimacy and standing as claimants to the social and political dialogue. These 
insurgents willingly modify their goals, objectives, tactics, and operations to win the 
favor of targeted NGOs and publics, many of whom have little or no direct stake in 
the conflict. Terrorists, on the other hand, typically have no recognized standing save 
that afforded by state sponsors and allied organizations. These groups also tend to 
have a much more limited scope, narrowing the sphere of conflict rather than 
expanding it. 
Terrorism studies are left, then, with a number of possible explanations for the 
question of why some groups survive over time and others enjoy only a brief, limited 
lifespan. Many explanations have been put forth in the literature, including those tied 
to the effectiveness of government counter-action, internal group dynamics, 
operational and organizational competency levels, and the actions of rival groups. Yet 
these explanations are limited, with significant gaps remaining in the body of 
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knowledge. Why some terrorists fail has been well explored, virtually nothing has 





Chapter 3: Building a Network-Based Affinity Model 
 The literature of terrorism leaves a number of questions unanswered. 
Significant insights into the identity of terrorist groups, their functioning, their 
operations, and their struggles against others are available for anyone with the time 
and energy to sift through a rapidly growing collection of scholarly work. Left largely 
answered, however, are questions addressing the dynamics of process, the complex 
interplay between terrorist and others, and the evolutionary progression of terrorist 
groups from small conspiracies, through initiation and conduct of violent action, to 
final outcome. Most terrorist groups enjoy limited lifespans before being defeated by 
their adversaries, withering from neglect or incompetence, or being absorbed by 
larger, better-organized, more robust kindred groups. A few, however, grow in 
numbers, influence, and capability, emerging at some point as an insurgent group 
capable of seizing, controlling, and administering territory, or emerging as a mass 
movement capable of mobilizing sufficient numbers to effectively challenge 
government authority. What remains woefully lacking are insights into the 
evolutionary dynamics of the terrorist groups themselves, particularly with respect to 
their need to generate some minimal level of public support that will not only offer 
the opportunity for maintaining operational viability, but also to establish the 
necessary preconditions for evolutionary growth. 
 Process dynamics, particularly evolutionary progression, are largely ignored 
in the terrorism literature. One of the principal reasons for this deficit may be that 
commonly held analytic models of terrorism focus attention on interactions between 
individuals, decision making cost-effectiveness calculations, or the group’s ability to 
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withstand governmental counter-action. Where the literature does address change it 
typically does so from a severely limited perspective which posits terrorism, or the 
particular aspect being examined, as if it were an isolated, independent closed system. 
To better understand terrorist groups and the differences that help determine which 
groups might survive, expand, and perhaps succeed, a network model of the process 
of terrorism is needed, one that directs attention to the evolutionary characteristics 
inherent in the interaction between all components of the system, the system’s 
structures, and the larger, more encompassing inclusive environment. 
 Present models of terrorism are most often reductionist, isolating selected 
actors or characteristics and examining each with little or no consideration of how 
that selected component affects the overall system environment and is, in turn, 
affected by that same environment. As such, these models construct a closed system 
in which two or more unique adversaries vie for effective control of the system.37
 A network model of terrorism is more fluid and adaptive than existing models. 
The network perspective recognizes a multiplicity of actors
 In 
this kind of model, actions and reactions are seen simply in kinetic terms, with 
physical and emotional impact extending beyond the immediate act albeit with 
limited scope and focus. Further, control of the system is taken as the expected prize 
sought after by unitary agents.  
38
                                                 
37 In this work, Axelrod and Cohen’s (2000: 6-7) definition of system is used. It is, they write, 
“one or more populations of agents . . .  , all the strategies of the agents. . . , along with the relevant 
artifacts and environmental factors. . . .”  
 on multiple levels, 
whether directly involved or not, competing in an open, dynamic system, all having 
38  In the discussion of systems, actors and agents are not used interchangeably, although in 
some literature this may be the case. This discussion holds to the convention that agents are 
individuals, groups, structures, institutions, interactions, or situations which act or affect other system 
components in any way, whether that action is intentional or not. Actors, on the other hand, are a 
specific subset of agents, representing only the humans, individually or collectively, in the system. 
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some degree of impact on the system itself, its environment, and structures. Any 
action not only changes an actor’s position relative to other actors and environment, 
but also changes the environment itself. Further, each actor’s activities, and the 
environmental changes each brings, affect the perceptual and interpretive cognitions 
of other actors. Since every action changes, in some way, the relationships between 
actors and the environment, the system is in a constant state of flux. This quality 
makes a systemic return to some arbitrary prior status or condition impossible since 
no condition of equilibrium exists. New models of terrorism’s dynamics will need to 
find effective ways of incorporating persistent flux and inherent fluidity if they are to 
allow further progress in understanding terrorism.  
The present work moves in that direction by envisioning terrorism in a 
network context, in which terrorist group, government, and various publics constitute 
nodes within a growing and evolving network defined by its structure and by the 
dynamics of interactions between nodes. Specifically, network environment and 
characteristics are explained, focusing on the basics of nodes, links, and context. In 
addition, the network environment’s impact on the relative fitness of constituent 
nodes, and the nodes’ impact on overall system fitness are explained. Finally, a 
hypothetical evolutionary curve is described, explaining how the network perspective 
of terrorism offers a framework for understanding terrorism in an evolutionary 
context.  
Modeling Dynamic Systems 
 
Modeling a dynamic relationship is fraught with difficulties, particularly given 
the model’s fundamental role of offering a simplified representation of reality. An 
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effective model serves one of three basic purposes: as a predictive tool, allowing for 
testing and evaluation of a given proposition; as a demonstration, allowing the 
modeler to show a proposition or relationship is possible, or; as an advisement, 
allowing for the suggestion of ideas for further study and evaluation (Holland 1998).  
When systems are complex and agents within the system include humans, the 
difficulties already inherent in modeling are amplified given the human potential for 
irrational behavior and subjective decision making (Campbell and Mayer-Kress 1997; 
Bonabeau 2002). The resulting output of model-based analysis offers the potential for 
widely divergent directions spanning the range of qualitative and quantitative 
outcomes. Because models of human interaction can become large and unwieldy very 
quickly, the most common approaches used are consolidation of individual behaviors 
– aggregation – and the selection and use of a single actor exemplar. While the 
aggregation and exemplar approaches work well enough for the study of broadly-
defined population tendencies, their application in a dynamic and complex system 
perspective is limited: 
  When there are large numbers of agents, simple or not, the “move 
tree” (the range of possible interactions) far exceeds the already enormous 
move trees associated with checkers or chess. Because the actions of the 
individual agents are conditioned by the immediate surroundings (other agents 
and objects in the environment), there is no easy way to predict the overall 
behavior by looking at the behavior of an “average” individual. The difficulty 
increases enormously when individual agents can learn or adapt. Then an 
agent’s strategy is not only conditioned by the current situation, it can also 
change over time . . . . As the difficulties increase, so do the possibilities for 
emergent behavior. (Holland 1998: 118) 
 
Success in modeling systems with emergent behavior rests on an ability to identify 
the processes – not the agents – that are most relevant to the questions being asked 
and the most appropriate level at which to examine those processes. Modeling 
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complex relationships, like that found between terrorists, government, and audience, 
necessarily needs to push beyond traditional linear cause-and-effect assumptions into 
more intuitive, non-linear approaches that allow for the leveraging of emergent 
properties in a simple, qualitative approach (Saperstein 1997; Campbell and Mayer-
Kress 1997). 
 
Applying Systems and Network Theories 
 
 Systems can be described as either closed or open. Closed systems exist in 
isolation, containing all necessary resources within itself and, as a result, needing no 
periodic interactions or replenishment from external sources. They are self-contained, 
with constituent agents and objects fulfilling unique and specifically delineated roles. 
Inputs, beyond those which initially populated the system, are extremely limited, if 
present at all, and have virtually no measurable effect on system dynamics. Open 
systems, in contrast, have interactions across its borders, gathering inputs from the 
surrounding environment and providing some form of output to that environment. 
Open systems have the potential to retain or increase systemic robustness through 
cross-boundary interaction where closed system counterparts invariably tend toward 
increased entropy and the resulting permanent loss of available energy and system 
degeneration. When dealing with human society as a system, either an open or a 
closed system can be envisioned, depending on how expansive the domain is taken to 
be. Including all humans in a global society would represent a closed system given 
the lack of interaction with structures or agents external to the system. But that 
expansive view serves no useful purpose since it is too broad to offer insights into 
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interaction dynamics. For the opportunity to achieve such insights, a smaller, more 
localized level of analysis – and hence open system – is needed.  
 Actors in open systems react to the presence and actions of others as well as to 
changes in environment and structure. Specialization may be present, but given the 
role of external agents and stimuli, an open system tends to display both a lack of 
effective hierarchical management and a complex interdependence between agents 
and attributes. While there is interdependence in this system there tends to be a 
pronounced lack of generalized internal dependency, particularly given the presence 
of regulatory feedback mechanisms. These feedback mechanisms help regulate and 
moderate goal-seeking behaviors, yielding a system in which the unchecked increase 
in entropy is mitigated, retarded, or at times eliminated.  Given the multiplicity of 
resources and stimulus inputs, there is an equifinality to the system, a range of 
alternative means by which a given outcome might be attained. At the same time, 
there is also a mutlifinality to the system, where a multiplicity of results stemming 
from the same inputs is possible. In complex systems, this multifinality is a hallmark 
of emergent behavior. 
 These systems are notable in their failure to meet the necessary conditions of 
linearity (see Beyerchen 1998 and Czerwinski 1998). The simple combination of 
inputs is normally expected to yield a predictable output such that the output 
represents the sum of inputs. Yet with an open system, outputs tend to be more than 
the sum of inputs, violating the principal of proportionality. By the same token, such 
systems are greater than the sum of their constituent parts, leading to a violation of 
the principal of additivity. With disproportionality between inputs and outputs, 
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coupled with the system’s violation of additivity, the open system defies replication. 
That is, given the same set of resources, structures, agents, and inputs, an open system 
cannot be created exactly like another nor created as an exact replica of what once 
was by virtue of the environmental changes brought about by each and every action 
(Jervis 1997, 1998). Open systems, then, violate the principle of replication. Finally, 
the principal of demonstrability of cause and effect is violated in that the inability to 
replicate the system, its non-additivity, and its disproportionality prevent the 
identification of specific causal factors leading to a given observed effect. Cause and 
effect are left largely ambiguous, difficult to define and describe given the range of 
possible interaction combinations which could yield a single result. The system is 
consequently characterized as unpredictable. 
 Open systems are defined by structures, agents, and interactions within a 
defined boundary, each of which having functional relationships with others in the 
system.39
                                                 
39 Some systems literature defines open systems as structures, agents, and interactions within 
a defined environment, while then portraying the system as allowing interaction of system entities with 
a larger, more encompassing environment. This paper uses boundary to delineated the set of entities 
and interactions that make up the system from the environment within which it exists. 
 The system’s structure, in turn, is then defined as not only as the constituent 
entities, but also as the series of processes through which interactions take place. 
When applied to human-centered systems, boundaries are at times nebulous, offering 
little in the way of clearly-defined limits of the system. More often, the human-
centered open system is defined not by which entities are included, but by the 
interactions between them, giving the system a porous boundary quite tolerant of 
frequent redefinition. Easton (1953, 1957, 1965a, and 1965b) was one of the first to 
apply systems thinking to the political aspects of human interaction, describing a 
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political system as having precise boundaries and a fluid system of decision-making 
steps held as part of a sequential process.40
 Terrorist groups, their adversaries, and the audiences they directly and 
indirectly affect are agents in a spatially limited milieu. The terrorist-adversary-
audience system is a localized, situationally-limited one which is structurally and 
behaviorally dependent more on the dynamic relationships between agents than on 
the nature and identity of the agents themselves. Placing terrorism into an open 
system perspective not only broadens the scope of inquiry beyond the spatial, 
temporal, or contextual bounds of typical terrorism studies, it also forces the 
reconsideration of what is and what is not most important to investigate. Emphasis 
consequently shifts from the actors and their actions to the interactive processes 
between and among entities.  
 A closed system perspective, not allowing 
boundary interaction, would exist in isolation, unable to interact with other systems 
and unable to incorporate change as a prominent feature of its functionality. The very 
nature of human society, however, is predicated on interactions, localized and global, 
with other agents, many of whom would be systems members only under the 
broadest, most expansive system boundary definitions. 
 Crelinsten’s (2002) communications model of terrorism is an example of  
systems thinking applied to the complex series of interactions and actions between 
entities in a given social system. In this model, society, its laws, its traditions, and its 
institutions are the system’s structures. The terrorists, would-be and potential 
                                                 
40  In Easton’s (1953, 1957, 1965a, and 1965b) conception, changes in the environment 
yielded demands on the system (Easton’s inputs), leading to competition among system entities, 
yielding a series of behaviors (the outputs). These behaviors, in turn, restructured the environment, 
generating a new series of demands and the ultimate perpetuation of the input-process-output cycle. 
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terrorists, the government and its agents, as well as the general public constitute the 
set of actors present in the system. The interactions and exchanges between these 
actors, which Crelinsten describes as social and political dialogues, are the system’s 
processes. It is through these dialogues that the nature of relationships within the 
communicative structure of society are shaped and reshaped, thus helping determine 
the likelihood of discontent and grievance transitioning to violent opposition to the 
state. Other descriptions of terrorism focusing on societal interaction and myth 
building (Tololyan 2001; Taylor and Horgan 2001 and 2006; and Downing 2001) 
emphasize the role of interactions in defining and redefining fundamental social 
structures and relationships. Rather than being restrained to a single dialogue, 
however, these “conversations” span multiple dialogues, addressing political, social, 
religious, ethnic, economic, topical, and other aspects of social interaction.  
 Terrorism, though, is more than “conversation,” regardless of how defined. 
Terrorists engage in violence, or the threat of violence, thus affecting fundamental 
change in the structure and processes of society. Intended outcomes of violence 
include wholesale social change; creation or reconfiguration of societal myths; 
redefinition of political, ethnic, religious, or cultural relationships, or; destruction of 
existing institutions, processes, and structures. Efforts by terrorists span the gamut of 
societal dialogues, whether intended to do so or not, such that their efforts can be seen 
as attempts to restructure the system itself. In a closed system terrorist violence would 
have no effect other than that visited upon the immediate victims. Extensive media 
coverage of terrorism, particularly catastrophic acts of violence, argues against an 
isolationist view of terrorism, demonstrating the reach of violence beyond immediate 
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spatial boundaries. Even for those not targeted by terrorists, separated by hundreds or 
thousands of miles from the violent act, terrorist strikes can have lasting debilitating 
behavioral or psychological effects.  
The Real Terrorist Network 
 
 A network, as used here, is a collection of agents, or nodes, connected by 
links. Depending on how the specific system is defined, nodes may be individuals, 
machines in factory, computers, organizations, population subgroups or any other 
collection of entities that interact in some manner. The connections between nodes – 
the links – represent the myriad ways those nodes might interact. Co-workers are 
linked by employment location and position, family members are linked by kinship, 
computer workstations may be linked by their connection to the same server or to 
connected servers. Often described in terms of communication or process pathways, 
linkages are any ties that in some way join two nodes in an affinity bond. The 
collection of nodes and their patterns of linkages describe a network and, depending 
on the distribution and pattern of linkages, dictate not only network structure but to an 
extent network behavior. 
 Terrorism describes a process which helps define the growth and evolution of 
a social network. The societal arena within which it takes place demands the 
emergence of a scale-free, rather than random, network. Scale-free networks exhibit a 
power law distribution of linkages, where few nodes enjoy a disproportionate share of 
links to other nodes. Random networks, on the other hand, feature nodes having a 
proportionate number of linkages (Barabási and Albert 1999). In a social and political 
context, nodes – or in this case actors – exhibit preferential attachment by building 
 83 
 
and maintaining a selected number of links to others through an individualized 
decision process. Because it allows for preferential attachment, the system exhibits a 
wide, and disproportionate, variance in numbers and quality of linkages. Like scale-
free networks, social structures tend to lack a clear, over-arching hierarchical 
structure in that identification of leaders or controllers is contextually defined. Human 
systems have also been found to exhibit the “Matthew” effect, where nodal 
attachment distribution and pattern are not simply functions of longevity, but an 
environment where well-connected nodes attract a disproportionate percentage of 
new linkages to the detriment of less well-connected nodes.41
 Emergent scale-free networks are also autopoeitic, or self-organizing and 
replicating. Structure and control mechanisms – positive and negative feedback 
processes – are not imposed upon the system. It is the system itself, its structures and 
organization, which create both regulatory mechanisms and organizational processes 
necessary for the system to survive and function. Societies create their own norms 
and traditions, myths and fables, all of which are used to structure broadly-accepted 
organizing and behavioral systems. As society develops, those norms and traditions 
are translated into religious dictates, political processes, laws, and social and cultural 
ethos which establish ranges for what is collectively deemed acceptable and 
unacceptable. The accumulation of self-organizing practices and processes, the 
continual change brought about by the actions of constituent components, and the 
individual and collective learning which help guide and shape future behaviors drive 
  
                                                 
41 Robert Merton coined the term, noting that the essential unfairness of reality had been noted 
as early as the Bible, where the gospel of Matthew tells us that “For every one that hath shall be given, 
and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.” 
See Watts 2003:108. 
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the evolutionary growth of the system and makes the network emergent. The 
accumulation of behavioral impacts – what some refer to as “strong emergence”42
 An emergent network, then, is a system of multiple interacting structures and 
agents seeking to adapt (Axelrod and Cohen 2000) rather than one being blindly 
driven by disturbances, inputs, and change. This drive to adapt is universal, with 
every constituent actor seeking advantage, or fitness, through its acts and decisions. 
The aggregate of individual node fitness levels describes the system’s “fitness 
landscape.” Unlike geographic landscapes, however, the fitness landscape changes 
continuously. When any actor within the system acts to adapt in an effort to improve 
its own fitness, the fitness landscape changes in the perspectives of all other actors, 
typically lowering their fitness levels relative to the landscape and to other competing 
actors in unpredictable ways.
 – 
not directly associated with system components or structures transform the system in 
fundamental ways. Society, and politics, arise from the interactions among people, 
producing a system much more than the simple sum of its components, thus 
displaying its essential emergent quality.  
43
                                                 
42 Weak emergence is taken to be the properties arising directly from the system’s 
components. Strong emergence, on the other hand, cannot be associated directly with specific system 
components, but arises instead from the direct and indirect interaction of agents. See Bedau (1997) and 
Davis, Laughlin, and Komorita (1976).  
 Terrorism is best understood in this context, where 
terrorists, their adversaries, the general public, and others – all seek to adapt to 
43 In biological systems, this is easier to see. If a species of frog ate a particular species of 
insect, and the insect species began producing mutations resulting in wings, within a few generations, 
the insect would gain relative advantage over the frog, raising its own fitness level and lowering that of 
the frog. Mutant frogs may then appear with now sticky tongues, giving those mutant frogs relative 
advantage. Before long, the sticky-tongue mutation would become a dominant characteristic of the 
frog species, since this particular adaptation to environmental changes brought on by the emergence of 
insect wings now provided new advantage. Over generations, the insect and frog species would 
produce a series of adaptive mutations, with those conferring advantage, and hence greater fitness, 
becoming the dominant characteristics of the species. In this simple example, the insect and the frog 
would be co-evolutionary actors in their particular environment. 
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environmental, structural, and behavioral changes in an attempt to move themselves, 
and the system, into a more desirable state. 
A Network Model of Terrorism 
 
 Terrorism, while appearing endemic in some parts of the world, is not an 
inherent property of any society. It is, rather, the product of frustrations, grievances, 
and powerlessness typically initiated by a very small group of individuals who 
decide, for whatever reason, that meaningful and desirable change could only be 
produced through violence. The model developed here is a system intended to 
illustrate and examine broad society-level evolutionary dynamics. The network’s 
nodes are the government, the terrorist group,  the public, and the collection of 
various sub-groups present in the system. These nodes, and the linkages between 
them, are in a constant state of flux as each actor seeks to improve its own fitness, 
thus redefining the fitness landscape for all, prompting adaptive reactions from all 
other actors. Societies thus evolve, although unlike biological evolution, societal 
evolution can take place on a quite condensed time-scale (see, for example, 
Huntington 1993; Moore 1993; Barabási 2002; and Diamond 2005). Building on the 
premise that societies evolve, this model conceptualizes terrorism as a series of 
internal and external perturbations of the system, triggered by actor efforts to improve 
or regain fitness, which forces other actors to adapt. Further, these perturbations – 
terrorism and counterterrorism – are deliberately undertaken by actors with the 
explicit intent of influencing or changing system structure and directing evolution. 
The model relies on several conventions of both social network analysis, particularly 
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the use of visualization as an essential tool for understanding evolutionary 
development over time. 
 The network model of terrorism holds that at some specified time, t0, the 
system is simple and appears generally stable. There are two principal networks of 
nodes within the system – the government and the people – even though both interact 
and commingle at multiple levels. Interaction between the government and the people 
is typically bidirectional, with each taking inputs from the other and providing inputs 
to the other. While the network evolves, the evolutionary process may proceed at a 
leisurely pace, largely driven by cooperative interchange among and between 
constituent networks and nodes. Large and significant changes to the networks are 
generally rare, and unpredictable, following something of a power law in the 
distribution and patterning of linkages. Within the larger component network, the 
“people,” there may exist an unrealized sub-network, a sub-population which will 
eventually emerge as, or be targeted by terrorists as the terrorists’ presumed 
“constituency.” This constituency has not yet been identified, and will not be so 
recognized until after a terrorist group emerges and defines the boundaries and 
membership of the constituency. At this time, however, the terrorist constituency 
remains only a possibility. This basic system is depicted in Figure 1. Arrows illustrate 
the interaction between the sub-networks and nodes, each of which are taken to 
represent countless bidirectional relationships. Arrow thickness offers a visual 
representation of linkage robustness, a measure of the expected relative number, 
frequency, and strength of its interactions. Nodes, represented by spheres, are sized 
according to relative fitness. 
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Figure 1: Network Model of Terrorism: Hypothetical Evolutionary  
     Progression 
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As the system grows, matures, and evolves – each of which it must do unless the 
society collapses soon after organization – various transaction functions emerge. Each 
transaction function grows out of the structure and dynamics of the system itself and 
from the interactions among and between system components. Norms and traditions, 
for example, are transaction functions which emerge from the patterns of component 
behaviors over time and, as they emerge, further shape and direct subsequent  
evolutionary progression of the system. Depending on system specifics – the initial 
state, in complex systems language – a transaction function may emerge shaped and 
informed by discontent and grievance held by one or more members of society. Given 
sufficient time, opportunity, and resources, this particular discontent transaction 
function may provide the impetus needed for the emergence of a new group of nodes, 
a sub-population frustrated and aggrieved enough to consider challenging other 
system agents for influence and power. With sufficient time and inputs, this new sub-
network may spawn a nascent terrorist group which seeks to directly challenge the 
authority and control enjoyed by the government. 
 As the terrorist group develops its ideology, its goals, and its operational 
capabilities, its threats of violence and violent attacks provide the necessary stimulus 
for the emergence of yet another unique system sub-network, the terrorists’ presumed 
constituency. This group, as a system entity, may or may not emerge self-aware, self-
defining, or self-identifying. Rather, the terrorists’ presumed constituency is generally 
a societal sub-population defined by the terrorists, who claim in some way to act on 
behalf of this particular sub-population. In extreme instances, this presumed 
constituency may be recognized as a unique system component only by the terrorist, 
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existing only in the terrorists’ imagination. In any case, it is in its initial stage largely 
an artificial construct of the terrorist in that its creation and maintenance do not 
emerge from the system and its dynamics but from the claims of the terrorist. As 
such, members of that constituency may accept, reject, or disregard actual or 
presumed membership. 
 As the system evolves, the government remains the dominant agent within the 
system, while the emerging terrorist group is small, poorly resourced, and often 
operationally timid and amateurish. The terrorists’ presumed constituency may be, in 
fact, a viable system agent, but may just as likely be an imaginary non-entity holding 
no role in system dynamics. Still in its infancy, the terrorist group’s operations tend to 
be sporadic, unsophisticated, directed against low-risk “soft” targets, and designed 
primarily to generate awareness and publicity. Organizational survival remains the 
paramount concern of the terrorist, and recruiting may find its most fruitful 
opportunities among society’s radical students and workers, disaffected minorities, 
prisoners, the chronically unemployed, the mentally and emotionally unstable, and 
others who frequently populate society’s fringes. Relationships between the 
government and the public may remain strong and bidirectional.44
                                                 
44 This is not to suggest that these relationships are positive, welcome, or mutually beneficial, 
only that there is frequent and purposive interaction of a reciprocal nature. 
 The relationship 
between the government and the nascent terrorist group, and between the terrorist 
group and the general population, are also bidirectional, gaining in robustness, but 
often antagonistic. The kinetic battlefield at this point garners the greatest attention, 
particularly as attacks become more audacious and destructive. The more critical 
battle, however, is over the terrorists’ presumed constituency, even as this aspect of 
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the contest is often unrecognized. As the terrorist group seeks to convince this 
presumed constituency to recognize itself as such and then to join in challenging the 
power and control of their shared adversary, whether by propaganda, persuasion, or 
threat of violence, the government typically takes greater notice and begins to 
develop and implement programs designed to mitigate or counter the terrorists’ 
appeals.45
 The interaction between government, terrorist group, and other component 
populations of the system over time lead to another series of transformational 
functions affecting the relationship dynamic between various system agents. As the 
system progresses, the nature of the relationships between agents may shift 
dramatically. For those terrorist groups that avoid particularly egregious operational, 
security, recruiting, or propaganda blunders, an expectation of growth, maturity, and 
increased operational capability is possible. As the terrorist group matures and 
improves its security awareness, resource acquisition, and operational abilities, it 
becomes a more direct threat to the government even though staggering disparities 
remain in the availability of resources and the ability to project deadly force. While 
the government may enjoy an overwhelming monopoly on power, the terrorist 
group’s small size, clandestine nature, and mobility afford it the opportunity to avoid 
devastating government counter-actions. Able to act with relative freedom, the 
  
                                                 
45  It should be noted that efforts to win over this sub-population, whether undertaken by the 
terrorist group or the government, can rest on positive inducements, incentives, and rewards, on 
negative inducements and punishment, or both. A third alternative, most effectively advocated by 
Carlos Marighella (1970) is for the challenger to prod its adversary into an escalating series of 
reactions and retaliations, thus goading the government into revealing its inherent undemocratic and 
tyrannical character. As the people come to understand government’s “true nature,” public support is 
expected to shift to the challengers, which by then strive to portray themselves as the defenders of the 
people. Done successfully, Marighella asserts, and the rebels push government into creating the 
necessary conditions for turning the people against it. 
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terrorist group at this point commands headlines and attention through its violence, its 
unpredictability, and its apparent operational impunity. The terrorist group, relying on 
fear and surprise, becomes a recognized threat not only to its government adversary 
but to the system’s stability as well. Terrorist operations, as insignificant on a larger 
scale as they may be, nevertheless produce significant shock that becomes, singularly 
or in series, a severe perturbation to the system. By this stage, too, a true terrorist 
constituency which recognizes itself as such may begin to emerge, giving terrorist 
and government alike a more clearly defined battlespace. The terrorists’ ability to 
attract a supportive audience, and maturing operational capability, may afford the 
terrorist the resources needed for positive evolutionary progression. All relationships 
between system agents remain, although some like those between terrorist and 
government, between terrorist and terrorist constituency, and between government 
and terrorist constituency, could take on a significantly more robust quality, reflecting 
the beginnings of a shift in the power and influence relationships within the system. 
The Evolutionary Curve 
 
 The development of the terrorists’ challenge to government for influence can 
be represented in a hypothetical model as an S-curve, recognizing slow initial growth, 
followed by more rapid expansion and maturation, then a slowing of development as 
the organization begins to reach full maturity and prepares to assume a co-equal 
status with government (Figure 2). As the nascent terrorist group develops sufficient 
wherewithal to begin violent attacks against the government or other designated 
target as informed by the group’s particular ideological orientation, violent anti-
government action is undertaken, ensuring the group it will soon come to the attention 
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of authorities. Because the group is now beginning to represent a direct threat to 
social and political order, it faces more challenging security concerns and greater 
pressures to invest more attention and resources into group survival. At about this 
point in the group’s evolution, the realities of operating violently against the state turn 
group attention more sharply toward the need to generate support from among the 
local population. This begins the group’s violent infancy. 
 At this stage, the terrorist group has few resources with which to effectively 
survive without some form of assistance. Violence against the state requires the  
Figure 2:  Hypothetical Evolutionary Curve 
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expenditure of resources, with more noteworthy attacks or sustained campaigns of 
violence requiring escalating expenditures. To counteract the overwhelming disparity 
in resources between itself and its opponents, the terrorist group will need to begin 
building a base of support as a necessary counterweight to their government 
opponents. Here, the terrorist will need to expend more effort on identifying a 
specific constituency it wishes to represent, crafting a “message” having relevance to 
a given constituency and likely to garner support from that constituency, and finding 
the most effective means of communicating that message to the selected constituency. 
Having a message, even if ideologically grounded, is not enough, however, to win 
over a constituency whose members probably afford greater weight to potential risks 
associated with support than to expected benefits of support. The terrorists will, 
consequently, need to ensure relevance of their message to the intended constituency, 
and will need to ensure that its actions are generally consistent with, and reinforcing 
of, their claimed rationale for violence. 
 As the group develops and grows, its violence becomes more regular, more 
professional, and more effective. Its operational capability increases to the point that 
less attention can be focused on mere survival, and more attention can be paid toward 
the  acts it deems necessary for achieving its stated goals. Recruiting should become 
easier, as knowledge of the group and its goals spread, attracting individuals who 
agree with the group’s aims or who have convinced themselves that group 
membership will result in future benefit. At this point, depicted here as the second 
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principal phase transition, violence becomes more institutionalized. Violence, which 
they alone author, may attain a prominent place in the group’s thinking, leading it to 
see their actions alone as the vehicle for societal salvation. The group’s perspective 
likely begins to turn inward, and its members begin to internalize the group’s claims 
of both ascendency and leadership in bringing about desired change. The group and 
its members see themselves as possessing the knowledge, the vision, the goal, and the 
determination to affect meaningful and lasting change. 
 Further development of the group, particularly in the face of a decline in 
governmental effectiveness in counter-terrorist operations, would likely lead to 
additional violence escalation. For the terrorists, growing membership, increases in 
available resources, success in recruiting, and suggestions of wider and deeper public 
support prompt even more violence against the state. The terrorist group may at this 
point believe it senses both a weakening government and a growth in popular 
approval, and may begin to think more about a final stage of conflict. From the 
government’s perspective, the threat posed by the terrorist group grows considerably, 
prompting it to escalate its own counter-terrorist efforts in an attempt to more 
effectively address the challenge it faces. Governments which believe they are losing 
public support may also, at this time, turn against that segment of society it sees as 
disloyal or supportive of their challengers, bringing the mechanisms of state power to 
bear against its own people. This third phase transition marks the transition to a new 
phase of the conflict, a concerted period of violence escalation.  
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The effectiveness of the terrorist group in maintaining positive growth46
 At the fourth phase transition, or criticality, the terrorist group has, then, three 
basic evolutionary trajectories which it might follow. First, and typical of many 
situations, the terrorist group may remain on the cusp of maturation, failing to take 
advantage of opportunities while avoiding the most self-damaging and self–
destructive actions. Here the system settles into a form of stasis where the strengths 
and robustness of interactions between the targeted constituency and both the terrorist 
 
determines, in part, the degree to which terrorist groups in the escalatory phase are 
able to progress toward full maturation. Sufficient growth of terrorist group 
membership, effectiveness, popular support, and efficacy can lead towards a fourth, 
and critical, phase transition in which the group’s ultimate future is determined. At 
this point, the government stills enjoys overwhelming superiority in numbers, in 
power, and in the ability to project deadly force. It may or may not enjoy widespread 
public support, but can be expected to maintain the support of a significant portion of 
the population. The terrorist group can be assumed to recognize by this point, and 
perhaps much earlier, that the key to undermining and effectively countering the 
government’s overwhelming superiority is to develop and maintain a sufficiently 
large – and active – supporting constituency. Because the government may enjoy 
majority support, the terrorist group’s potential for evolutionary progression rests on 
its ability to maintain and grow a supportive audience into an actively participating 
constituency which can, properly constituted, begin to swing the conflict momentum 
towards the terrorist group. 
                                                 
46 Positive growth, in this context, is the ability to attract more recruits than the loss of 
members brought about by arrests, defections, incapacitation, willing or unwilling exile, or death.  
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and the government remain more or less equal, leaving neither government nor 
terrorist with the capacity or the will to achieve a decisive victory. Stasis is not 
stability, however, leaving the system and its components to lurch from crisis to 
crisis, disturbance to disturbance, without achieving resolution.  
 A second possible developmental direction is that the terrorist group can 
commit an unpardonable act, author a series of less catastrophic but nevertheless 
egregious acts, or fall prey to either their own ineptitude or to a significantly 
improved government counterterrorist capability. In this circumstance, the terrorist 
group finds itself unable to retain its supporters, for whatever reason, and falls into a 
destructively disadvantageous position with respect to its adversaries. Here, the 
strength and robustness of system components and relationships with the targeted 
constituency shift dramatically in the government’s favor. As a result, the terrorist 
group sees a significant erosion, if not outright destruction, of its ability to access 
resources necessary for maintenance of operational and growth capabilities. The 
terrorist group in this situation consequently devolves, perhaps to the point at which it 
withers away, a victim of its own limitations and poor decision-making.47
 A third possible evolutionary path finds the terrorist group making the 
transition from fringe sub-state agent to mass movement, becoming a more equal 
claimant to power and influence, with greatly improved odds of affecting both desired 
 
                                                 
47  Much as the German Red Army Faction (RAF) did in the 1990’s, when it found itself no 
longer able to effectively recruit from a shrinking population of radical students and workers and no 
longer able to acquire other resources needed for maintaining operational viability and political 
relevance. The RAF, however, failed to understand that its devolution was largely a product of both 
circumstance and internal failings, choosing instead to lay blame for its failure to advance the 
revolutionary cause squarely on the shoulders of the German proletariat and students by claiming both 
populations were too ignorant and too stupid to understand revolutionary praxis and their critical and 
unique role in the inevitable progression towards communism. See the Red Army Faction’s (1998) 
statement on ending the armed struggle.  
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socio-political change and the defeat of their adversaries. Here, the terrorist group 
finds a way to connect with its presumed constituency well enough to enable and 
enhance its evolutionary potential. Building on that connection, the terrorist group 
effectively leverages the moral and political support found among that constituency to 
recruit, acquire funds and supplies, gather information about government activities, 
and find safe haven. The linkages between the terrorist group and the presumed 
constituency become stronger and more robust and, depending on circumstance, may 
finally become truly bidirectional. By the same token, the linkages between 
government and the terrorist’s constituency weaken considerably and may become 
largely unidirectional as the government continues to try leveraging the supportive 
public away from the terrorist. In this model, such circumstances auger well for the 
terrorist group to begin leveling a claim for status and legitimacy, and finds avenues 
opening which would allow it to begin the transition, in whole or in part, towards an 
overt mass movement existence.  
The competition between terrorist group, government, and other actors in the 
system inevitably changes the fitness landscape, the operational milieu of the conflict, 
in violent, dramatic, and unpredictable ways. In the hyper-competitive environment 
that characterizes an active terrorist presence, multiple populations of agents and 
localized networks compete, driving each to adapt to the actions of others and to the 
environmental and contextual changes all actions bring about. This mutual, 
reinforcing, and responsive series of adaptations is what Axelrod and Cohen (2000) 
refer to as the co-evolutionary process of the system. 
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While much focus is given to the direct kinetic competition between terrorist 
and government, the more important conflict is found elsewhere. Sub-network 
membership is fluid, with individuals establishing connections to others on the basis 
of some individually defined set of criteria. This practice of deliberative preferential 
attachment, in turn, is defined in societal settings by context. New actors in the 
system face a daunting task in determining when, where, and how to establish 
connections, since the search for viable and compatible linkage possibilities can be 
resource intensive. To compensate for the high cost and lack of resources initially 
available, new actors in a system will search instead for affinity groups – sub-
networks defined by shared interest or common characteristic – to link to first (H. 
White 2008) before seeking subordinate individual connections. These self-defined 
affinities establish “context,” a foundation upon which subsequent social linkages are 
built. For the terrorist seeking to build and maintain a supportive audience from 
within the larger population, defining a context of shared grievance, shared 
perspective, and shared hopes for the future is critically important. Here is where the 
real conflict is found, in the war of ideas, ideologies, interpretations, and belief used 
to garner support for oneself and deny it to competitors. Often subsumed under the 
notion of “winning hearts and minds,” defining and leveraging context are the 
underlying purposes for both terrorist messages and terrorist violence. 
In societal settings, however, sub-populations tend towards mutual exclusivity 
in the provision of sympathy and support. Sympathizing with the terrorist or his cause 
generally precludes sympathizing with the government, and vice versa. Supporting 
terrorists in words and deeds is most often risky activity, raising the possibility of 
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sever consequence at the hands of the state. Because terrorist and government offer 
diametrically opposed choices for the targeted audience, success in defining context 
favorably translates into stronger linkages between terrorist or government, on the 
one hand, and that segment of the population from which support and sympathy is 
sought, on the other. The stronger these linkages can be made, the greater the 
relational resilience in the bounds between those actors resulting in gains in relative 
fitness levels.  Here, in a network model of terrorism, the contest between terrorist 
and his opponents is one over context, where each competitor seeks greater fitness 
and relative advantage by using violence, the threat of violence, or messages to 
manipulate and guide the definition and development of context in ways expected to 
be advantageous.  
Shifting Perceptions 
 
 Terrorism does not take place in isolation, and affects many more people than 
the immediate audience(s) and victim(s). This has long been acknowledged by 
terrorism scholars, but only when addressing the impact of terrorist attacks, either 
singularly or in series. But the non-violent acts – everything from the rhetorical war 
waged against their opponents in the form of propaganda and statements, 
communiqués and claims of credit, petitions and placards, provision of services not 
provided by government or otherwise accessible to cooperation with other criminal 
enterprises for any reason – also have far-reaching and sustained effects on the 
system and its components. Terrorist groups do not act in isolation any more than 
their government opponents do, for each acts within an ever-evolving adaptable and 
adaptive network of networks where strength and status are conditional upon those of 
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other system and network agents, upon the structures of the networks and 
subnetworks and the systems they make up, and upon the environment in which all 
those components exist. Understanding terrorism in this context will allow continued 
growth and evolution of the understanding of terrorist itself, helping propel the study 
of terrorism forward. 
 To reach that goal, however, demands reductionist and zero-sum perspectives 
give way to systems and network thinking. It also demands, at these initial stages, 
evidence that there is potential for serious inquiry and insight to be gained by such a 
radical approach to the study of terrorism. This work endeavors to begin just such an 
exploration by suggesting an evolutionary-based, system- and network-oriented 
approach holds both promise and value for terrorist studies. This paper works towards 
that end by proposing a new measure of linkage resilience based on specific violent 
and non-violent activities of terrorists as they seek to define and leverage context. 
This expected affinity measure is intended to offer an opportunity to evaluate and 
predict the most likely evolutionary trajectory – the expected efficacy and success of 




Chapter 4: Operationalizing Models 
 The previous chapter built two hypothesized models outlining a network-
centered systems perspective of terrorism. This chapter explains the intent of the two 
models, outlines the way variables in the models are operationalized, explains how 
each model is examined, and explains how conclusions are reached. 
 Social network analysis (SNA) of terrorist groups offers little by which one 
can effectively judge the strength of relationships between the terrorist group and its 
presumed constituency. SNA is relational, yet focuses its attention on the totality of 
network linkages and structures, limiting examinations to description of network 
structure and development.  The network itself, however it develops, and the resulting 
topologies encapsulate the principle areas of interest in SNA analyses. As a result, 
most network analyses are conducted at the system level of analysis, offering little 
insight into the nature, needs, or activities of individual nodes or into the nature of the 
linkages between specific nodes. 
 SNA typically focuses attention on sub-systems or sub-networks within the 
context of larger networks and systems. Terrorist groups, for example, when subject 
to SNA analysis, are addressed as largely self-contained networks rather than as 
active entities within a larger political or social context. Typical SNA measurements 
– path length, centrality, density, betweenness, and the existence or absence of 
clusters – limit the scale of inquiry to the immediate sub-network. A disproportionate 
level of attention, therefore, is devoted in these studies to description of the network, 
assessment of the centrality and connectedness of various component entities, and the 
identification of leading or controlling component entities. Opportunities for 
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assessing the evolutionary potential of terrorist groups, however, are not possible 
given the limited scope of these studies since such assessments demand examination 
of network topology and network interactions within the context of the larger supra-
network structure. Where typical SNA studies consider the potential for evolutionary 
growth of a node in terms of its probability of, and opportunities to, link to other 
nodes in the network, they do not assess growth potential in terms of the strength or 
robustness of linkages between nodes.  
The level of analysis in this paper consequently shifts to the mid-range, 
between the larger network and smaller, isolated sub-network of interest, to the 
specific characteristics of a linkage between two critical sub-networks. The social and 
political environment in which the struggle between terrorist group and its adversaries 
takes place constitutes the larger, encompassing network. Contained within this 
network are a variety of sub-networks, most of which overlap with a variety of other 
sub-networks. At this level, the terrorist group constitutes a specific sub-network, as 
does the government, the terrorist’s presumed constituency, the media, students, 
workers and businesses, sports leagues, cities and other local governments, churches 
and similar religious groupings, and countless number of other associational groups. 
Where typical SNA analyses study specific sub-networks, the present study addresses 
the linkage between selected sub-networks, specifically the terrorist group and its 
presumed constituency. 
 Terrorist group survival, particularly in the face of effective and determined 
government opposition, rests in large part on the terrorist group’s ability to build a 
reservoir of support from which it can replenish or increase supplies, funds, 
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information, and, most importantly, recruits. While logistical assistance and material 
supplies can, and often are, acquired either from outside sources or from criminal 
acquisition at the local level, insuring a steady stream of recruits requires some degree 
of local sympathy and support. External recruiting may boost organizational status 
and effectiveness over the short term, but is inadequate for sustaining operations over 
the long term. Terrorist groups that rely on outsiders to fill their ranks quickly come 
to be seen as mercenary forces seeking to import a cause or exploit a local weakness. 
The result is often a failure to generate a sustainable level of local support and 
sympathy necessary for forging lasting local ties and standing. 
 In order to leverage opportunities for success in operations and develop into a 
potential victor, a terrorist group must 1) find or create common cause with an 
identifiable constituency and 2) locate that constituency among the population in their 
area of operations.48
                                                 
48 Cross-national or international terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda today or al-Fatah in the 
1970s and 1980s, sometimes operated in countries far removed from the geographic area in which their 
grievances rested and far removed from their claimed constituency. In these instances, the group’s 
primary area of operations were in the geographic area most closely associated with their presumed 
constituency and grievance or the group developed and maintained a broad spectrum of support in that 
area.  
 Identifying those groups best positioned to evolve into serious 
threats to power thus rests on an assessment of the group’s ability to gain and 
maintain a supportive local audience. This paper explores the potential for making 
such an examination by creating a measure of linkage strength, or robustness, in a 
network that, at present, does not exist, and testing the validity and efficacy of that 
measure in several carefully selected case studies. This project’s focus, as a result, is 
principally the development and initial testing of a new measure through which 
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relational strength can be measured in studies of terrorist evolutionary potential rather 
than on the subject terrorist groups or their struggles and operations. 
 Evolutionary biology offers a useful starting point, since that field has 
addressed similar questions in the continued study of evolution. In recent years, Stuart 
Kauffman (1995) has challenged the notion first outlined by Darwin that evolutionary 
processes dictate a graduated adaptation-mutation dynamic leading to incremental 
change in organisms in order to meet environmental challenges. In doing so, 
Kauffman developed a fitness model, otherwise known as the NK-model, which 
describes a potentially explosive adaptation response among living organisms as 
much a product of genetics as environmental stressors. Kauffman’s NK-model posits 
evolutionary change as stemming from the complex interaction of genes and alleles, 
the outcome of which determines the organism’s relative fitness49
                                                 
49 In Kauffman’s NK-model, genes are assigned one of two values, + if “on” and – if “off.” 
Whether a gene is expressed, or turned on, depends on the specific affect other genes and alleles have 
on it. In a simple three gene example, the total number of possible gene combinations equals 2N, where 
N represents the total number of genes. An organism with three genes would thus have 8 possible 
expression combinations, ranging from +++ to - - - . For each combination, a fitness coefficient, W, 
can be calculated, which Kauffman designates W1, W2, and W3, representing the specific impact of 
genes on each other. The organism’s overall fitness, then, is a combination of specific gene pair 
fitnesses, 
 by which its 
survival as a species is determined. Fitter species meet existing and developing 
environmental challenges while less fit species do not. Kauffman’s model envisions a 
“fitness landscape” of peaks and valleys, with relative height equating to level of 
fitness, to describe an organism’s ability to survive through multiple generations. 
. In evolutionary biology, each of the possible outcomes of gene expression 
can carry a calculated overall fitness, illustrative of the possibility that species evolution can result in 
branching, with different sub-species evolving in different directions. Adapting the NK-model to social 
and political groups, however, offers less of an opportunity to consider variances in sub-group 
evolution. Given the greater inflexibility, the adaptation of the NK-model used here posits only one 
possible state for any series of potential “gene” interactions. See Kauffman (1995: 170-187).    
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Nature, however, appears to dictate constant striving for greater fitness, hence lasting 
survival, such that living things never regress toward less fit states.  
 Social interactions, including terrorism, however, offer the possibility that one 
or more actor can regress to a “less fit” state. Stressors leading to the crumbling of 
societies, for example, offer clear examples of instances in which a social 
arrangement can descend to a less fit level as it seeks to address internal and external 
challenges. Neither failure nor success in adaptation appears guaranteed, yet the NK-
model does not allow for any possibilities other than success or stabilization. As a 
result, Kauffman’s NK-model is used as an illustrative model rather than as a 
template for assessment. Where the NK-model offers an opportunity to assess 
multiple paths of species evolution, the fitness model developed here considers 
organizational evolution in terms of potential states of operational status, or 
instantaneous robustness, such that fitness can be calculated at selected points across 
a given time span, and those fitness levels compared over time. 
Defining Expected Link Affinity 
 
 Whereas evolutionary biologists face a complex genetic matrix even for the 
simplest organisms, translating fitness to a social setting can be quite simple, albeit 
with a different set of entanglements. Living things carry hundreds, if not thousands, 
of genes, many of which having roles that are poorly understood, if understood at all. 
The sheer number of genes in even the simplest species offers a significant hurdle to 
understanding evolutionary change. In a social setting, a simpler model is possible, 
offering both a more straightforward evolutionary path and a much simpler set of 
factors analogous to genes with which to work. In considering a terrorist group’s 
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efforts to evolve and increase operational effectiveness and survivability over time, it 
improves its relative fitness with each new connection to a supportive audience. The 
criticality of the terrorist – audience – constituency linkage, then, is seen as the key to 
understanding the opportunities a terrorist group has in improving fitness, 
maintaining a steady state fitness level, or regressing to a less fit status. 
 Grunig’s (1976, 1982, 1984, and 1997) theories of a situational theory of 
publics offers a reasonable starting point for the development of a link robustness 
measure. According to Grunig, four factors are critical for an information or 
marketing campaign to be effective. First, there must be a degree of problem 
recognition, either already existent or created, producing individual perceptions of a 
“need for information” such that the individual acknowledges a given problem exists. 
Grunig (1982: 167) holds that problem recognition is critical since “a person who 
perceives a situation as problematic needs information to solve the problem.” 
Terrorists seeking support have the same critical need, requiring a constituency to 
understand and agree that a given situation or status is unacceptable or undesirable. 
Recruiting potential members or supporters demands linkage to some dissatisfaction 
or grievance, particularly given the expected costs that would be associated with anti-
government activities. Where a problem is not widely acknowledged, the terrorist 
must create the impression that a problem exists and find a way to convey effectively 
that understanding to a targeted audience. Where some degree of problem recognition 
already exists, the terrorist can best capitalize on that perception by highlighting and 
reinforcing that awareness. Effective exploitation of problem recognition, whether 
created or manipulated, could be achieved through effective articulation of 
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grievances, repetition of grievance claims, and establishing and maintaining 
credibility, particularly where the creation of a grievance is involved. 
 Second, the degree to which a person perceives a personal association with a 
given grievance, what Grunig calls level of involvement, helps determine the degree 
to which a communications or marketing campaign is effective. A personal stake in 
an issue results in motivation to acquire information, since the individual needs 
information in order to plan appropriate behavior (Grunig 1982: 167). For the 
terrorist, creating and maintaining problem recognition is inadequate if that level of 
problem recognition is undermined by a weak or missing level of involvement. The 
most effective means by which apathy can be overcome is through the creation of 
such a personal stake in the outcome of an issue, by making the grievance personal, 
by personification of the issue in order to tie an issue to an individual’s goals, 
aspirations, or sense of justice. The terrorist’s effort to gain support must have a 
personal impact on the intended audience, with communications on a level that 
resonates with that presumed constituency. By personalizing the grievance, and the 
effort to address the grievance, the terrorist must create and foster some sense of 
community or shared stake in the outcome of the struggle.  
 Recognizing a problem and understanding one has a personal stake in its 
address and resolution, however, are not enough to spur most people into accepting 
the considerable risk associated with supporting a terrorist group. Grunig (1982: 167) 
calls a necessary third factor constraint recognition, the level to which an individual 
believes he or she can have an impact on the outcome. Futility is recognized as a 
significant barrier to action, so the terrorist seeking to gain support would need to 
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overcome the risk aversion that often accompanies calls to violent struggle. To 
succeed, the terrorist would need to convince his presumed constituents that the 
benefits and rewards of acting outweigh the risks associated with acting. 
Alternatively, the terrorist could choose to convey the message that the costs of 
inaction, or of acting and failing, far outweigh the costs of joining the struggle. 
Depending on prevailing societal perspectives and norms, such a message could also 
be couched in the language of religion, asserting that action is consistent with the 
dictates and expectations of a deity or is otherwise consistent with religious duties. 
Similar appeals to ethnic or cultural survival or protection could also serve to create 
the necessary levels for overcoming constraints. 
 Finally, Grunig posits a referent criterion, a sense of “whether the person 
thinks he has a solution for the issue,” noting that an individual will seek out 
information, and process it more often, when no referent criterion exists (Grunig, 
1982: 167-168). For Grunig, individuals with a referent criterion seek less 
information because they already have an understanding of what needs to be done. 
The terrorist, however, seeks to create and maintain a belief that only the terrorists’ 
way, however difficult or distasteful, is the appropriate way of addressing grievances. 
A constituency that already has a solution offers barriers to this effort by holding 
competing notions about appropriate solutions. Should such alternatives exist, the 
terrorist would likely seek to characterize them as flawed, unworkable, or ineffective. 
As such, the absence of a referent criterion, or the destruction of a preexisting referent 
criterion, serves the terrorists’ purpose by affording him the opportunity to establish 
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and maintain a perspective that acknowledges only one avenue for grievance 
resolution. 
 Terrorists communicate with their audiences, including their presumed 
constituents, both by violence and through publicly released statements and claims of 
credit for violent acts. The overt communications of the terrorist constitute a 
rhetorical component of the communication effort, serving to explain and justify the 
terrorists’ positions and actions. Through these messages, the terrorist seeks to 
provide a rationale for his actions, explaining why something was undertaken, issuing 
demands, conveying threats for failure to accede to demands, offering or dictating 
proposed solutions to stated problems, and appealing for assistance and support. In 
creating and dissemination their statements, claims, and communiqués, the terrorist 
group seeks to construct and convey a particular worldview, often through a 
combination of disparaging and hostile characterizations of “the enemy” and vague 
but attractive visions of what the future could hold.  
 These messages are reinforced through the symbolic message inherent in the 
violent acts undertaken by the group. Weapon selection, target selection, type of 
attack, and even timing of an attack convey meaning to the terrorists’ audiences. 
More often than not, the interpretation of the violent act reflects more the perspective 
of the observer than it does the intent of the terrorist. While some discrepancies are 
intentional, serving as part of the “propaganda war” between terrorist and 
government, most likely stem from a more innocent difference in perspective and 
interpretive framework associated with the differences between aggressor and 
perceived victim.  
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 Bringing the insights of Kauffman and Grunig together in the context of 
terrorism offers a novel approach to assessing the likelihood of terrorist group 
evolution towards status as a serious contender for power or mass movement. 
Whereas Kauffman’s NK-model, applied to evolutionary biology offers a “fitness 
landscape” of varying topology, adaptation to a societal setting simplifies the 
landscape. Gone are the multitude of peaks and valleys representing a variety of local 
maxima and minima of fitness potential, replaced by a fitness terrain dominated by a 
single system-defining optimum evolutionary outcome.50
 Fitness, in the assessment of terrorist groups, must address the interaction of 
each factor, in both rhetorical and symbolic contexts, as well as the impact of any 
existing referent criterion. To capture that interaction, fitness, or expected affinity, A, 
is defined as 
 
A = (1 + SY) (μ) 
 
 
where SY is a measure of the symbolic orientation of the terrorists’ actions and μ is a 
measure of the rhetorical orientation of the group’s communications.  Each of the 
terms, in turn, contain multiple components intended to describe the nature of both 
rhetorical and symbolic communicative content directed at the group’s anticipated 
and presumed constituencies. Grunig holds that a referent criterion acts as a damper 
                                                 
50 Kauffman’s fitness landscape of peaks and valleys represents the multitude of possibilities 
species evolution can taken. While such a landscape’s topology changes over time, as environmental 
conditions re-define advantageous and disadvantageous traits and abilities, the societal fitness 
landscape exhibits a much lower propensity for change. In large part, this lower propensity for change 
is due to the relative stability offered a social grouping by virtue of its accepted and established norms, 
values, and belief systems. Significant changes to the societal landscape are not generally the product 
of internal tensions and disturbances, which terrorism would represent, but are rather the product of 
external challenges coupled with poor reactions and responses (see Diamond 2005). Wars, natural 
disasters, and economic collapse exacerbated by increasingly interrelated global dependencies are 
much more likely to result in significant societal fitness changes than are more localized perturbations 
and pressures.  
 111 
 
on problem recognition, level of involvement, and constraint recognition. Where a 
referent criterion is present, individuals are less likely to seek out information, and act 
on it, since they are more prone to believe they know what needs to be done. As a 
result, a referent criterion determines the degree to which the other three factors can 
and will come into play. Grunig’s work, however, focuses on interactions where each 
actor is relatively free to choose between available options, to act or not act, to pay 
attention or ignore, the delivered message. In an environment of terrorist activity, 
where fear and uncertainty inform perceptions, choices, and perceptions of choices, 
the referent criterion is effectively removed, freeing individuals to perceive events 
around them in an often-personal way and to make choices about how to react to 
those events. 
 Problem recognition, or lack thereof, is expected to affect both the level of 
involvement and the impact of constraint recognition. If an individual were not to 
recognize a problem exists, there would be little call for action and, consequently, no 
expectation of involvement. Similarly, a lack of problem recognition precludes 
consideration of constraints, since there are no expectations of sanction or negative 
reward where participatory behavior is not undertaken.  
 Level of involvement is expected to escalate rapidly, particularly given the 
extra-legal nature of supporting or participating in terrorist activities. As one gets 
more deeply involved in such activities, the threat of sanction and punishment rise. 
Similarly, involvement in terrorist group activities would be expected to escalate 
gradually over time, with initial forays in support of terrorists relatively small, 
offering no overt illegality, and only incrementally moving toward a more easily 
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distinguishable break from prevailing behavioral rules and expectations. Escalation of 
behaviors could result either from action followed by lack of sanction, or from 
perceived government over-reaction. The former would reinforce a notion that one 
might continue to act and act more brazenly with impunity, while the latter could 
push the non-committed to openly side with the group in order to “punish” the 
government for its excessive behaviors (see, for example, Bell 1998 and 2000). From 
either of these points, escalation in level of involvement could be expected to rise 
rapidly,51
 Constraint recognition, on the other hand, is expected to be cumulatively 
additive, given the notion that the greater perceived impact of constraint recognition 
is likely to be at the onset of activity, rather than after the individual has become 
habituated to a pro-terrorist behavioral pattern (see, for example, Kahneman and 
Tversky 1984; Hoffer 1951). The more “comfortable” one gets in acting, overtly or 
covertly, on behalf of a terrorist, the less of an impact on perceptions and fears the 
threat of sanction will carry, leaving later considerations of constraints to continue 
dampening an individual’s willingness to act but in increasing smaller measures. 
 making the cumulative impact of level of involvement multiplicative rather 
than additive. 
Calculating the Message Factors 
 
 Assessing fitness, or expected affinity, requires a means to address both the 
rhetorical and symbolic contexts of terrorists’ communication with their audiences, 
                                                 
51 Terrorists have long recognized the value of commitment to the cause as a bar to societal 
re-integration. Recruits have often been tested to establish the status as bona fide recruits, rather than 
informer or agent of the government, by being directed to undertake clearly illegal acts that ordinarily 
carry severe legal sanction. Recruits are ordered, for example, to murder, since the terrorist group 
understands that crime is too excessive to allow those responsible to return to the government side 
without penalty.  
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especially with that particular audience the group sees as its primary constituency. In 
some respects, the rhetorical dimension has greater impact on problem recognition, 
level of involvement, and constraint recognition given its ability to accurately and 
concisely convey meaning specifics. The symbolic content of a message, on the other 
hand, is often ambiguous and subject to sometimes widely divergent interpretations. 
Regardless of how careful the terrorist is in operational planning, the accurate 
conveyance of a symbolic message is always tenuous, depending as it does on the 
interpretive abilities of an audience. Given these differences in expectation of 
accuracy in interpretation, problem recognition is defined as a combination of the 
number of messages delivered in a given month and the ratio of problem 
acknowledgement or definition references to problem denial referents. The more 
complex the ideological grounding of the terrorist group, the more likely that group’s 
goals, objectives, and meaning will be difficult to convey to an external audience. 
Text messages offer more of an opportunity to contribute to accurate interpretations 
than do the hidden and ambiguous sub-texts inherent in operational decision-making. 
Similarly, groups seeking to create grievances where recognition of problems does 
not already exist have greater opportunity to avoid interpretive inaccuracy by 
explaining themselves and their actions in textual forms than with acts of violence.  
Problem Recognition  
 
 Rhetorical problem recognition, ρR, addresses the intent of the terrorist to 
convey to a specified audience the recognition or belief that there is a problem or 
issue that is not only a common concern, but needs to be addressed. Conveying 
recognition or identification of a particular issue requires the terrorist’s 
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communications acknowledge the problem while also persuading that audience to 
accept the interpretation of the situation presented by the terrorist. Not only must the 
terrorist convince the audience to see the situation in substantially similar ways to the 
perception of the terrorist, it must also work to affix blame to some external entity, 
preferably the terrorists’ adversary. To be effective, that message needs to establish 
and maintain consistency over time in order to avoid confusing issues and risking a 
cognitive and perceptual split in the audience the terrorist deems its constituency. 
Furthermore, the message needs to be relatively simple, since too complex a 
discussion, too esoteric or too theoretical a discussion may alienate some or all of the 
audience the group targeted. Simple messages are easier to understand, boosting the 
probability that the message will be understood and accepted by that audience. The 
message needs to have cultural, ethnic, contextual, or communal relevance, giving the 
issue or problem discussed greater resonance and salience with the targeted audience. 
The terrorist can also increase chances of achieving a connection with the targeted 
audience by emphasizing a communal or shared nature of the issue, establishing in 
turn a common cause with the targeted audience and establishing a sense of 
partnership and shared hardship. 
 The degree to which the terrorists’ message achieves these goals can be 
assessed through content analysis of the messages the terrorist creates and 
communicates to the targeted audience. Rhetorical problem recognition is calculated 
using a content dictionary of 175 words incorporating issues of centrality and shared 
hardship.52
                                                 
52 To create the dictionary, appropriate categories for the General Inquirer and the Lasswell 
Value Dictionary were combined, forming an initial set of categories designed to reflect the concepts 
 Centrality, in this context, refers to words used to emphasize core values, 
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shared belief, and legitimacy. Hardship words indicate, reinforce, or help create 
awareness in the existence or persistence of some undesirable activity or condition, 
particularly when that situation can be blamed on an outside or authoritative 
adversary. Words in the dictionary that address centrality and hardship are referred to 
here as “issue positives.” Linguistically simple messages, borrowing Rudolph 
Flesch’s (1948, 1951) notion of the affect of convoluted messages, are expected to 
have a greater impact on the targeted audience and its members since a simpler 
logical argument construction is expected to be easily understood by a greater number 
of message recipients. Words associated with complex logical constructions are 
referred to here as “issue negatives.” Both issue positives and issue negatives are 
further expected to increase in effect the longer and more frequently each appears in a 
message presented to the intended audience, therefore the frequency of relevant 
phrasing repetition contributes significantly to calculation of rhetorical problem 
recognition: 
ρ R  = c [ ln  ] 
 
 
where c  is a standardized score indicating the semantic complexity of the message, 
νi+  is the calculated frequency of issue positives in those messages, and νi-  is the 
calculated frequency of issue negatives in those messages. There is always the 
possibility, however, that a terrorist group’s message might gravitate to one or the 
other extreme, resulting in a wholly positive or negative message. In such a case, the 
                                                                                                                                           
encapsulated in Grunig’s situational theory of publics. This initial category set as then reviewed word-
by-word to ensure both appropriateness of included words and completeness of each created category. 
Categories were then selectively augmented by context-specific words and phrases common to 
discourse on and in periods of political and social violence. In constructing the categories in this 
manner, the intent was to create a set reflective of Grunig’s concepts that is general enough to hold 
applicability across a range of temporal, cultural, and political contexts. 
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ratio between frequency of message positives to message negatives could be either 
zero, 0, or undefined mathematically. To avoid that possibility, the calculation of 
issue positives and issue negatives incorporate an arbitrary base of one, 1, for each, 
generating the expressed (1+νi+) / (1+νi-) ratio. The natural logarithm of that ratio is 
then taken in order to standardize measures across time and operational context. 
Level of Involvement 
 
 Level of involvement calculations follow a similar pattern, with the measure 
seeking to capture the extent to which terrorists’ messages articulate a recognition of 
the need for, or desirability of, individual involvement in efforts to resolve the 
previously identified problems. Since level of involvement engenders either the call 
to action or the resulting action itself, level of involvement is moot for the terrorists’ 
constituency until they choose to act in conjunction with or on behalf of the terrorist 
group. For that reason, there is no separate symbolic component for level of 
involvement. Level of involvement is thus defined as the number of messages 
delivered in a given month and the degree to which those messages emphasize or 
highlight the need to act. 
 Calculating level of involvement in terrorists’ messages requires 
determination of the extent to which those messages encourage, prompt, or rationalize 
the choice to act in some way supportive of the terrorist or his aims. Consequently, 
rhetorical level of involvement addresses the desirability of acting on a personal level, 
a sense of kinship or shared condition, and a sense of obligation. Messages scoring 
high on rhetorical level of involvement would be expected to combine an appeal to a 
sense of justice and either inspirational encouragement or incitement toward hatred 
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directed at the claimed adversary or problem source. The content dictionary 
constructed to allow measurement of rhetorical level of involvement contains 728 
words offering a mixture of positive and negative appeals, the “action positives,” 
tempered by ambivalence, complexity, and expressions of satisfaction, the “action 
negatives.”  Both action positives and action negatives are expected to have 
increasing effects the more often and the more frequently each is expressed, making 
the number of messages delivered another important factor. Level of involvement is 
thus calculated as: 
λr = nm [ ln  ]  
 
where nm  is the number of messages provided to the audience to date, νa+  is the 
frequency of words or passages supporting and encouraging action present, and νa-  is 
the accumulated frequency of passages or words promoting or encouraging inaction. 
Given the possibility that a particular message may be entirely action negative or 
positive, the ratio incorporates an arbitrary base of one, 1, to eliminate the possibility 




 The constraint recognition component is a bit more involved, and is defined as 
a combination of constraint referents or denials in communicated messages, an 
embellishment score, and a measure of the physical impact, in terms of casualties, 
associated actions of the terrorist group convey. In the rhetorical context, constraint 
recognition may be a bit more difficult for an observer to understand, depending on 
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how obtuse or how positive the textual messages of the terrorist are. Few 
communications are expected to highlight the costs of joining the struggle, promoting 
instead the virtues or gains associated with the terrorists’ efforts. What conception of 
constraint that might exist may well be dependent on the interpreter’s perspective, 
rather than any text present in the message. The symbolic component, in similar 
fashion, may be largely dependent on interpretation, but such interpretation may be 
easier for many given the visual and emotional impact of a violent act and of the 
government’s response. 
Rhetorical Constraint Recognition 
 
 Rhetorical constraint recognition poses what may be a difficult aspect of 
persuasive communications for the terrorist. On the one hand, the terrorists’ message 
must convey a realistic sense of constraint, limitation, possible negative consequence 
of action. On the other hand, the message must find an effective way of encouraging 
recipients to minimize, compartmentalize, accept, or disregard the potential negative 
consequences that may be associated with acting on behalf or in conjunction with the 
terrorist group (the “constraint negatives”). The message must convey a sense of 
purpose as well as an expectation of ultimate gain or benefit while simultaneously 
expressing confidence in the outcomes of action despite, or in some instances because 
of, hardship that might have to be endured in pursuit of the desired outcome of 
activity. Passivity or inaction, which might be the more typical response to 
recognition of the possibility of sanction (the “constraint positives”), must be 
overcome in the mind of the message recipient such that when weighing the benefits 
of acting and risks of inaction, action is chosen. Those recipients already risk 
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acceptant need to be encouraged, while the more risk adverse recipients need to be 
convinced that the risk is not as undesirable as supposed or can somehow be 
mitigated to an acceptable degree. Rhetorical constraint recognition, as a result, 
consists of 405 words designed to convey a sense that the resultant benefits of action 
outweigh any anticipated consequences. Rhetorical constraint recognition, α, the first 
component of message constraint recognition, is calculated as: 
α = 1 +  
 
where  νc-  is the frequency of words or passages minimizing the impact or likelihood 
of possible negative sanctions and νc+  is the frequency of words or passages that 
encourage passivity and inaction or highlight the probability or impact of any 
resulting negative sanctions. An arbitrary base of one, 1, is added to the measured 
frequencies of both constraint negatives and constraint positives, and to the ratio itself 
both to avoid the possibility of a mathematically undefined ratio and to ensure the 
calculated rhetorical constraint recognition measure does not negate the impact of the 
embellishment or symbolic content components. 
Embellishment 
 
 In addition to expressions of risk acceptability engendered in the constraint 
negative – constraint positive ratio, measurement of overall constraint recognition 
must also account for the degree to which textual content is modified or qualified, 
since heavier modification and qualification would be expected to deemphasize the 
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desirability of action and risk acceptance in the message. This measure, called 
embellishment,53
β = 
 β, is calculated as: 
 
 
where praise and blame are content dictionary categories specifically developed for 
the generation of the embellishment score. The praise category consists of 226 words 
or word senses that convey a sense of praise, approval, affirmation, or support for 
actions or conditions. Blame, as a category, consists of 373 words or word senses that 
convey a sense of evil, ill will, denigration, inappropriateness, or unfortunate 
circumstances. A higher ratio, or embellishment score, would suggest text more 
attuned to emphasizing the desirability or approval associated with action. 
Constraint Recognition Calculation 
 
 Combining the rhetorical and symbolic components of constraint recognition 
with an embellishment score yields a measure of message constraint recognition 
consistent with the most widely accepted theories of persuasion. The rhetorical 
components, rhetorical constraint recognition and embellishment, act directly on each 
other, offering a clear expression of the extent to which the terrorist group crafts a 
consistent message either de-emphasizing risk of action or re-defining existing risk as 
a desirable consequence of action. Symbolic content of the terrorists’ message, 
engendered in the symbolic constraint recognition, acts on the product of rhetorical 
interaction, elevating the measure to a more inclusive level by acknowledging the 
                                                 
53 The embellishment score is adapted from similar content categories used in Roderick Hart’s 
(1984, 1985, and 2000) Diction content analysis software. 
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degree to which effective messages offer consistency between words and deeds. 
Thus, constraint recognition, γ R,  is described as 
γ R = ln (αβ)  
 




 Consideration of the symbolic content is a measure is intended to parallel 
consideration of associated rhetorical messages. Whereas the terrorist must persuade 
an audience of the justness, the rightness, the appropriateness of his cause and 
actions, he must also conduct himself in ways mirroring and supporting those claims 
if he is to build and maintain political and social standing consistent with his own, 
and his presumed constituency’s, expectations. From his audience’s point of view, 
violent acts convey as much meaning, perhaps more, than any other message. 
Terrorist violence, as many have noted, is a form of political theater intended to 
create, maintain, and manipulate both perceptions and political and social agendas. 
The symbolic message of the terrorist would seem to have greater import if the acts 
and the way those acts are perceived and interpreted support the rhetorical 
expressions of issue identification, level of involvement, and constraint recognition.
 Symbolic message representations address the extent to which the terrorist’s 
chosen targets reflect the issue or problem highlighted as a source of conflict by the 
terrorist. Three pairs of targeting attributes, combined with measures of weapon 
selection and attack severity, are used to generate a score reflecting the consistency 




   
Targeting Attribute  +1   -1 
   
 
Societal   public       private 
  Locational   foreign          domestic 





The societal attribute seeks to capture and articulate the apparent focus of the 
violent attack. Terrorists typically identify a government, either its own or a foreign 
state’s, as its primary target. Consequently, a greater action – message congruence is 
expected when that institution or its representatives are targeted. As a result, attacks 
directed against government facilities, symbols, institutions, or representatives, or 
attacks against those entities widely considered closely associated with government or 
governmental policies and practices, are considered public targets, and assigned a 
value of one, +1. In the Israeli-Hamas, for example, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 
facilities or personnel, infrastructure such as transportation hubs or modes, and 
settlers and settler activities are considered public targets since each is either part of 
the Israeli government or enjoys the support and protection of government. Area 
attacks, where no specific target exists otherwise, such as Hamas mortar and rocket 
attacks on populated areas, including settlements, are deemed attacks on private 
targets due to the notorious inaccuracy of these weapons. Attacks against private 
targets are assigned a value of negative one, -1.  
 The locational attribute is relatively straightforward. Attacks take place either 
within the borders of the terrorists’ home state or they occur outside that state’s 
borders. While some attacks, particularly high-casualty attacks commonly referred to 
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as “spectaculars,” can have a significant impact on a home state population regardless 
of location, particularly given the global penetration of electronic mass media, 
locational considerations remain of interest. Domestic attacks are often perceived 
with a higher degree of relevance and immediacy, highlighting the possibility that 
subsequent attacks on home soil could have a direct impact on an observer whereas 
attacks outside one’s home territory offer some degree of perceptual insulation. For 
this reason alone, domestic attacks are taken to offer a greater opportunity to 
influence the perceptions, interpretations, and subsequent choices of individuals 
among the terrorists’ presumed audience. Domestic attacks, carrying greater 
immediacy, can also convey a message that risks associated with action are 
overvalued, particularly as frequency of attacks increases. For the terrorist, attacks on 
home soil not only offer reinforcement of problem identification, they offer a 
compelling argument that action can be undertaken against the state with little or no 
risk. Attacks against domestic targets thus are assigned a value of positive one, +1, 
while attacks undertaken on foreign soil are assigned a value of negative one, -1. 
 The intimacy attribute builds on notions associated with entity identification 
in that attacks are assigned values based on the scope of an attack. Selective targeting, 
where the violence is limited to a highly selective and discriminating target set, while 
horrific, may be perceived by observers as somewhat less threatening than 
indiscriminate attacks. Assassination targets are selected because they meet specific 
criteria, conveying by that selectivity the notion that others are less likely to become 
victims other than by having the ill fortune of being in the wrong place at the wrong 
time. Indiscriminate or random attacks destroy any opportunity for an audience 
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member to rationalize their own immunity, making these attacks more personally 
unsettling and frightening. As a result, attacks that are indiscriminate or random in 
their target selection may be perceived as less supportive of the terrorists’ stated goals 
and objectives and are assigned a value of negative one, -1. Selective targeting, where 
victims are easily identified as having been specifically selected, may similarly offer 
observers an opportunity to believe themselves less vulnerable and help reinforce the 
terrorists’ message of specific grievances, goals, and objectives. These attacks, then, 
are assigned a value of positive one, +1.  
 Weapon selection also affects the audience’s perception of terrorist attacks, 
particularly as they relate to the discriminate or indiscriminate nature of the attack 
and the extent to which casualties are produced. By their nature, some weapons carry 
more shock value than others do, with more familiar weapons offering less shock 
value than more exotic weapons or those designed to create mass casualties. 
Assigning scores based on weapons selection, however, is quite subjective: weapons 
some may find rather ordinary may be quite shocking and terrifying to others. With 
this in mind, a scale for assigning value to weapon selection was developed that 
identifies the relative amount of kinetic energy released through weapon use as a 
defining criteria for assigning values. The greater the amount of kinetic energy 
associated with use of a particular weapon, the higher the assigned value. Since the 
emphasis here is on weapon selection as a reflection of the terrorist group’s 
objectives, it is also expected that the audiences observing the terrorists’ acts will 
interpret weapon selection as a concrete expression of intent. Weapons which release 
greater amounts of kinetic energy in their application are also more likely to result in 
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a larger circle of death and destruction, raising the possibility that any attack, 
regardless of how carefully targeted, may be seen as an indiscriminate attack. Values 
assigned to different weapon choices reflect both the relative level of kinetic energy 
released in its application and an expected interpretation of observers: 
 
 Weapon      
 No weapon used, unknown     0 
Assigned Value 
 Non-explosive, non-projectile (e.g. knife, rope)  1 
 Handgun       2 
 Long gun (e.g. rifle, machine gun, shotgun)   3 
 Incendiary device (including arson attacks)   4 
 Non-incendiary explosives     5 
 Missiles and other heavy projectiles    6 
 Radiological devices      7 
 Chemical devices      8 
 Biological devices      9 
 Nuclear explosive devices     10 
 
 Much like assigning values for weapons selection, assigning values for attack 
severity is equally subjective. Greater immediacy, closer proximity, nature of the 
target, even the life experiences of observers, as well as a host of other factors 
influence the way in which a given attack might be perceived by observers. In an 
examination of the deterrent impact of Operation El Dorado Canyon, in which the 
United States bombed targets in Libya in 1986 in retaliation for Libyan involvement 
in the bombing of Berlin’s La Belle Disco and other attacks, Prunckun and Mohr 
(1997: 267-280) develop and refine a severity scale to differentiate between small and 
large scale attacks. A modified version of the Prunckun-Mohr scale54
                                                 
54 To modify the Prunckun-Mohr scale, values they assigned to various types of attacks were 
presented to three separate groups of 20 individuals, each group composed of both military and civilian 
students at the National Defense Intelligence College (formerly the Joint Military Intelligence College) 
in Washington, DC. Members of each group were asked to arrange the types of attacks presented in 
order, from most severe to least severe. Group averages were compiled from the combined individual 
orderings, and the resulting three scales were then added to that presented by Prunckun and Mohr. The 
resulting scale represented the average of the four combined ranking sets and was found to generally 
 is used here to 
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assign severity values to different types of terrorist attacks. These values are intended 
to reflect a degree of observer reaction to attacks, based largely on perceived severity.  
The scores assigned are arranged along a 0 to 5 scale, with 5 representing the most 
severe: 
 
Act    Score  Act    Score 
Unknown   0.50  Armed attack   3.30 
Theft    1.00  Robbery (with death)  3.30 
Prison escape   1.00  Barricade (with hostage) 3.33 
Threat or hoax   1.12  Letter/parcel bombing  3.39 
Hunger strike   1.25  Explosive bombing  3.44 
Arms smuggling  1.69  Skyjacking   3.58 
Attempted bombing  1.77  Assassination/murder  3.82 
Facility occupation  2.14  Car bombing   4.00 
Armed robbery (no dead) 2.50  Suicide bombing  4.01 
Sabotage   2.56  Missile/rocket attack  4.04 
Sniping (at facility)  2.59  Chemical attack  4.43 
Shoot-out with police  2.96  Biological attack  4.56 
Incendiary / arson  3.02  Radiological attack  4.57 
Transportation seizure 3.07  Nuclear detonation  5.00 
Kidnapping   3.10 
 
 Most often, media reports emphasize the number of people killed in an attack, 
resulting in longer-term remembrance of death tolls than of the numbers of wounded. 
Indeed, when reporting a terrorist attack, both media outlets and government 
authorities appear to gauge severity in terms of the number of people killed rather 
than in total casualties or in terms of property damage caused. Since the symbolic 
value of the attack lies in the impressions created among both public and audience, 
more highly scored attacks tend to reflect actions typically resulting in greater 
                                                                                                                                           
track with that originally presented by Prunckun and Mohr. There are differences, however, possibly 
resulting from the personal and professional experiences of the NDIC respondents as well as from 
changes in terrorist tactics and weapon lethality, particularly in car bombs, in the years between 
development of the original scale and the revision adopted here. 
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numbers of casualties or, in the case of nuclear chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear attacks, expectation of total casualties in the event of such an attack. 
 Constraint recognition must also take into consideration the symbolic message 
contained or inferred in acts of violence authored by the terrorist. A greater degree of 
congruence seen in physical acts and rhetoric should serve to reinforce the message 
transmission efforts of the terrorist. Lesser congruence would be expected to work at 
cross-purposes for the terrorist, sowing confusion among members of the targeted 
audience over terrorist goals and expectations or serving to suggest the rhetoric of the 
group is somewhat lacking in veracity. For a rhetorical message to have resonance 
with a targeted audience, meaning inferred in acts by that group must be seen as 
directly tied to the expressed goals and intents of the group. Focusing rhetorical 
attention on real or presumed evils stemming from one source, for example, then 
targeting violence against a distinctly different target set undermines the intended 
message and minimizes the group’s ability to convey a persuasive message. To 
capture the potential impact of actual or inferred congruence between a terrorist 
group’s words and deeds, a ratio of casualties directly associated with expressed 
group goals and purposes to total casualties is included. Since many attacks result in 
no casualties, each part of the ratio is augmented by one.  
In calculating the symbolic orientation, locational attribute scores are 
combined with entity attribute scores as a reflection of the expected perceptual impact 
of geographic proximity and target identification. Given the scope, immediacy, and 
reach of electronic media, none of these attributes are expected to have a significant 
impact on its own. Rather, the combination of target identity and geographic 
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proximity act in concert to shape perceptions of terrorist activity, leading to use of the 
average of the two attribute scores instead of the sum of attribute values for all attacks 
in a given month. This score is then combined with the full value of scores 
representing weapon selection and attack intimacy, reflecting the greater perceptual 
impact of weapon choices and specificity in target selection. Then resulting figure is 
then combined with the number of attacks in a given month and the averaged severity 
scores for those attacks: 
SY = (  )/(nm) [S (τ+w+i)] 
 
where SY is symbolic orientation, (  ) represents the ratio of directly related 
casualties to all casualties,  nm is the number of attacks by the terrorist group in 
question in a given month, S is the averaged severity score of those attacks, τ 
represents the averaged sum of locational and entity attribute scores, w is the 
averaged monthly weapon selection scores for that month’s attacks, and i represents 
the average intimacy attribute score for that month’s attacks.  
Methodological Strategy 
 
 This project seeks to advance and test two related propositions. The first is 
that for terrorist groups to maintain effective operational viability over time and 
exhibit positive evolutionary growth, they must identify and maintain a supportive 
constituency among that segment of the population they claim to represent. The 
second holds that a test can be developed and used allowing assessment of a terrorist 
group’s chances of positive evolutionary growth, based on the extent to which that 
group’s words and deeds identify or establish common cause for action consistent 
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with the terrorist’s stated goals and objectives. To test these propositions, a measure 
has been created, called expected affinity, which if validated will help address both 
propositions. 
 Expected affinity is fluid and changing, depending on the accumulated actions 
and statements of the terrorist group, its opponents, and the targeted audience the 
terrorist seeks to reach. With each new statement, announcement, or communiqué 
from the terrorist, and with each violent attack undertaken or attributed to the 
terrorist, the expected affinity score assigned to that group should change, reflecting 
resulting changes in perceptions, attitudes, and levels of approval or disapproval. The 
interaction between terrorist and their presumed constituency is anything but static. 
 To test the utility of the expected affinity measurement, information on both 
the terrorists’ attacks and the content of the messages he relays to his presumed 
constituency are needed. While there is a wealth of such information available for 
research, the quality and consistency of data can, and often is, inconsistent at best and 
unreliable at worst. Attack data is often subject to a range of interpretations, resulting 
at times in significant disagreement between purportedly equivalent data sets. While 
many of these differences stem from definitional differences, some can also be 
attributed to ideological or political agendas of dataset compilers. The same holds for 
text collections, with differing compilations frequently varying in scope and 
inclusiveness. These differences are mitigated in this project by using only that data 
found in multiple datasets, suggesting general agreement on the merits of inclusion. 
 Since its founding in 1987, Hamas has released a significant number of 
statements of varying lengths and purposes. This study uses 176 statements released 
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to the public, spanning the months from October 1998 to January 2002. While these 
50 months represent only a portion of Hamas’ existence, the documents gathered 
from those months represent a dynamic period of Hamas’ growth and development, 
including a period between the 1st and 2nd Intifadas where civic engagement and 
political maneuvering tended to dominate. The period also includes the opening 
months of the more violent 2nd Intifada, when Hamas’ use of unguided mortars and 
homemade rockets supplanted its use of suicide bombings. This period also saw the 
beginnings of active conflict between Hamas and the rival Fatah movement. In 
addition, these documents represent a selection of communications that offered 
statements in both Arabic and English, allowing for random checks of texts published 
in English with their Arabic originals to gauge reliability of translations. 
 Seventy-four documents from the Red Army Faction are used, representing a 
time span of 324 months, or the effective lifespan of the organization. Unlike Hamas, 
the RAF underwent periods of relative inactivity, both in actions and in text releases, 
leading to a number of gaps, sometimes spanning months. The documents, however, 
offer an excellent view of the RAF’s evolution, since documents include those 
produced and released by the first generation leaders as well as various leadership 
groups that emerged over the course of the organization’s three decades. Included in 
the collection used are major ideological statements, pleas for action channeled 
through media interviews, and the organization’s final statement declaring an end to 
the RAF and its armed struggle. These documents also represent a collection of 
documents for which reliable English translations and German originals exist, 
allowing for greater confidence in translations’ reliability. 
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 The Symbionese Liberation Army enjoyed a much shorter operational 
lifespan, barely two and a half years, and consequently has fewer documents to offer. 
In all, 22 documents or transcripts produced by or attributed to the SLA are used, 
spanning the entirety of its operational life. This collection included statements 
written and distributed by the organization’s original leaders as well as statements by 
the second generation leadership that emerged following the May 1974 shootout with 
the Los Angeles Police Department that lead to the deaths of most of the SLA’s 
members. Latter documents are those published by the survivors seeking to regroup 
and reconstitute the organization. 
 All documents used were used in their entirety, rather than parsed or 
otherwise manipulated. Use of the entire document, including any title and 
introductory information found in the original allows for consideration of the overall 
impact of the text, building on the belief that the terrorists’ ability to gain and 
maintain a supportive audience depends on the totality of the impact it makes through 
words and deeds on its intended audience. Consequently, minimal adjustments were 
made to the texts, and only done to make each compatible with the features and 
requirements of the content analysis software used.55
                                                 
55 Specifically, brackets ( [ ] ) were converted to braces ( { } ) or parentheses, and all numbers 
were rendered in Arabic numerals. In the WordStat software used, brackets carry a specific meaning, 
directing the program to consider only text found enclosed by brackets.  Braces instruct the WordStat 
software to ignore enclosed text. As a result, only those brackets containing footnote numbers were 
converted to braces. All those containing text of any sort were converted to parentheses, which convey 
no special instructions to the software program. Numbers were converted to Arabic numerals for 
consistency, insuring that in any instance where a numerical term affected content analysis results, they 
would affect results in a consistent and uniform manner. 
 Once prepped, texts were 
imported into WordStat 5.1, an integrated content analysis package developed by 
Provalis Research, where they were assessed using content categories specifically 
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developed for generating the data leading to expected affinity calculations.56
 Attack data was gathered from multiple sources, offering an opportunity to 
combine datasets, eliminate duplicate, questionable, and incomplete entries, and 
develop a single dataset for each group’s attacks. In combining existing datasets in 
this way, variances in act inclusion based on perspective, interpretation, or conscious 
or unconscious compiler agendas can be minimized. From the resulting dataset, 
information on attack date and location, target identity, weapon use, attack type, and 
casualties was extracted and used to generate both constraint recognition score 
components and symbolic orientation data. Where information was available, self-
directed violence, particularly voluntary hunger strikes, were included since these 
actions were undertaken for the express purpose of generating publicity and 
promoting anti-government feelings among the public. Attacks against other militant 
or terrorist groups, however, were not included, since these acts were judged to have 
been undertaken not for public consumption and consideration but to hamper the 
effectiveness of rivals other than the targeted government.  
  In order 
to impose regularity and consistency on the data, documents from each organization 
were consolidated by month, resulting in problem recognition, level of involvement, 
and constraint recognition scores calculated for each month where reliable documents 
exist. In doing so, variances resulting from the organization’s differing publication 
schedules and practices are avoided. 
                                                 
56 Content categories were built using Grunig’s (1976, 1982, 1984) situational theory of 
publics. Using General Inquirer categories as a base, refinement was also informed through use of 
Osgood, et.al. (1957),  Levelt (1978), Flores d’Arcais (1978), Riesbeck and Schank (1978), Eco, et.al. 
(1988), Hogenraad and Bestgen (1989), and Smith, et.al. (1992). 
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 From the rhetorical data engendered in calculated problem recognition, level 
of involvement, and constraint recognition scores and the symbolic orientation scores 
generated from attack data, an expected affinity score was calculated for each group, 
by month, where data available data allowed. In a number of instances, however, 
reliable rhetorical data was unavailable, skewing any calculated expected affinity to 
zero. For continued assessment of the expected affinity calculation, these scores were 
discarded as missing data. For those months in which rhetorical and symbolic data 
allowed realistic generation of an expected affinity score, results were expected to 
span a rather wide range of values, particularly given the scoring of attack severity 
and the generated problem recognition scores, especially in later messages that 
enjoyed a foundation of year’s worth of accumulated repetition of problem 
identification and emphasis.  
Visual Analytics Applications 
 
 To allow for a meaningful comparison of the trends in expected affinity for 
each group, and for meaningful comparison between groups, problem recognition, 
levels of involvement, and constraint recognition scores are plotted over time, 
allowing for a visual examination of month-by-month variability. By relying on 
visual analytics rather than more usual statistical tests of correspondence, this analysis 
transcends the limitations imposed by differing environmental contexts coupled with 
the lack of a common referent standard that could be equitably applied across the 
three cases examined. Defined as “the science of analytic reasoning facilitated by 
interactive visual interfaces,” (Thomas and Cook, 2005: 4), visual analytics offers a 
means through which useful insights can be effectively derived from massive 
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amounts of data or highly variable and unstandardized data, particularly where 
patterns and relationships might be otherwise missed . As an interdisciplinary field, 
visual analytics remains an emerging field which includes active research in a number 
of areas including visual representations and data representations and transformations, 
as used here (see, for example, Tufte, 1969; Keim, et.al. 2006; Gregory, et.al. 2006; 
Yang, et.al. 2007; Ghoniem, et.al. 2007; and Wang, et.al. 2008).  
 In this assessment, problem recognition, level of involvement, and constraint 
recognition scores are plotted over time, represented in months elapsed since the 
subject group’s emergence, followed by analysis deigned to generate a best-fit 
regression curve to the data. The resulting graphs are then supplemented by the 
inclusion of time-line data of significant events in the subject group’s history, 
allowing visual comparison of score variations in temporal comparison to significant 
affective events in the organization’s history. This type of visual representation thus 
allows for the identification of potential changes in rhetorical efforts in response to 
environmental and situational stressors. Graphical presentations of symbolic 
orientation illustrate the intensity of violent activity attributed to each group, adding 
additional comparative data through which each subject group’s persuasive efforts 
can be assessed. A final set of graphical representations is then generated, plotting the 
generated expected affinity score over elapsed time, in months, affording an 
otherwise unavailable opportunity to compare variations in expected affinity scores 
with group actions, stressors, and events. This comparison, then, forms the basis for 
determining if the newly created expected affinity metric offers opportunities for 
assessing group evolutionary potential and predicting evolutionary trajectories. 
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Fitting a regression curve to time plots of expected link affinity may allow for the 
calculation of the slope of the line at any given point in time which, if the created 
measure offers utility, should reflect the evolutionary status and direction of the 
subject group.  
 There are, however, limits to what can be done by taking such an approach. 
Questions about how much expected or potential affinity is enough cannot be 
addressed until a demonstrably effective measurement of the affinity a targeted 
constituency actually holds for the subject group can be developed and applied. At 
present, the best indicators available are sporadic opinion polls that are rarely 
designed to ferret out true sympathies for terrorist groups among poll respondents. 
Whether because of respondents’ desire to ensure personal security leading to 
evasive, misleading, or untruthful answers, by poor penetration of poll takers into 
areas of conflict or widespread opposition, or the weight of cultural, societal, or 
political pressures, polling data offers a poor indicator of support for terrorist groups. 
Similarly, observational means of assessing terrorist support are notoriously 
unreliable given the clandestine nature of terrorism and terrorist support activities. 
 Similarly, the degree of affinity necessary for positive evolutionary growth 
cannot be determined until further studies are conducted, allowed a more nuanced and 
deeper understanding of the roles played by environmental factors, presence or lack 
of initiative, arms and safe haven availability, and numerous other additive or 
mitigating factors.  It is possible, however, to assess the general direction of 
evolutionary progress despite the wide range of complex interactions present. Fitness 
calculations, such as those generated through use NK, fitness, and similar models, as 
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usually used, would afford an assessment of the opportunity for evolutionary 
progression, or point to evidence of past evolutionary development, but offer little 
through which to determine the potential future. The local minima and maxima 
identified through these methods offers considerable insights, but must be tempered 
by the realization that the environmental context in which these minima and maxima 
appear are different for each subject group. Visualization of the linkages between 
terrorist and presumed constituency, as expressed through an expected affinity score, 
helps to highlight trends and patterns. While any trends or pattern identified is subject 
to unexpected change, visualization can help describe the possible future trajectory in 
the absence of significant shocks to the interactive dynamic being modeled. 
The Cases: Hamas, the RAF, and the SLA 
 
 Cases used to test the validity of the measure are the Palestinian Resistance 
Movement (Hamas), Germany’s Baader-Meinhof Gang/Red Army Faction 
(henceforth discussed as the Red Army Faction, RAF, for the sake of simplicity), and 
the Symbionese Liberation Army.  
 Hamas is used because it offers clear example of a terrorist group that has 
evolved to become a mass movement and subsequent legitimate claimant to power. 
Regardless of opinion about the status of Hamas, it has successfully grown from a 
small-scale conspiracy to a mass movement of sufficient size, ability, organization, 
and complexity to win not only a mass following in Gaza, and portions of the West 
Bank, but also elsewhere in the Arab world. That development has been relatively 
rapid, leading to Hamas’s emergence from the January 2006 Palestinian elections as 
the elected government in the Palestinian Authority. At the same time, Hamas has 
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continued its violent attacks on Israel and Israelis, as well as on its rivals in 
Palestinian politics, often by secretive and violent means. Hamas, then, represents one 
extreme that, if the measures developed here are valid, will exhibit the expected 
evolutionary progress with anticipated rhetorical and symbolic measures.  
The RAF and SLA, on the other hand, offer clear examples of terrorist groups 
which failed to achieve either mass movement status or standing as a viable claimant 
to power. However, they are also different, affording an opportunity to fine-tune the 
measures and approaches developed here.  The RAF lasted roughly 30 years, with the 
German authorities unable to defeat and destroy the group. Rather than facing defeat 
at the hands of German authorities, the RAF ending its armed struggle of its own 
accord in 1998 after concluding the German public was unable to recognize its proper 
role in the revolution and act accordingly. Nevertheless, the RAF maintained over 
three decades enough of a supporting constituency, primarily among radicalized 
German workers and students, that it was able to maintain some degree of operational 
capability over time, and to attract new recruits, despite a long string of government 
success against the group. The SLA, on the other hand, lasted only a short time as a 
viable entity before being defeated by law enforcement authorities. The RAF and 
SLA, further, had enough similarities that a comparison is warranted – both operated 
in liberal western democracies, espoused a vaguely Marxist-Leninist philosophy 
although each was actually more anarchist in scope, and both claimed to work on 




Data and Data Collection 
 
 Since this study focuses on the effort of terrorists to gain and maintain a 
supportive constituency through its rhetorical and symbolic communications, the 
primary source material for content analysis of the messages the group presents are 
the communiqués, statements, and claims of credit issued openly to a wide audience 
in their area of operations. Internal group communications and communications 
directed primarily to law enforcement or security service are not included, since these 
messages are typically not intended for a wider audience. Similarly, assessments, 
biographies, histories, and synopses of each group written by observers, the press, 
government officials, or scholars are not used, since each of these represents an 
outsider’s interpretation of the group, its activities, or its communications. For the 
RAF and SLA, this body of data is represented by statements sent to the press in their 
respective countries, as each group sought to widen its pool of message recipients by 
leveraging the media as a witting or unwitting message transmission service. These 
messages can be found in printed anthologies and on web sites devoted to study or 
support of either group.57
                                                 
57 Red Army Faction communiqués can be found at either URL 
 SLA communications are found in the original English, 
while RAF communications are originally in German, although this study uses 
English translations verified for accuracy. 
http://www.baader-
meinhof.com or URL http://www.germanguerilla.com/red-army-faction/. Various other sites have, at 
times, collections of relevant documents, but many are sporadic in their appearance on the Web. The 
same holds true for Symbionese Liberation Army documents, although URL http://sladocuments.com/ 
has been a fairly steady presence. Also helpful in the search for SLA-related materials were detectives 
in the Anti-Terrorism Division of the Los Angeles Police Department who, given their assignments, 
wish to remain anonymous.  
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Hamas statements, communiqués, and claims of credit offer a slightly more 
problematic dataset. Unlike the RAF and SLA, Hamas and its supporters maintain its 
own web site, where communiqués, statements, demands, and claims are posted in 
both Arabic and English. In this study, English versions of Hamas statements, pulled 
directly from the organization’s own web site,58
 Events data are culled from a number of sources, and, unlike statements, are 
generally not subject to purposive manipulation. A dataset is constructed using 
multiple sources, offering details about time, date, location, weapon(s) used, target(s) 
 are used, thus ensuring that that the 
statement provided is that intended by Hamas and not subject to mistranslation or 
interpretation by others. Use of English language versions, however, does open the 
possibility of error, since Hamas, like many groups offering statements in multiple 
languages, has been suspected of offering substantially different versions where there 
is expectation that different audiences will peruse the different versions. Arabic 
language statements by Hamas may, in fact, be substantially different from English 
language versions, especially if the organization expects the English language 
versions to be consumed primarily by outsiders, rather than the Palestinian public. 
Nevertheless, English language versions provided by Hamas are used because they 
are original translations of messages provided directly by the group in question and 
because the immediate intent of the present study is on determining the feasibility of 
the measures developed, rather than the direct applicability to a particular socio-
political dynamic.  
                                                 
58 Hamas has made many of its documents available over the years, although at times cyber-
wars between Palestinian and Israeli activists hinder access. Steady resources for Hamas documents 
include the Palestinian Information Center site, available at either URL http://www.palestine-
info.co.uk/  or URL http://www.palestine-info.com/hamas/communiques.index.htm.  
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attacked, property damage incurred, deaths and injuries, claims and competing claims 
of credit, and additional details as available. This dataset was then reviewed to ensure 
that each action included not only represents an attack by one of the groups chosen 
for this study, but that there were no duplicate entries resulting from slight differences 
in source materials. Where questions arose about the nature of an entry, original and 
follow-up press reporting and peer-reviewed chronologies59
 
 were consulted to resolve 
differences. Once finalized, the dataset of attacks was then coded, as described above 
in the constraint recognition, problem recognition, and referent criterion discussions. 
                                                 
59 Multiple sources were used to develop a dataset unique for this project. Sources used 
included datasets developed or maintained by the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the 
Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel (available at URL http://www.ict.org.il); the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of 
Maryland (available via URL http://www.start.umd.edu/start/); the Terrorism Research Center 
(available via URL http://www.terrorism.com); IntelCenter (available via URL 
http://www.intelcenter.com), and; the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events 
(ITERATE) database, developed by Edward F. Mickolus, Dunn Loring, VA: Vineyard Software. 
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Chapter 5:  Establishing a Foundation for Expected Affinity 
 Good models offer a representation of reality, rather than a complete 
reconstruction of reality. Models, when designed and used effectively, capture the 
most salient components and interactions of the system under observation, offering a 
picture of the most relevant aspects of that system and leaving out those that are not 
germane to the questions being addressed. Models are not perfect reflections of what 
exists, and should not try to be. Rather, they are distillations of that reality, designed 
and constructed to highlight, and at times isolate, the actors, actions, and interactions 
deemed important to understanding one or more aspect of the system and systems like 
it. 
 Which elements and interactions in the system are incorporated in the model 
depends, in turn, on the questions being asked and on the perceptions and 
interpretations of the researcher. Some of the more enduring questions associated 
with terrorism reflect an abiding interest in the causes of terrorism, the triggers of 
violence, target selection and command decision making within terrorist 
organizations, radicalization of its members, and ways in which terrorism ends. For 
each of these areas, unfortunately, there are few, if any, good answers. 
 One of the reasons why terrorism studies have yielded few good answers 
stems from the models used to address the important questions. Models used 
emphasize the shock and fear brought about by terrorist violence, the unique history 
and qualities of a selected terrorist group, the ideological underpinnings of the 
group’s motivations and objectives, or a structuralist vision of terrorism intended to 
offer insights into the exploitable organizational weaknesses of terrorist groups. Few 
 142 
 
models of terrorism attempt to address the dynamics of terrorist – audience 
interaction, and even fewer assign any value to the salience of intra-group 
interactions. This project takes a first needed step away from the dominant models of 
terrorism and shifts emphasis to the functional couplings between terrorist groups and 
their presumed audiences and constituencies. 
 Where some emphasis has been placed on the interaction between terrorist 
and public, much reflects a belief that the predator-prey model offers an accurate and 
usable basis for examining the relationship. Where terrorism is examined largely in 
terms of its violence, or when it is examined in a counter-terrorism context, the 
predator-prey model serves well in capturing many of the most important aspects. 
Expanding the perspective a bit, however, exposes the limitations of the predator-prey 
model. Terrorists and their adversaries are not always in direct competition with each 
other, although there is significant direct conflict between the two. Most terrorist 
groups understand at some level that they cannot match the government’s ability to 
apply force, nor can they match or sustain the level of lethality governments can bring 
to bear. Terrorists often choose to direct violence and the threat of violence to third 
parties, the innocent uninvolved public. Few, if any, terrorists believe they can 
directly cause the downfall of their adversaries and choose instead an indirect 
approach, creating a climate of fear and intimidation where the government must 
either accede to the terrorists’ demands or comply and risk alienating the public. 
Applying a predator-prey model to terrorism assumes that the antagonists compete 
over the same resource set and that those resources are finite, with gains by one side 
equaling losses of the other. 
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 Terrorism, however, is a competition over a variable and fluid resource where 
gains by one side do not necessarily equal losses of the other. The resource 
competition is characterized by multivalence rather than bivalence, where both sides 
can win or lose at the same time. This project captures the fluid, multivalent character 
of the conflict by suggesting a better model. Societal groups often have membership 
overlaps, leading at times to instances in which an individual might be a member of a 
pro-government association while simultaneously holding affiliation in a second 
organization supportive of the government’s opponents. A coevolutionary model of 
terrorism allows for such duality, whereas a predator-prey model would not. 
 Coevolution can be one of three types. In indiscriminately coevolutionary 
systems, actors adapt and change without having a direct affect on other actors in the 
system. Where adaptive activity by one actor changes the environment, thus changing 
the environmental pressures on other actors, forcing them to adapt, the adaptation 
remains neutral with respect to the relative fitness of other actors in the system. 
Symbiotic coevolutionary systems are those in which adaptations benefit groups of 
actors such that adaptations by one forces change in others and all find increased 
fitness levels as a result. The terrorist – audience – government relationship is of the 
third type, a competitive coevolutionary system. Here, adaptation or change by one 
lowers the relative fitness of others, forcing them to adapt in ways they hope will 
increase their own fitness.  
Searching for the Predictive Model 
 
The present work seeks a way to evaluate the evolutionary growth potential of 
terrorist groups. It does so by testing the proposition that the communicative link 
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between terrorist and a presumed constituency is critical for maintaining and growing 
the terrorist’s operational viability, a necessary condition for positive evolutionary 
development. Testing that proposition, in turn, involves the creation of a new social 
network analysis measure, called expected link affinity, designed to allow estimation 
of the relative strength and resiliency of linkages between coevolutionary system 
actors. In order to test the efficacy of such a metric, three groups were selected as a 
test based on either current status or group history – Hamas, because it has 
transitioned from small, conspiratorial terrorist group to mass movement and de facto 
government and both the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Red Army 
Faction (RAF) because of their similarities yet strikingly different operational 
capabilities and longevity.  
 Social network analysis addresses the structure and behavior of linked actors 
within a common system. One of the principal arenas for exploration in this discipline 
lies in exploring and understanding the relationship between network characteristics 
and the resulting social and interactive structure that arise from network topography. 
Here, emphasis is placed on deriving knowledge about socially distinct groups, their 
organization, their interactions, and their similarities and differences. A second 
principal arena for exploration lies in the structural aspects of the network in question, 
particularly in terms of ways in which network topography dictates the flow of 
information between network nodes. Accordingly, metrics emphasize network node 
clustering, the presence or absence of linkages between nodes, the number of nodes 
that must be transitioned moving from one node to another (the centrality of a given 
node), prestige, transitivity, and structural equivalence – all of which address network 
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structure or nodal behaviors stemming from such structures. Even Granovetter’s 
(1973, 1983) weak ties address the density of ties between nodes rather than any 
inherent or emergent strength of a particular tie or set of ties. Expected link affinity 
supplements current social network analysis metrics by addressing the strength of 
node-to-node connections, treating that strength as a function of shared causes, agreed 
upon beliefs or purpose, and the degree to which action constraints and expectation of 
negative behavioral inducements might be overcome.  
Hamas (Harakat al-Muqāwamat al-Islāmiyyah) 
  
 Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, was founded in late 1987 by 
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, and Mohammed Taha, at a time 
corresponding to the beginning of the first Intifada, or uprising, against Israeli 
occupation of the Gaza Strip. Despite its origins in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, 
Hamas has insisted that its struggle is not a religious struggle between Muslims and 
Jews, as is often assumed, but a struggle for human rights and liberation from 
occupation and oppression by the Israeli state. The pervasive use of Islamic discourse 
in its statements, both internal to the organization and external, is claimed to reflect 
the prevailing cultural perspectives of both Hamas’ members and Hamas’ 
constituency rather than any overt religiosity.  Nevertheless, Hamas’ charter is 
steeped in the language of Islam, couching its conflict with Israel in religious terms: 
This is the Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement, showing its form, 
revealing its identity, stating its position, clarifying its expectations, 
discussing its hopes, and calling for aid, support, and a joining of its ranks, 
because our struggle with the Jews is long and dangerous, requiring all 
dedicated efforts. It is a phase that must be followed by succeeding phases, a 
battalion that must be supported by battalion after battalion of the vast Arab 
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and Islamic world until the enemy is defeated and the victory of God prevails. 
(Hamas 1988, reprinted in Hroub 2000: 268) 
 
More generally, Hamas offers a sophisticated ideology grounded in Islam but 
centered on the organization’s desire for the liberation of all lands claimed by 
Palestinians. Hamas, however, is much more than a violent organization, building and 
maintaining a wide variety of schools, medical clinics, and social welfare 
organizations in Gaza and the West Bank. Membership has fluctuated through the 
years, but Hamas succeeded in building an organization sufficiently large and capable 
to challenge Yasir Arafat’s Fatah, claiming status within the Palestinian resistance 
movement equal to or greater than Fatah and, in 2006, posting an overwhelming win 
in Palestinian legislative elections. Since taking 74 of 132 seats in the legislature, 
Hamas has broken with the more widely accepted Palestinian Authority, effectively 
expelling Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Palestinian 
Authority from the Gaza Strip.  
Violence has remained one of the Hamas’ principal means of pursuing its 
liberation goals. Since its founding, Hamas has developed and employed a wide 
variety of tactics and capabilities, including suicide bombings in occupied Palestine 
and within Israel proper, and the employment of mortars and short-range homemade 
rockets. During the initial months of the 1st Intifada (1987-1993), Hamas actions 
tended to center on low-level violence and agitation, seeking perhaps to leverage 
widespread Palestinian discontent and channel the frustrations of ordinary 
Palestinians toward confronting Israeli authority in frequent street-level actions. 
Perhaps due in part to the Gulf War’s diverting attention away from the Palestinian 
cause, Hamas created a military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, in 1992 
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and began to increase the tempo of violent attacks against Israeli government targets. 
The Oslo Accords of 1993 offered the prospect of a negotiated peace between the 
Palestinians and Israel, undermining to an extent Hamas’ rational for violence,  but 
did not significantly reduce Hamas sponsored violence. Following an attack on the 
Cave of the Patriarchs by a militant Israeli settler in February 1994, Hamas expanded 
its typical target set to include Israeli civilians and settlements. Two months later, 
Hamas staged its first suicide car bombing against Israel.   
In the fall of 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited the Temple 
Mount in Jerusalem, triggering widespread Palestinian anger and offering the 
immediate cause for the 2nd Intifada. The violence between Israel and Hamas 
escalated, with Hamas expanding its suicide attacks and rocket attacks against Israeli 
settlements and Israel significantly expanding targeted strikes against Hamas leaders. 
In July 2002, Israeli forces dropped a 1-ton bomb on Salah Shehadeh’s house, killing 
the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades leader and 14 others. Ibrahim al-Makadmeh, 
another prominent Qassam Brigades leader, was killed less than a year later, and in 
September 2003 Sheikh Yassin, Hamas’ founder, was wounded in an Israeli airstrike. 
Israeli further escalated actions against Hamas as the number and frequency of Hamas 
rocket attacks increased, leading to the March 2004 death of Yassin, the April 2004 
death of Yassin’s successor, Rantisi, and the September 2004 death of Eldin Subhi 
Sheikh Khalil, Rantisi’s successor, in Damascus, Syria. 
Red Army Faction 
 
Germany’s Red Army Faction offers a different developmental and 
operational model than that of Hamas. Emerging from the student protest movement, 
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the RAF came to symbolize disaffected rebellious middle class German youth of the 
late 1960s and 1970s. The development of the radical German left took a haphazard 
evolutionary path from commune to political group. Little was thought-out and 
planned, with the majority of individuals involved simply reacting to the environment 
and events of the times. The RAF was no exception, growing from the increasing 
militancy of a few individuals who reacted to police anti-crime efforts, with political 
ideology solidifying later. The shooting of Benno Ohnesorg by police on 2 June 1967 
during a protest in Berlin against a visit by the Shah of Iran radicalized many among 
the German left, including the RAF’s founders (Baumman 1977; Merkl 1995). 
Despite the ideological evolution of some German leftists, what would become the 
RAF remained largely focused on purely criminal activities, singly and collectively, 
for a few more years. 
 The anger over Ohnesorg’s death and police reactions to the resulting protests 
led the mainstream German media to begin drawing clear distinctions between the 
radical students and the remainder of German society, further isolating and 
marginalizing the students. The tabloid press in particular painted the students in stark 
and uncompromising terms while agitating the larger German society by playing on 
their fears of the east, using headlines such as “Young Reds Want to Communise 
German Property” and “Stop Terror of the Young Reds Now.” (Baumman 1977; 
Becker 1977; and Cook 1982) The only support for the students came from the 
already supportive leftist press, and it was from among that supportive press that a 
founder and catalyst of the RAF emerged. 
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 Considered the voice of the anti-establishment movement, Ulrike Meinhof, an 
editor for the communist journal Konkret, joined with radical lawyer Horst Mahler in 
May 1970 to form the RAF proper. The new organization soon made itself known by 
organizing and executing the escape of Andreas Baader from custody. Baader, along 
with Meinhof, Mahler, Gudrun Ensslin, and other founding RAF members shared a 
vision of a socialist German society closely associated with Third World liberation 
movements (Merkl 1995).  Despite the group’s advocacy of a socialist German 
society, its ideology remained relatively obscure in that it failed to offer any clear 
vision of the nature of the society. Indeed, one of the more prevalent criticisms of the 
RAF has been that it was not a socialist group, as it portrayed itself, but rather an 
anarchist group focused simply on the destruction of the existing German state and 
society. Even other German militant groups questioned the RAF’s ideology and 
program, leading one prominent June 2 Movement member to charge: 
… there was a tendency on the left to say R.A.F. isn’t a political group 
anymore, because they no longer take part in any political dialogues. It was 
said they’d become criminals, who rob banks and live in expensive 
apartments, and drive around in expensive cars. It was after this that R.A.F. 
laid its bombs, in order to legitimize itself again as a political group; out of 
this emergency situation they started their insane bombing campaign, which 
was really wrong. (Baumman 1977: 109-110) 
  
RAF “actions” followed a familiar path, with the first acts generally attributed 
to the group being April 1968 firebombings of several department stores in Frankfurt 
am Main, even though the attacks were actually undertaken by Baader, Ensslin, and 
several others individually in response to a challenge to Baader to follow through on 
his frequent calls for violent action.  Through 1970 and 1971, RAF actions focused on 
bank robberies, car thefts, and violent run-ins with police during traffic stops, identity 
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checks, and other routine police activity. In February 1971, RAF violence took a 
more ominous turn when the Socialist Patients Collective, which had merged with the 
RAF, attempted to bomb the train used by the President of the Federal Republic. RAF 
leaders were further encouraged by an Allenbach Institute poll that indicated 20% of 
Germans under age 30 expressed some sympathy for the RAF and 10% of north 
Germans indicated a willingness to provide shelter for RAF members (Merkl 1995).  
 The RAF developed a decidedly more destructive and internationalist 
perspective by 1972, when they bombed several targets to retaliate for U.S. bombing 
in Vietnam and the West Berlin British Yacht Club in support of the Irish Republican 
Army. The authorities, however, enjoyed considerable success against the RAF later 
in the year, capturing and imprisoning most of the leaders by late August. Indeed, the 
earlier support the RAF seemed to enjoy largely disappeared due to the extent and 
savagery of RAF attacks. The RAF’s standing in German public opinion would 
fluctuate in 1974 after the death of RAF member Holger Meins during a prison 
hunger strike and the RAF’s retaliatory effort to kidnap the president of Germany’s 
Superior Court of Justice, Günter von Drenkmann. To some, Meins was murdered by 
the authorities, leading to small support gains for the RAF, while others focused on 
von Drenkmann’s death to call for greater efforts against the RAF (Huffman 1997).  
In subsequent years, RAF actions, coupled with several Palestinian-authored 
spectaculars in support of the RAF, focused on securing the release of RAF members 




 By 1977, the core of the RAF had been removed from active participation, 
with Baader, Ensslin, and Jan-Carl Raspe sentenced to life in prison and Meinhof 
dead by suicide. The RAF once again sought to free its leaders, this time kidnapping 
Hanns-Martin Schleyer in August. Almost two months later, a Palestinian team 
hijacked a Lufthansa flight, eventually landing in Mogadishu, Somalia, where the 
hijackers made a series of demands that included release of imprisoned RAF leaders. 
German’s new counter-terrorist team, GSG-9, successfully rescued the Lufthansa 
hostages on October 17, after which three RAF leaders – Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe 
– perhaps sensing the futility of continuing the struggle, committed suicide in their 
Stammheim prison cells.  
 The deaths in Stammheim prison effectively ended the original RAF, although 
the group’s second and subsequent generations continued the struggle. Each 
succeeding RAF generation, however, met with the same effective state response and 
public disapproval, limiting effectiveness and cementing its marginalization. Between 
October 1977 and December 1991, the nature of RAF activities remained much as it 
was during active operations of the group’s first generation. The RAF’s growing 
international perspective, however, became much more evident and failed just as 
miserably to generate mass support. The remaining RAF members announced the 
disbanding of the group in 1998, prominently citing that failure while simultaneously 
seeking to lay blame on German society’s sloth and ignorance (RAF 1998). 
Symbionese Liberation Army 
 
 The Symbionese Liberation Army offers another striking contrast to Hamas. 
The SLA emerged in California in early 1973, growing out of the discontent and 
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aspirations of then-recently escaped Vacaville prison inmate Donald DeFreeze. 
DeFreeze would later give himself a “revolutionary”  name, Cinque, and lead his 
group on a roughly two-year campaign to bring about a proletarian revolution. 
Ideologically, the SLA claimed to follow a poorly defined and conceptualized 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, albeit one with significant ethnic and feminist undertones. 
The group’s ability to articulate their ideology was never well developed, perhaps 
because the members of the group exhibited little affinity or interest in ideological 
development. Although responsible for a number of violent acts, the group is best 
known for its murder of Oakland school superintendent Marcus Foster, who enjoyed 
considerable support from Oakland’s poor and minority population, and the 
kidnapping and subsequent co-option of newspaper heiress Patricia Hearst. The 
SLA’s violent activities were confined to California, particularly the San Francisco 
and Los Angeles areas, giving the group a very narrowly defined spatial dimension. 
In May 1974, six of the nine active SLA members perished in a shootout with the Los 
Angeles Police Department at a commandeered safe house in Los Angeles, leaving 
survivors Bill and Emily Harris and Patricia Hearst to attempt to reconstitute the 
group. For the most part, activities of the group following the May 1974 shootout 
were limited to a few robberies and failed bomb attempts. Membership was never 
more than a few dozen members and hangers-on, mostly middle class in origin, and 
relatively unsophisticated in both operational arts and its ideology. Efforts to build 
itself into a vanguard of the proletarian revolution tended to revolve around 
disorganized meetings on the fringes of the student movement. 
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 Unlike Hamas and the RAF, the SLA seemed almost determined to deny itself 
effective connection with its claimed constituency. In its short operational life, the 
group released just 13 communiqués, declarations, and policy statements, as well as 6 
tapes made and delivered for broadcast on area media. The earliest SLA document, its 
August 1973 “Declaration of War,” set the tone for what would become a series of 
angry rants, and grandiose fantasies culminating in their last, the so-called “bathroom 
communiqué,”  a threat written on a restroom wall in late 1975.  
Parsing the Texts 
 
 Hamas, RAF, and SLA texts and transcripts were processed using two 
separate content dictionaries. Analysis of message tone utilizes Martindale’s 
Regressive Imagery Dictionary (Martindale 1979),60
                                                 
60  Hogenraad, and Bestgen (1989) and Hogenraad and Nysten (1995) use a French adaptation 
of Martindale’s dictionary, Dictionnaire d’Imagerie Regressive or DIRE, in their examination of 
Combatant Communist Cell communications. Martindale’s Dictionary is also available for download 
from the Internet from the Provalis Research web site, URL http://www.simstat.com/RID.htm, in 
English, French, Portuguese, Swedish, German, and Latin versions. 
 which offers approximately 
3,200 words assigned to 29 separate categories of primary process cognition, 7 
categories of secondary process cognition, and 7 categories of emotions. The 
Regressive Imagery Dictionary (RID) leverages the notion that psychological 
processes are mirrored in the content of text, and allows for the measurement of 
differences between primordial thinking – associative and concrete – and conceptual 
thinking –abstract, logical, and reality-focused. Analysis was accomplished by 
highlighting several categories and subcategories of the dictionary, and using these 
selected groups to indicate each of the three critical components of successful 
marketing identified in the situational theory of publics (Grunig 1976, 1982, and 
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1997).  Validated through a number of studies, the RID offers a unique metric 
through which the expected affinity measure may be compared and validated. 
Problem identification, identified as a critical component of successful 
persuasive efforts by Grunig, is highlighted using several secondary process cognition 
subcategories of RID. Abstraction is taken to suggest a thought process that the 
terrorist would seek to use to his advantage. Containing words such as know and 
thought, this word set offers a way of gauging the extent to which communications 
seek to engage the audience’s reasoning processes. Additionally, the restraint word 
set is used to focus attention on the communicant’s effort to engage his audience in 
reasoning. Containing words such as must, stop, and bind, this word set acknowledges 
the terrorist’s effort to underscore the nature of a grievance or issue set which needs 
to be addressed. 
The terrorist’s effort to convey a sense of relevance and importance of the 
identified issue, another critical aspect identified by Grunig, is illustrated by 
emphasizing moral and behavioral aspects within RID’s secondary process 
subcategory. The morality and moral imperative word sets suggest an appeal to a 
sense of what is, or should be, sought because of an ethical or virtuous quality beyond 
the mundane. Similarly, the social behavior word set highlights efforts to appeal to 
the public’s notions of common good and shared expectations, while the instrumental 
behavior word set offers an opportunity to engage in appeals to the public’s sense of 
common cause and action. These are analogous to the communicant’s efforts to 
define a desired level of involvement and convey that belief to an intended audience. 
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To focus attention on Grunig’s need for recognizing constraints, several 
subcategories of the Regressive Imagery Dictionary from the primary process 
cognition category are used. Among primary process cognition categories, the 
defensive symbolism subcategories of passivity and chaos are selected for use due to 
their focus on thought processes and labels associated with the need to overcome 
inertia in activity (passivity) and confusion, crowding, or ruin (chaos). Similarly, the 
regressive cognition subcategory’s unknown word set offers an additional indicator of 
constraint recognition in highlighting secrecy and strangeness, both significant 
barriers to action. All three word sets are taken to offer indications of constraints to 
action that must be overcome, from the group’s perspective, in order to convince the 
public that the utility cost of action is acceptable even in the face of potential limits or 
sanctions.  
RID’s categories and subcategories are used to get a general sense of the tone 
of each group’s communications. Within the emotions subcategory, the aggression 
word set offers an opportunity to gauge the degree to which the communication’s 
content emphasizes or focuses on the negative, the hostile, and the hated. Coupled 
with this is the glory word set, which offers a mechanism for assessing the degree to 
which the message praises and promotes positive or pleasant topics. The two sets 
taken together, in turn, offer an opportunity to assess the extent to which the message 
as a whole emphasizes the desirable or the undesirable. 
As an adjunct, a second dictionary is used to assess the text. This dictionary, 
specifically designed to address the critical components of successful marketing 
strategies, rests on the category and subcategories first developed in  the General 
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Inquirer tool (see Lasswell 1948 and 1968; Stone et. al. 1966).61
Texts were processed by first converting each into ascii text files, then 
selecting and isolating the communicative portions of each file. Dates, organizational 
“signatures,” comments, and notes (particularly on the SLA tape transcripts) were 
bracketed to prevent their inclusion in the content assessment. Text files were then 
processed using each dictionary separately in the WordStat content analysis software. 
Raw data, in the form of reported percentages fitting each category and subcategory, 
were then transferred into an SPSS data file from which statistics and illustrative 
graphs were generated.  
 Composed of 
approximately 8,300 words and word senses, this dictionary is divided into three 
categories, each of which contain a number of specified subcategories. The Problem 
Recognition category includes those words indicative of the existence of, or the desire 
for, a set of common goals and aspirations, understood purposes, objectives, and 
desires. Incorporated within this category are additional subcategories designed to 
assess senses of accomplishment or achievement. The Level of Involvement  category 
includes words and word senses which suggest or indicate a sense of community, 
friendship, alliance, centrality, collective perspective, or rapport as they apply to 
definition and justification of appropriate activities and activity levels needed to 
successfully address identified problems. The Constraint Recognition category, in 
turn, includes words and word senses indicative of expectation of negative incentive, 
hardship, risk, or punishment that could lead a message recipient to avoid action. 
 
                                                 
61 The dictionary used was specifically constructed for this study. Built on a foundation of the 
General Inquirer and Lasswell’s Value Dictionary, this dictionary is designed o reflect the concepts in 





 Comparing the textual records of the SLA, the RAF, and Hamas offers an 
interesting contrast. Hamas, as might be expected, exhibits greater consistency in its 
messages. The RAF and SLA, on the other hand, are much more erratic in the tone 
and context of their communications, indicating a much more variable approach to 
efforts to convey their thoughts, demands, and expectations. Hamas’ communication 
efforts offer a markedly different picture, one suggestive of a greater appreciation for 
the nuances of both communications and the sensibilities and expectations of their 
intended audience. The RAF’s wide variability may be the result of environmental 
changes, or of changes in group leadership over time. The SLA, in stark contrast, 
seemed to have little clear understanding of its audience, or care little if it did 
understand. 
 Looking at Hamas, RAF, and SLA messages over time (Figures 3, 4, and 5, 
respectively) illustrates that contrast. Using RID categories analogous to those 
developed for testing a situational theory approach to group messages shows Hamas 
messages offering greater cohesion over time as well as greater consistency. The 
SLA’s communications also offer a vision of general consistency, although of a 
downward track, indicating less attentiveness to effective conveyance of its message. 
In each figure, the y-axis is word presence percentage and the x-axis is elapsed time 
in months. 
The three groups show somewhat similar general tone characteristics in their 
messages over time, in each case emphasizing aggressive themes in a manner 
consistent with their environmental context. For Hamas, the percentage of message 
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texts emphasizing aggressive themes exhibits a gradual, but variable, upward trend 
over time, corresponding to an escalating conflict with both the Palestinian Authority 
and the Israelis in association with the 2nd Intifada (beginning September 2000, month 
154). 
     
 
Figure 3:  Hamas Message Tone Over Time (elapsed) 




















An increase in aggressive content would be expected given the escalation in 
violence in Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel proper. Themes of glory also increase in 
conjunction with escalation in fighting, and this would be an expected outcome given 
Hamas’ appeal to themes of martyrdom in the struggle to liberate Palestine. The RAF, 
on the other hand, found itself increasingly pressured by authorities and the public 
more and more after 1971 (ending in month 25). The group’s widely divergent 
emphasis on both aggressive themes and referents to glory suggest a highly complex 



























 N = 31  Range = 20.80  Minimum = 3.80    Maximum = 24.60 
   Mean = 15.472  Std. Error = .8090 
   Skewness = -.596 Std. Error = .421 
   Kurtosis = .536  Std. Error = .821 
Beginning of 2nd Intifada 










leaders. The SLA also found itself increasingly pressured over its short life, and the 
group’s diminishing emphasis on themes of aggression could be expected of an 
organization struggling to win a modicum of support. Glory-related themes, however, 
never played much of a role in SLA communications, and the steady consistency, 
albeit low, of glory-themed content in SLA communications reflects this tendency. 
Figure 4: Red Army Faction Message Tone Over Time (elapsed) 



















Figure 5: Symbionese Liberation Army Message Tone  
Over Time (elapsed) 





















































N=9 Range = 22.20  Minimum = 0.00  Maximum = 22.20      
Mean = 12.2778 Std. Error = 2.3272 
Skewness = -.475 Std. Error = .717 
Kurtosis = -.355  Std. Error = 1.400 
 N = 51  Range = 23.10 Minimum = 2.60    Maximum = 25.70 
   Mean = 13.0647 Std. Error = .7248 
   Skewness = .338 Std. Error = .333 

































 General trends are also indicated by calculated skewness and kurtosis figures. 
Skewness, or the degree to which measures are found to be bunched on one side of a 
central tendency or the other, in these cases may suggest variations in emphasis of 
certain themes as a function of time. For Hamas and the SLA, skewness in message 
tone is negative, -.596 and -.475 respectively, indicating a slightly greater distribution 
of observed measures fall to the right of the central tendency, suggesting a slightly 
greater frequency of aggressive or glory-related word occurrences in messages than 
might be otherwise expected by chance. For Hamas, skewness thus suggests an 
increased favoring of aggressive or glory-related wording over time. The general tone 
of SLA messages decreases over time, in contrast to those of Hamas, suggesting a 
disproportional emphasis on such wording in later texts. Skewness for the RAF is 
positive, indicating a positive skew where more frequent aggressive and glory-related 
word use is found in earlier texts than in those disseminated later in the organization’s 
lifetime. Kurtosis is an indication of the extent to which a distribution deviates from 
the normal random-distribution Bell curve. Hamas texts exhibit a leptokurtic 
distribution, where a graph of the distribution would exhibit a sharper than normal 
peak in distribution, suggesting a greater degree of consistency in message themes. 
The kurtosis scores for both the RAF and SLA, however, are negative, indicating a 
platykurtic distribution, or a lower and flatter distribution curve than normal. This 
suggests a greater degree of message tone variability for the RAF and SLA, consistent 




Link Specific Assessments 
 
 In terms of the situational theory of publics and expected link affinity, the 
differences between Hamas, the RAF, and the SLA become a bit harder to assess for 
want of an already validated metric with which to measure the strength and resiliency 
of ties between network nodes. Each organization operated in a unique environment, 
with varying levels of freedom of movement, different mechanisms for the 
dissemination and diffusion of knowledge and opinion, different cultural and social 
norms, and vast differences in spatial diffusion of the targeted audiences. The role of 
religion, both for members of the subject organization and for members of their 
targeted audience also plays a significant role in network and network dynamic 
uniqueness. Hamas’ calls to action, for example, depend heavily on a claimed 
religious mandate that, arguably, had no counterpart in late 20th Century Germany or 
the United States. In both the RAF’s and SLA’s milieu,  individuals are generally 
considered free to make whatever choices each deems best given his or her goals and 
perspectives. In Hamas’ milieu, however, Islam provides a pervasive and at times 
overriding behavioral framework that has a deep-rooted affect on individual decision-
making.  While the expected affinity metric is designed in part to help overcome such 
environmental differences, it can neither eliminate nor anticipate all possible 
determinants and influences on human agency. It can, however, offer some insights 
into the ways audiences might be effectively approached and persuaded. 
Problem Recognition 
 
 Convincing an audience that a problem is sufficiently grave to warrant 
attention cannot be guaranteed regardless of any pre-existing audience concerns. Not 
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only must a potential audience recognize the existence of a problem and its gravity, it 
must also recognize it as one that can be solved. That audience must also come to see 
it as something needing their personal attention. For Hamas, the campaign against 
Israeli occupation of Palestine and Gaza is easy to acknowledge and leverage. 
Convincing a Western audience that the state and the bourgeoisie continue to oppress 
the proletariat, or that the relatively well-off Western middle class needs to be 
concerned about revolutionary movements halfway around the world, is quite a bit 
more problematic.  
 Among Palestinians, Israel’s occupation has been a conflict point since the 
1940’s, making problem recognition for Hamas one of reinforcing prevailing 
sentiment rather than identification and promotion of a new cause for concern.  
Finding common cause with its intended constituency, thus, is a simple matter for 
Hamas leaders. The shifts of message content focused on recognizing existing 
problems reflect the ease with which Hamas can leverage Palestinian frustration, 
anger, and discontent (Figure 6a). Hamas need expend little effort in its messages to 
convince its audience that Israeli actions are detrimental to Palestinians and their 
aspirations.  Months 134 (January 1999) through 149 (April 2000) correspond to a 
period in which Hamas continued attacks against Israel, but outside of the 
expectations of many Palestinians who continued to invest faith in the Oslo Accords. 
The spike in month 153 (August 2000) reflects increased Palestinian frustration, and 
activity, immediately preceding the beginning of the 2nd Intifada, reflecting growing 
Palestinian disenchantment with the prospects for peace. Israeli Prime Minister 
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Sharon’s September 2000 walk at the Temple Mount brought Palestinian anger to the 
forefront once again, effectively highlighting Hamas’ principal 
 
Figure 6a:  Hamas Problem Recognition Over Time 
   Source: Author’s construction 
 
      
 
complaint. Subsequent months show a striking increase in problem recognition 
language in Hamas messages, as Hamas worked to ensure the Palestinian people 
placed anger about Israeli occupation and actions atop their daily concerns. 
 Using the Regressive Imagery Dictionary to assess the same messages, 
however, offers a different portrait of Hamas communications (Figure 6b), although 
this does not suggest a discrepancy between the two measures. Using the RID 
abstraction and restraint measures to reflect problem or issue identification in 
Hamas’ messages shows a strong emphasis on both in the 20 months (February 1999, 
month 135, to September 2000, month 154) leading up to the 2nd Intifada. In the 
interim period between the 1st and 2nd Intifadas, Hamas messages emphasized abstract 
2nd Intifada 








concepts, such as Palestinian rights, in an effort to keep the relevant issues in the 
forefront of intra-Palestinian dialogue. A number of Hamas communications during 
this time addressed political and cultural aspirations and reflected, most often 
negatively, on the Oslo Accords and the efforts of  
 
Figure 6b:  Hamas Message Abstraction and Restraint Over Time 


















other Palestinian groups such as the PLO and Fatah to find a negotiated settlement 
with Israel. Increasing tensions within the Palestinian community in the months 
leading to September 2000 may explain the downward turn of emphasis on 
abstractions and restraints as Hamas sought to derail the Accords. 
 The RAF’s message history shows a much flatter evolutionary trajectory, with 
the notable exceptions of a few significant spikes. Less emphasis in problem 
recognition (Figure 7a) may have been the result of ideological stuntedness on the 
part of RAF leaders. Angry and frustrated over what they saw as continuing Nazi 
influence among German government, security, and business leaders, the RAF may 


































presumed constituency. RAF communiqués could be quite self-centered, focusing on 
their complaints and dislikes without effectively connecting to either the desires or 
aspirations of those they claimed to speak for in German society. Following its 
emergence in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, the RAF enjoyed a brief period of  
 
  Figure 7a: RAF Problem Recognition Over Time 





relatively widespread support, at least among German students and worker groups. 
The banditry of the early RAF helped create something of a “Robin Hood” image for 
the group, yet continued violence soon eroded much of its support. In and around 
October 1971 (months 15 to 24), the group was perhaps at the height of its popularity 
Height of popularity 
Leaders captured 













and its message at this time tended to capitalize on public interest, promoting its 
perspective of pressing problems in part to distinguish itself from other German 
militant groups. 
 In 1972, violence by the RAF and other German terrorists began to take a toll 
on their popularity, leading to the German state’s response to public demands for 
order by adopting the Berufsverbot laws, denying apprehended militants easy access 
to militant legal counsel. German police effectiveness also increased in this period, 
culminating in the arrests of RAF leaders Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike 
Meinhof, Holger Meins, and Jan-Carl Raspe in June 1972 (month 26). The period 
following the arrests of RAF founders was dominated by their continued trials and 
tribulations in prison, leading to a spasm of violence in April 1975 (month 60) and the 
fall of 1977 (roughly months 87 to 92). By April 1975, the RAF had absorbed another 
German militant group, the Socialist Patients’ Collective,62
 The third generation of RAF leaders emerged in the late 1970’s and early 
1980’s, followed by a final spasm of RAF violence. The RAF’s murder of a U.S. 
Army soldier, Edward Pimental, simply to obtain his identification card, turned public 
  whose members formed 
the core of the RAF team that seized the German Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, 
and executed a German attaché during that action. The fall of 1977, called the 
“German Autumn,” saw another spasm of RAF violence, including the assassination 
of Dresdener Bank President Jürgen Ponto, the kidnapping and subsequent execution 
of German Employers’ Organization chairman Hanns-Martin Schleyer, and the prison 
suicides of Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe.  
                                                 
62 This group was begun by Dr. Wolfgang Huber at Heidelberg University from among his 
psychiatric patients. Huber claimed his patients’ ills were caused by capitalist society and the only cure 
was through Marxist revolution.  
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sympathy and support away from the RAF. Other German radicals condemned 
Pimental’s murder as excessive (Arm the Spirit 1994) and unnecessary. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, and the reunification of 
Germany put additional pressure on the RAF, eventually leading its leaders to 
conclude revolution could not be achieved in Germany in the foreseeable future. 
Despite the level of support the group enjoyed at various times, RAF leaders chose 
either to ignore public sentiments or to dismiss them as uneducated or erroneous.  
Following the Pimental murder, for example, the RAF responded to criticisms not by 
acknowledging errors or disagreements, but by admitting to making mistakes in 
releasing a second communiqué to an unenlightened audience.63
 Assessing the same series of messages using the Regressive Imagery 
Dictionary shows a fair degree of overall consistency over time, albeit with 
significant highs and lows throughout the organization’s lifespan (Figure 7b). This 
chaotic consistency may be due in large part to the nature of RAF messages, which 
frequently made liberal use of both abstract and concrete concepts, intimately tying 





                                                 
63 Arm the Spirit 1994: 8-9. In fact, the RAF response was rather arrogant, noting, “it was 
certainly a mistake to send this second communiqué and the ID card together. We presumed that those 
who understood the action would make the connection.” When asked about the differences between 
Pimental’s death and the deaths of two others on the American airbase in Frankfurt, accessed through 
use of Pimental’s ID card, the RAF responded by saying “the relationship between us [the RAF] and 
them [the U.S. military] is war. We needed his card, otherwise we could not have accomplished the 
attack. Of course, we wouldn’t say we should now shoot every GI who comes around the corner or that 
other comrades should do so. One can clarify this only by considering the actual situation, the political-
practical determination of the attack, i.e., it is a tactical question.” Follow-on communications by the 
RAF added, “Naturally, we have, as a result of our mistake, that is not making it politically clearer how 
we understood the attack and our silence about the GI, which prevented people from knowing it was a 




Figure 7b: RAF Message Abstraction and Restraint Over Time 










For the Symbionese Liberation Army, communications language highlighting 
or identifying significant problems peaked early, then exhibited a precipitous decline 
following the loss of its first generation leaders in the May 1974 (month 10) shootout 
with Los Angeles police. In its first communications attempts, the SLA sought to 
outline its goals, its purpose, and its ideology, resting heavily on phrasing suggestive 
of its concerns and perceptions of societal ills. Subsequent communications tended to  
 
 
emphasize many of the same concerns, although at times in the form of angry rants 
and insulting labeling and in others as grandiose claims to status and legitimacy. A 
graph of problem recognition language over time (Figure 8a) clearly illustrates the 
growth, then rapid decline, in SLA efforts to convince an audience that the problems 
it identified are sufficiently important to garner support.  
Assessing SLA messages using the Regressive Imagery Dictionary offers 
additional insights into SLA communications (Figure 8b). In November and 
December 1973  (months 4 and 5), the group sought to explain its rationale for the 
murder of popular San Francisco Schools Superintendent Marcus Foster. Foster was 
called a fascist by the SLA, and was killed because, according to the group, he sought 
to impose a police plan to issue identification cards to students. In February 1974 
(month 7), the SLA kidnapped Hearst, leading to repeated explanations of how its 
actions were necessary to advance the revolution. By April 1974 (month 9), Hearst 









































robbery in San Francisco. The shootout between most of the SLA and Los Angeles 
police, on live television, not only significantly reduced the group’s membership, but 
also corresponded to a final precipitous decline in communicative efforts to build 
agreement with a public on the nature of problems needing action-oriented solutions. 
Figure 8a: SLA Problem Recognition Over Time 




  Figure 8b: SLA Message Abstraction and Restraint Over Time 
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Level of Involvement  
 
 To successfully gain and maintain a supportive audience, a terrorist group 
must also convey a sense of importance of the issues and problems identified such 
that message recipients would likely agree that the issue is important enough to 
warrant their personal contribution to resolution efforts. These types of appeals can 
take the form of abstract concepts, tying issues to ideals, or concrete goals and 
aspirations where level of involvement is couched in terms of  specific actions or 
goals to undertake and support. As such, variability should be expected in 
assessments of group communications, reflective of the flexibility with which this 
aspect of persuasive efforts can be affected. For Hamas, level of involvement 
measures exhibit stark differences, depending on which dictionary is used to make the 
assessment.  
Using the dictionary specifically developed to generate measures of expected 
link affinity (Figure 9a), Hamas messages show slow but steady increases in 
involvement references up to the beginning of the 2nd Intifada in September 2000. 
This may reflect the impact of the Oslo Accords on Palestinian discourse, where 
involvement was largely confined to the actions and agency of states. Beginning in 
September 2000, however, the sphere for potential action shifted back to the personal 
level, giving Hamas additional opportunities to emphasize the potential benefits of 
personal involvement in countering Israeli occupation. Assessing the same 
communications with the Regressive Imagery Dictionary (Figure 9b), on the other 
hand, shows considerable variation over time, with little if any correspondence 
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between expressed levels of abstraction and restraint and activities in Palestinian or 
Israeli lands. This lack of correspondence and persistent variability may reflect the 




Figure 9a: Hamas Level of Involvement Messaging Over Time  




RAF communications show greater correspondence between assessments 
using different dictionaries.  Using the expected link affinity dictionary, RAF 
messages exhibit considerable variations over time (Figure 10a), showing peaks in 
level of involvement phrasing roughly corresponding to periods of lessened  









Figure 9b: Hamas Message Morality and Social Behavior References 
Over Time 


















Figure 10a: RAF Level of Involvement Messaging Over Time 

































organizational activity. This may indicate a slight shift in messaging emphasis based 
in part of the organization’s own operational capabilities. In periods where the RAF 
was more active, there appears to be less message emphasis geared toward promoting 
active support by outsiders. During those periods where RAF activity subsided, often 
as a result of German police counter- measures, messages seem to place greater 
emphasis on promotion of constituent activity and involvement. Results obtained 
using the Regressive Imagery Dictionary (Figure 10b) show less variation over time, 
but with a few notable shifts. Here, the largest single spike in frequency of moralist 
and behavior language corresponds to a period following the German Autumn of 
1977, a time when the RAF’s operational capability had been weakened.  
 
Figure 10b: RAF Message Morality and Social Behavior References Over 
Time 

















Level of involvement references in SLA messages also vary considerably over 
time, with graphic representations of results using the two dictionaries appearing 







































perspective (Figure 11a), SLA message references to level of involvement show 
peaks following significant operational activities undertaken at the group’s initiative, 
most notably the Foster murder and the Hearst kidnapping. This could reflect the 
group’s belief that action on their part would trigger and inspire action and support 
from among their presumed constituency, with messages crafted in a way intended 
to encourage recipients to join the revolutionary efforts of the SLA. Messaging trends 
reflecting level of involvement references exhibits sharp declines following 
significant activities initiated by the group’s adversaries or which drew negative 
publicity, notably the shootout with Los Angeles police, suggesting the group 
retreated into something of a reevaluation period. 
 
Figure 11a: SLA Level of Involvement Messaging Over Time 

















The Foster murder and the emergence of Hearst as Tania marked low points in 
morality and social behavioral references when messages were assessed using the 
Regressive Imagery Dictionary (Figure 11b). This may reflect a greater emphasis in 
messages on the group’s own actions and a de-emphasis on justice or responsibility of 
the actions. Indeed, typical SLA communications sought to lay blame for violent 
action on the victims or the system the victims were said to represent, often either 
holding themselves blameless or arguing their violence was a necessary and 
inevitable consequence of government oppression. 
 
Figure 11b: SLA Message  Morality and Social Behavior References Over 
Time 

















 Conveying or creating a shared perception of problems and inculcating a 
sense of individual action needs are not sufficient for generating and sustaining the 
kinds of support a terrorist group would need to evolve operational capabilities. They 






















the perception of risk associated with action against the government. To do this, the 
group must find effective ways of convincing some portion of their audience that the 
potential benefits of supporting or acting on behalf of the terrorist outweigh the costs 
that may be associated with activity. More successful groups would be expected to 
include language in their messages acknowledging risk, but offering persuasive 
arguments for disregarding or minimizing those risks. Constraint recognition themes 
reflect this need.  
 For Hamas, environmental conditions in Gaza and the West Bank may 
mitigate the need for specific appeals to risk mitigation in their messaging. The 
conditions under which Palestinians live, particularly in Gaza, highlight for many the 
hopelessness of the Palestinian situation such that Hamas might find little need to 
emphasizing benefits of action or to minimize risk. Hamas messages in an expected 
affinity perspective (Figure 12a) reflect this, exhibiting a generally constant level of 
emphasis over time. After the beginning of the 2nd Intifada, when armed conflict 
between Hamas and Israel touched most Palestinians personally, emphasis on 
constraint recognition flattened even more than during earlier periods, although there 
are several periods in which Hamas relied more than previously on constraint 
recognition or mitigation language. The Regressive Imagery Dictionary (Figure 12b) 
offers a slightly different perspective, although one still characterized by little overall 
variation. There is, however, a sharp spike indicating much more extensive 
expressions of passivity and chaos in late 1998 and early 1999, and these may reflect 
perceived changes in communicative needs in response to optimism stemming from 
the Oslo Accords.  
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Figure 12a: Hamas Constraint Recognition Messaging Over Time 




Messages disseminated by the RAF offer a somewhat confusing picture of the 
group’s inclusion of constraint recognition in its communications, although there 
appears enough to suggest that the level of emphasis generally tracks with the ebb and 
flow of the group’s fortunes (Figure 13a). The high point for constraint-oriented 
phrasing is found shortly after July 1971 (month 15), suggesting enjoyment of 
increased popular support prompted a belief among RAF authors that little additional 
persuasive effort directed at the public was needed. Other periods of increased 
constraint-oriented wording is found in the months following enactment of the 
Berufsverbot laws and capture of the group’s founders in 1972, towards the end of the 
 











Figure 12b: Hamas Message Passivity and Chaos References  
Over Time 

















Stammheim trails of RAF first-generation leaders, in the months following the 
German Autumn, during a period of increased anti-U.S. activity (including the 
Pimental murder), and following progress in German reunification.  
Using the Regressive Imagery Dictionary (Figure 13b), RAF messages exhibit 
consistent levels of expression associated in the RID with either passivity or chaos. 
Three notable increases appear, however, during significant periods in the 
organization’s history. The first sharp increase is found immediately after initiation of 
a one of the first hunger strikes by prominent RAF inmates and immediately 
preceding the death of hunger striking RAF leader Holger Meins in November 1974 
(month 55). A second significant increase corresponds to the beginning of the 
German Autumn and the final increases in 1990 and 1993 corresponding to periods of 
stress associated with German reunification and the RAF’s last major act of violence. 























with the group’s ideological arrogance, tempered only occasionally when external 
pressures necessitate increased efforts to encourage public support and sympathy. 
 
Figure 13a: RAF Constraint Recognition Messaging Over Time 


































Figure 13b: RAF Message Passivity and Chaos References Over Time 

















Assessments of SLA communiqués using the two dictionaries show 
remarkable consistency. Even more arrogant, perhaps, than the ideologues of the 
RAF, SLA leaders were quite dismissive of the public from the organization’s 
founding. Rather than couching their struggle in terms of opposition to a state, 
government, or structure, the SLA made it quite clear that their opposition was to all 
who supported any part of the capitalist system. Their murder of Marcus Foster, for 
example, was explained as an action necessary to punish Foster for his supposed 
subservience to a police program designed to track minority youth.64
Constraint recognition content of SLA messages (Figure 14a) shows fair 
consistency for the first eight months of the organization’s existence, spiking in 
December 1973, the month following the Foster murder. The SLA openly 
acknowledged that the original rationale for Hearst’s kidnapping was to force local, 
 
                                                 
64 This is despite the fact that the school identification card initiative was originally Foster’s 
idea and served as a compromise between those who wanted no such program and city leaders who 
wanted a more extensive program than that proposed. Foster was also quite popular with Oakland’s 










































state, and national media to publicize the group and its goals, perhaps offering an 
explanation for the relatively low level of emphasis placed on constraint recognition 
by the group. The more confident the group appeared to feel about themselves and 
their operations, the less they paid attention to constraint recognition. Levels of 
constraint recognition shifted sharply following the decimation of the group’s 
leadership in May 1974, perhaps indicating a growing recognition that they had lost 
virtually all advantage and confidence they might have previously enjoyed. An 
examination using the Regressive Imagery Dictionary (Figure 14b) shows a quite 
similar pattern in message phrasing, albeit with a nearly one yearlong lag.  
The frequency of occurrence found in phrasing indicative of passivity or 
chaos spikes in April 1975 (month 21) rather than in April 1974. This suggests that 
the second generation leaders of the SLA – those who emerged after the organization 
was decimated in the previous May’s shootout in Los Angeles – had a different sense 
of the necessity for building rapport with an audience. These leaders spent the 
majority of their time trying to avoid capture, rather than attacking targets, further 
suggesting an increased emphasis on organizational survival. 
A Situational Perspective 
 
Looking at the messages of each group from a situational theory perspective 
offers a few opportunities for assessment based on observed differences. For Hamas 
messages, the overall tone and context of messages appears to have remained fairly 
constant over the time period assessed. A greater proportion of message content 
appears devoted to establishing and buttressing shared purposes of action. Second in 
importance in message themes appears to be expressions of hostility. While these 
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expressions are mainly directed against the Israelis, more than a few Hamas messages 
express hostility at both the Palestinian Authority and Arab states, mainly for their 
willingness to negotiate with Israel or for their actions hampering Hamas activities. 
Establishing and maintaining a shared sense of community seems to hold the least 
amount of attention in Hamas messages, perhaps because the organization’s history 
and social welfare actions speak much more eloquently in this respect. Hamas, too, 
has little need to establish such a sense of community with its Palestinian audience, 
since that community is homogeneous and rather robust. 
Figure 14a: SLA Constraint Recognition Messaging Over Time 























Figure 14b: SLA Message Passivity and Chaos References Over Time 















 The Red Army Faction’s messages suggest a different set of messaging 
priorities. Since its founding, the RAF has exhibited a certain contempt for the public, 
seeing ordinary Germans as deluded by the capitalist system and ignorant of the 
implications of their leader’s ties to the Nazi regime. Given their hatred of Germany’s 
recent political path, RAF leaders felt obligated to reveal the German state as a 
creature of the Nazi regime and to educate the workers, students, and other 
“progressives” of German society on the necessity of Marxist revolution. The RAF’s 
messages, consequently, express considerable contempt, even for their presumed 
constituency, and convey a sense of pontification rather than persuasion. Efforts to 
build a shared community are present, but limited in that they tend to be directed 
primarily at the German left. Apparently assuming common cause and perception 
with their audience, primary emphasis rests in expressed anger at the German state, 
the capitalist system, and, later in the organization’s life, the United States and 


























 The SLA offers yet another sense of importance through its messages. In its 
early days, much of the SLA’s textual efforts were spent establishing and defining 
purpose as the group sought to establish a rationale for its operational existence. This 
effort appears tempered, however, by an ideological arrogance that assumed problem 
awareness would lead naturally to acceptance of the SLA’s perspectives and goals. In 
much the same way, secondary importance appears given in the early days to 
establishing and maintaining a community among the San Francisco-area radical left, 
although much less so with the Bay-area general public. Expressions of hostility are a 
hallmark of SLA messages, mostly directed at the “system” and those who support it, 
although this varied most likely in response to external pressures on the group. As the 
desperation of the group grew, hostility and contempt gained prominence, and 
permanence, in the group’s messages. In the final months of the organization’s 
existence, purpose and community disappeared from the group’ messages, reflecting 
well the group’s final days spent grasping for a last opportunity to justify its past. 
A Valid Comparison? 
 
There are, quite evidently, limits to what can be derived from comparing 
assessments using two content dictionaries designed for different purposes. On the 
positive side, the comparison offers a clear sense that given the appropriate modeling 
of content analysis dictionaries, categories, and subcategories, differences in the 
communicative efforts of various terrorist groups can be highlighted and examined. 
Such work may, in turn, offer additional insights toward understanding the dynamics 
of group birth, evolution, maturity, and decline. The ability of a terrorist group to 
establish and maintain a constructive dialogue, however marginal, may be a critical 
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component for organizational longevity and operational effectiveness. Without the 
ability to replenish used or lost resources, especially membership, any terrorist group 
becomes more susceptible to the law enforcement and security efforts of its 
opponents. Without new members to replace those lost, the operational viability of 
the group will reach a maximum quickly, and can only decline from there. Injecting 
fresh members into the group’s activities, however, offers the opportunity for 
continued renewal, and maintaining a supportive environment, however minimal or 
marginal, is vital to the group. 
One way in which the efficacy of the measures might be assessed is by fitting 
an ordinary least squares regression curve to the available data. Comparing the 
resulting regression lines, particularly their slope, offers additional insights into how 
the message communications of each group comparing in relation to the efforts by 
others. Similarities and differences would point to variations in patterns of problem 
recognition, level of involvement, and constraint recognition message emphasis over 
time, helping place each group on hypothetical evolutionary ladder introduced in 
chapter 3. Results from an association of variance are quite soft, with almost all 
generated statistical measures falling short of statistical significance. While having 
very few significant statistical results limits interpretive value for the analysis of 
variation and curve fit efforts, the graphical results retain utility for gross 
comparisons. 
While few of the results generated in curve fitting or analysis of variance were 
found to be at statistically significant levels, the slopes of the regression curves 
nevertheless offer a general sense of the level of emphasis afforded each in the 
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groups’ communications over time. These tendencies can help in placing each group 
along the hypothetical evolutionary curve discussed in chapter three, providing a 
sense of where each group may be in terms of generating and maintaining enough of 
a supportive audience that it could be expected to evolve in the direction of greater 
fitness. This visual representation of evolutionary trajectory does not yet allow for an 
exact determination of relative fitness, evolutionary path, or evolutionary status at any 
given time. It does, however, offer a general indication of where each group may be 
in its evolutionary arc and provides an indication of the most likely direction it has 
taken over a given period. Thus, graphic visualization as applied here, creates 
opportunities to begin consideration of potential explanations of the mechanics of 
network growth and resiliency processes involved in each group’s efforts to generate 
sympathy and support. At the same time, the visual representations allow for coarse-
grained comparisons between widely divergent groups, each operating in a spatially 
and temporally unique environment, each targeting a uniquely identified target 
audience. 
All three groups exhibited a positive regression slope when problem 
recognition is plotted against elapsed time (Figure 15). Hamas and the Red Army 
Faction offer the greatest slope, both at .001, although neither result is significant. 
The Symbionese Liberation Army slope is flat, at .000, also not at a significant level. 
Apparent differences in slope result from variations in scale along the elapsed time 
axis. These findings suggest all three organizations addressed problem recognition in 
their communications at relatively comparable rates, and generally in the direction 
needed to help generate sympathy and support. None of the three, however, showed 
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significant, sustained emphasis, or a significant increase over time, on problem 
recognition, most likely for a variety of reasons. Similarly, little of the overall 
variation observed in problem recognition emphasis is explained by elapsed time 
alone, suggesting that other factors play a greater role in determining the extent to 
which each group might emphasize problem recognition in its communications.  
 
Figure 15:  Curve Estimation Comparison: Problem Recognition 
   Source: Author’s construction 
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Plotting regression curves for level of influence over time (Figure 16) shows 
some remarkable differences. For Hamas, the correlation coefficient, R, between 
x-axis = t elapsed 




elapsed time and level of involvement emphasis in communications is 0.570, with an 
adjusted R2 of 0.302. This suggests that roughly 30% of the observed variance in level 
of involvement may be explained by elapsed time, with variation not likely due to 
chance (F = 13.968, significant at the .001 level). The slope of the regression line is 
modest, 0.101, at a statistically significant level. This suggests that levels of 
involvement emphasis in Hamas communications can be tied in part to the passage of 
time, perhaps indicating a transitional period reflecting maturation of messages. It 
may also show that Hamas has succeeded in creating or leveraging a common 
perception of problem and has adapted its messages to leverage a shared sense of 
problems and begin building a common framework for action among its audience. 
 The RAF and SLA, on the other hand, show flat and negative regression 
curve slopes, respectively, neither of which appears at a statistically significant level. 
Variations in level of involvement emphasis for the RAF and the SLA cannot be 
explained well by the passage of time, indicating that for both observed changes in 
emphasis stemmed from other factors. The RAF’s long-term trend appears to hold 
fairly steady, albeit with a very slight downward trend, suggesting perhaps either 
complacency towards prompting action or a failure to recognize the need for 
encouraging action in support of the group. The SLA seemed to grasp the importance 
of prompting action at its inception, but quickly took a more egocentric tone in its 









Figure 16: Curve Estimation Comparison: Level of Involvement 
   Source: Author’s construction 
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None of the three groups exhibited much emphasis on constraint recognition 
(Figure 17), here defined in terms of acknowledging and accepting or mitigating risk  
associated with action. Hamas exhibits a modest positive slope, suggesting that the 
organization has tended to increase overall levels of constraint recognition in its 
communications. This may be explained by a situational need to explain hardship, 
particularly for Gazans under threat of Israeli military action, while building support 
and a common agreement on activism. The RAF exhibits a downward slope over 
time, suggesting a lesser emphasis on recognizing risk in later years, which may be 
x-axis = t elapsed 




attributable to changes in group leadership, assumption of risk minimization 
associated with the formation of strategic alliances with other European terrorist 
 
Figure 17: Curve Estimation Comparison: Constraint Recognition 
   Source: Author’s construction 
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groups, or an ideological belief that prompting over-reaction by the state would 
convey a suitable substitute message. The SLA offers an even sharper downward 
slope, perhaps suggesting that the group was forced to react to increasing pressures 
applied by not only state and federal authorities, but also desperation borne of a 
mounting defensive perspective in the months following its loss of leadership in the 
Los Angeles shootout. New members joining in the aftermath of that confrontation 
x-axis = t elapsed 








 The disparity in record size in this examination leads to important limits and 
caveats. The SLA offers significantly fewer messages, of poorer quality, than do the 
RAF and Hamas. While this may reflect the composition and capabilities of each 
group’s leadership, it also limits the generalizability of any results offered. Similarly, 
the time spans covered for each group raise concerns. It might be more appropriate to 
compare each across the whole of their respective organizational life spans, but at 
present the lack of available Hamas communications from its earlier years makes 
such a comparison problematic. Since these preliminary inquiries suggest there is 
utility in further exploration, accessing the full range of organizational 
communications becomes an immediate goal. 
 Finally, but certainly not least and certainly not indicative of the remaining 
limitations to such research, is the notion that observed differences could be caused 
by other casual factors. Once such factor could be the ideological underpinnings of 
each group, but the extent to which that factor explains differences has not been 
determined. Spatial limits and orientation, as well as nature of targeted audiences, 
may also account for observed differences. Similarly, the purpose for which each 
dictionary was developed surely account for some differences, with the expected link 
affinity dictionary and the Regressive Imagery Dictionary testing different 
manifestations of very complex perceptual, interpretive, and behavioral processes. 
Equally important are questions associated with the appropriateness of the measuring 
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instruments used. Both the RID and the expected link affinity dictionary have clearly 
defined purposes, but those purposes are not expressly compatible. The categories in 
the RID used here are substitutes for more specifically focused content categories, 
accounting in large part for the variations in results produced by each. The 
fundamental tone and texture of the two sets of results so far suggest, however, that 
enough result similarity and interpretive consistency exists to proceed with 




Chapter 6:  Expanding the Metric 
 If terrorist groups sought to gain and maintain a supportive audience simply 
by the power of their words, the persuasiveness of their communiqués and 
pronouncements, and the strength and justice contained within their goals and 
ideologies, they would be able to compete for status and standing on a legal basis, 
rather than resorting to extra-legal activities. Indeed, if this were the case, the 
competitive arena for the terrorist group would be quite different, the potential for 
reward greater, and the potential for risk and sanction much lower. Yet terrorists 
choose, for whatever reason, to engage in violent acts regardless of any existent 
opportunities for peaceful engagement.  
 The decisions to engage in violent acts, whether against the state, their non-
state opponents, or some segment of the public, carry significant consequences for the 
terrorist. Choices of target, arms, and timing contribute to governmental decisions 
about counter-measures. Increasing the appearance of threat or escalation in attack 
frequency or severity inevitably lead to harsher counter-measures intended to 
preserve political and social stability. For some terrorists, prompting increasingly 
harsh and draconian counter-measures by government is the immediate goal, intended 
to show the public the “true nature” of the government (Marighella, 1970). Given an 
ideological affinity for the Uruguayan Tupamaros and the writings of Carlos 
Marighella, the Red Army Faction and the Symbionese Liberation Army both 
adopted an operational strategy designed to provoke government over-reaction. 
Hamas, too, has followed a similar path, with respect to Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority, although it has not expressed explicitly any ideological debt to Marighella. 
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 Decisions to engage in violence also affect terrorist groups and their strategic 
development by shaping the nature of the group’s relationship with the public and any 
segment of the public seen by the terrorist as a natural constituency. Terrorism affects 
not only its immediate victims and those closely related by familial, ethnic, cultural, 
social, economic, or political ties, but also a much wider circle of observers no matter 
how far spatially removed from the violence. Even where individuals are spared from 
the immediate effects of a terrorist attack, violent acts, particularly terrorist 
“spectaculars” that produce widespread damage and casualties, bring a degree of 
psychological damage to observers. 
 For terrorists claiming to act on behalf of a particular group, or constituency, 
violence can be a two-edged sword. On the one hand, violence directed at common 
enemies or their representatives can be seen as having a propitious effect on the 
terrorist – constituency relationship. Where violence is seen as benefitting a particular 
constituency, that portion of the population may be predisposed to approve of the 
terrorist’s actions, leading perhaps to support and assistance to the terrorist. On the 
other hand, where violence harms the very people the terrorist claims to act for, little 
support or sympathy for the terrorist or his cause could be expected. Where the 
terrorist’s acts and the goals, aspirations, and needs of his presumed constituency 
conflict, the terrorist may find little sympathy and may feel compelled to enforce 
compliance with his dictates through negative sanctions (Lichbach 1995; Bell 1998).   
 Winning popular support is a long-established precept in insurgency and 
counter-insurgency. Terrorists, too, understand the need for popular support, with 
very few terrorist groups utterly disregarding public sentiments.  Those few that have 
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disregarded popular sentiments have tended to find their operational capabilities 
severely constrained, so much so that their ability to operate at all has been largely 
defined by the degree to which they can secure support and safe haven from a state.65
 The violence authored by a terrorist group affects their relationship with their 
audiences and constituencies in ways beyond the act of violence itself. Target 
selection, choice of weaponry, timing and frequency of attacks, location, and intensity 
of violence all convey meaning to observers. Attacks are designed to send a message, 
at least with respect to the selection of targets and timing of attacks (Drake 1998a). 
How the terrorist perceives this aspect of communications, however, varies widely. 
Some groups presume all observers can be expected to understand the message 
inherent in the act and eschew issuance of a claim of credit. Others are not so certain 
their intent and message will be immediately understood and choose to issue a claim 
of responsibility. Still others allow context and reaction to attacks to dictate whether 
to claim credit, indicating a degree of attentiveness to public opinion (Rapoport 1997; 
Pluchinsky 1997; and B. Hoffman 1997).  
 
Terrorists, particularly those whose ideology calls for the creation of a mass 
movement or popular revolution, seek the comfort and support of an audience larger 
than themselves and their active sympathizers. It is from this audience that they can 
expect to draw recruits, gain intelligence and information, find relative safety for rest 
and recuperation, and draw both ideological and material support.  
                                                 
65 The Japanese Red Army, particularly after embracing the Palestinian struggle and attacking 
religious pilgrims at Israel’s Lod Airport offer an instructive example. As the group became further 
marginalized from any identifiable constituency outside the Middle East, it found fewer opportunities 
for refuge, eventually becoming limited to safe haven in North Korea.  
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 Less obvious, perhaps, is the way in which weapon selection and degree of 
discrimination in the application violence may have on understanding any intended 
message contained in the act. Targets are often selected for their representational 
value, their symbolic value, lending context to any act of violence. The Red Army 
Faction’s kidnapping and subsequent execution of Hanns-Martin Schleyer, chairman 
of the German Employers’ Association, made clear the RAF’s opposition to the 
capitalist system’s oppression of the proletariat. Similarly, Hamas’ attacks on Israeli 
Defense Forces soldiers or on Israeli settlers make clear its opposition to Israel and 
Israel’s presumed territorial expansionism. The weapon used in the attack, however, 
does not seem to hold the same communicative value as target selection, especially 
since many terrorist groups are somewhat constrained in their choices of weaponry by 
resource availability. Nevertheless, weapon choice may have an effect on observers’ 
interpretations of the act, suggesting that the communicative impact of weapon choice 
may be easily skewed by misinterpretation. Similarly, less discrimination in limiting 
damage can be easily interpreted as indicative of actual group intent. Highly selective 
applications of violence, where a specific target is attacked in such a way as to limit 
collateral damage, may engender greater opportunities to attract neutral or favorable 
consideration of the act by observers. Highly indiscriminate acts, on the other, 
undertaken with complete disregard for collateral damage, can be seen as inherently 
more threatening since there may be no correspondence between one’s role (or lack 






 Intentionally or unintentionally, terrorist acts convey messages to a variety of 
audiences. The way in which those messages are interpreted by the terrorist’s 
presumed constituency can have a significant impact on the extent to which the 
terrorist is able to generate support and sympathy for his cause and his actions. The 
symbolic orientation metric is intended to capture the potential communicative aspect 
of a violent act, intended or unintended, thus supplementing the rhetorical component 
found in statements and communiqués released by the group. The effect of persuasive 
efforts by the terrorist, designed to gain and maintain a degree of support, found in 
those texts can be supported or undermined by the acts themselves, making observer 
interpretations as important, if not more so, than the authors’ intent. How acts of 
violence are interpreted, however, is not only highly sensitive to context, but also 
uniquely individualistic. There is no way of knowing how any group of observers 
interprets the acts of a terrorist group short of asking each individual in a given 
population how he or she understands the act. Even were mass surveys possible, the 
data derived is likely to change over time and in the presence or absence of repeated 
exposure to terrorist acts or terrorist sympathizers. 
 Developing a symbolic orientation metric, then, is highly subjective. Based on 
an expectation of impact and interpretation, it can only offer a sense of potential 
rather than a verifiable objective measure. Interpretation lies with the observer, not 
the author of the message, although the author can seek to direct and guide 
interpretations. Nothing, however, suggests that authorship necessarily engenders 
communicative intent, leaving any measure of effort to manipulate interpretation of 
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symbolic content of acts presumptuous. Even in the absence of explicit intent, 
meaning is likely to be inferred by an audience, suggesting some value in considering 
the potential impact of symbolic meaning. Terrorism often seems purposeless, 
random, and unpredictable. To cope with the fear and uncertainty of terrorism, 
observers tend to attach meaning and purpose, however tenuous, to acts of terrorism 
in order to help assuage the psychological trauma of witnessing such violence. 
Symbolic orientation thus assumes interpretation of intent on the part of observers 
regardless of whether or not specific meaning was intended by the terrorist.  
 
Severity, Intimacy, and Weapon Selection  
 
 Acts of terrorism are frequently judged on the basis of severity. The greater 
the degree of damage caused, the larger the casualty totals, and the degree of 
innocence attached to the target help shape popular reactions to acts of violence. One 
of the more common ways in which an act of terrorism is assessed is by the amount 
of kinetic energy released by the act itself, with greater amounts of kinetic energy 
released equated with greater destructiveness and severity. A knife attack releases 
little kinetic energy, limiting physical damage to a very small area. A single hand 
grenade releases much more energy on detonation, yielding a much wider, but still 
limited, destructive radius. A car bomb packing several hundred pounds of high 
explosives generates a tremendous amount of kinetic energy, yielding a much larger 
destructive radius. As the destructive radius increases, so too do the extent of physical 
damage and likelihood of multiple casualties, leading observers to see greater releases 
of energy as more severe.  
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 Most terrorist groups appear to make decisions about weapons largely on the 
basis of resource availability. Often constrained in this regard, terrorists may find 
themselves unable to bring to bear weapons of choice on selected targets. Well-
resourced groups, on the other hand, typically have the luxury of selectivity where 
weaponry is concerned, with some groups able to affect their own research, 
development, and manufacture capability.66
Similarly, the nature of the victim adds to the perception of severity in a 
terrorist attack. Attacks limited to property damage are often taken to be less severe 
than attacks that result in casualties. Death and injury quite naturally lead to more 
empathy, more personalization, and a greater readiness to translate the pain and 
suffering to a highly personal context. Even when an attack produces casualties, 
perceptions of severity can be tempered by the identity of the victims. Victims 
intimately tied to identities, positions, or roles associated with high degrees of risk, 
such as police, security, and military personnel generally result in less shock then do 
attacks against innocent civilians. Similarly, stand-off attacks, where a close 
connection between attacker and victim at the time of the attack is missing, tend to 
engender less shock and fewer opportunities for personalization than do intimate 
attack settings, where attacker and victim share a common space. 
 Despite limitations that may be imposed 
on a terrorist group by its resource availability, observers of terrorist acts tend to 
assume meaning in weapon selection, in large part due to the extent of damage and 
injury the weapon causes. 
                                                 
66 Aum Shinryko, the Japanese group responsible for a sarin gas attack against the Tokyo 
subway systems, is an excellent example. Aum not only had access to millions of dollars donated by its 
adherents and supporters, but also enjoyed the services of a number of highly trained technicians and 
well-educated chemists, physicists, and medical doctors. Aum’s supplies of sarin, VX, anthrax, and 





 Perceptions, assumptions, and interpretations of any inherent message in a 
terrorist attack can also be affected by the location of the attack. Violence in close 
proximity to an observer would be expected to have greater impact, and greater 
likelihood of attached meaning, than would an attack taking place far removed from 
the observer. Attacks at a distance offer increased opportunities to rationalize an 
attack as directed at others for reasons unconnected to an observer. Even when an 
attack is not directed at an observer, violence in close proximity may confuse an 
observer’s interpretation of events such that nearness is assumed to correspond to 
deliberate targeting. While the spatial proximity of an attack may have no actual basis 
in terrorist decision-making, nearness tends to convey a sense of heightened relevance 
to the act. In much the same way, violence undertaken in the home territory of the 
terrorist or terrorist constituency personalizes the action by establishing context, even 
if unintentionally. Disassociation is more easily accomplished when an attack takes 
place on foreign soil. 
Empathy  
 
 Terrorism is perceived as conflict between identifiable parties, although one 
side of the conflict may be described in rather amorphous terms such as society, the 
capitalism system, the military-industrial complex, or the infidel. Even so, specific 
target roles within the context of the conflict convey meaning to observers. 
Government and quasi-government institutions and personnel are, in a sense, 
expected targets of terrorist attacks. Violence directed against the institutions and 
mechanisms of state can be rationalized as a consequence of government policies and 
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practices, and attacks against individuals fulfilling governmental roles can be 
interpreted as a cost associated with position and duty. Attacks against non-
governmental targets tend to be perceived differently, often since the civilian target is 
not readily seen as an active party to the conflict. As a result, attacks directed 
specifically at non-governmental entities are readily interpreted as more violent, more 
shocking, and more frightening given their unpredictability. 
Measuring Symbolic Orientation  
  
 The symbolic message of an attack, called here symbolic orientation, is held 
to be a combination of attack frequency, severity, degree of spatial separation 
between attack and observer, target identification, weapon selection, and intimacy. 
These factors combine to create a critical component of the terrorist’s message, 
helping provide important interpretive context to any available rhetorical message. 
Where rhetorical communications are missing, the symbolic message conveys 
meaning regardless of any intent to do so by the terrorist. When rhetorical 
communications are a factor in activity interpretations, the symbolic meaning 
attributed to attacks serves to reinforce the message conveyed by other means. 
Positive reinforcement, when the interpreted symbolic message generally supports the 
rhetorical, enhances a terrorist group’s efforts to build a sympathetic and supportive 
constituency by offering a consistent, easily interpreted message of clear direction, 
purpose, and goals. Negative reinforcement, on the other hand, where the intended or 
inferred message contained in the rhetorical and symbolic components conflict, 
would tend to confuse an intended audience, leaving observers to wonder what the 
terrorist’s true objectives and intentions are. This lack of certainty in interpretation 
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and lack of consistency would tend to undermine the terrorist’s efforts to build 
support, since individuals are being asked to assume considerable risk without clear 
establishment of suitable rationale. 
Attack Frequencies and Symbolic Orientation 
 
 Few if any terrorist groups start at a high operational tempo. Typically lacking 
resources and access to preferred targets, most start small and build operational 
capability over time as the group gains members, mobility, information, and 
opportunity. Hamas, the Red Army Faction, and the Symbionese Liberation Army are 
not exceptions, with each leveraging resource and opportunity gains to build 
capability.  The extent to which each was able to expand operational capabilities, 
however, was tied to its ability to not only acquire material resources, but members 
and support. The skills, knowledge, and abilities of their members, coupled with 
material resources, dictate the pace and scope of any capability expansion and 
increase in operational tempo. In all three examples, attack capabilities expanded over 
time, although to varying degrees, despite counter-actions undertaken by their 
opponents. 
Attack Frequencies, Hamas 
 
 Hamas attacks against Israeli targets began soon after the organization was 
founded in 1987. The first attacks by Hamas tended to be small, rather intimate 
attacks characterized by lone individual attackers or small groups, using small arms 
or knives, to attack randomly selected Israelis. Over time, Hamas-authored attacks 
became more sophisticated and destructive, first with small squads of attackers 
 203 
 
infiltrating Israeli settlements and the first deployment of explosives against Israeli 
targets. In 1992, Hamas’ military wing, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was formed 
in order to increase the pressure on Israel. Initial Qassam Brigades activities, 
however, tended to target representatives of Israeli state authority, such as Israeli 
soldiers and infrastructure. In February 1994, an Israeli settler, Dr. Baruch Goldstein, 
attacked and killed a number of Palestinians at the Cave of the Patriarchs, prompting 
Hamas to expand targeting to include Israeli civilians.  By 1994, Hamas had 
expanded its operational capability, using a car bomb against an Israeli target for the 
first time.  
 Hamas’ military strategy continued to evolve at a rapid pace (Figure 18). 
Between 1996 and 1999 (months 98 through 145), as the Palestinian Authority and 
Israel, under the encouragement of the United States, moved the peace process 
forward, Hamas used a series of suicide bombings, followed by relative restraint, in 
an effort to disrupt the progress made in resolving Palestinian-Israel differences 
(Karmon 2000). Palestinian political aspirations appeared to be moving closer to 
realization as the peace process moved forward, particularly with the 1996 Palestinian 
legislative and presidential elections, which Hamas boycotted. Attacks by Hamas 
continued, although at a generally low level.  
In September 2000 (month 154), however, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
visited the Western Wall in Jerusalem, sparking the beginning of the 2nd Palestinian 
Intifada. Within a year of the resumption of unrest in Gaza and the West Bank, 
Hamas had begun to actively exploit the situation by increasing its operational tempo 
against Israel. At the same time, tensions between the Palestinian Authority and 
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Hamas increased as the Arafat government worked to both continue the peace process 
and restrain Hamas. Israeli actions against Hamas also increased in tempo and scope, 
resulting in the death of senior Hamas figure Salah Shehadeh and 14 others in an 
airstrike in July 2002, Qassam leader Ibrahim al-Makadmeh in March 2003, and 
Qassam leader Ismail Shanab in September 2003. One month after the death of 
Shanab, Israel wounded Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin in another airstrike. By 
January 2004 
 
Figure 18:  Hamas Attack Frequency Over Time (attacks per 
month) 
     Source: Author’s construction 
 
      
 (month 194), deputy Hamas leader al-Rantisi had offered Israel a 10-year truce in 
exchange for Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 borders, but Israel made its position 
quite clear when it killed Yassin in an airstrike in March, then killed Yassin’s 
successor, al-Rantisi, in another airstrike one month later. 
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Tensions between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority continued to escalate, 
as did the conflict between Hamas and Israel. In September 2004 (month 2003), Israel 
killed senior Hamas figure Izz el-Deen Sheikh Khalil in Damascus, Syria, a presumed 
safe haven for Hamas leaders. Two months later, Palestinian Authority president 
Arafat died, opening the door to open armed conflict between Hamas, on the one 
hand, and the Palestinian Authority and Fatah, on the other. Seizing the advantage 
born of Fatah and Authority weakness in the wake of Arafat’s death, Hamas’ 
operational tempo increased significantly by late 2004 and early 2005. It was during 
this period, too, that Hamas expanded its ability to operate in Gaza with relative 
impunity, offering it an unprecedented opportunity to use Gaza as a launch area for its 
emerging longer-range strike capabilities. Much of the rapid increase in attack 
frequency during this period can be traced to a significant expansion of Hamas’ use of 
mortars and self-produced Qassam rockets to strike Israeli territory. By October 2003, 
Hamas had increased its operations tempo from roughly 2 to 3 significant attacks per 
month, to an average of 8 to 9 per month, then to as many as 95 in December 2004. 
Symbolic Orientation, Hamas 
 
 The calculated symbolic orientation metric for Hamas (Figure 19) between 
March 1987 (month 1) and February 2005 (month 208) shows a wide degree of 
variance, consistent with the ebb and flow of active conflict between Hamas, the 
Palestinian Authority, and Israel. Prior to the beginning of the 2nd Intifada (September 
2000, month 154), levels of violence were relatively low, except for a significant 
spike between July 1997 (month 116) and September 1997 (month118). In those 
months, Hamas suicide bombers attacked the Mahane Yehuda market and the Ben-
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Yehuda shopping center, both in Jerusalem, resulting in 195 and 209 casualties 
respectively. With the beginning of the 2nd Intifada, however, Hamas violence 
became more frequent, more pronounced, and potentially more destructive. The first 
three years, through September 2003, saw a tremendous increase in the number of 
suicide bombings attributed to Hamas, notably in a wave of attacks against passenger 
busses, and an increasing reliance on mortars and Qassam rockets targeted at Israeli 
cities and settlements near Gaza. As attack frequency increased, so too did either 
casualties or the potential for casualties, making Hamas attacks overall much more 
deadly than was the case prior to September 2000.  The increase in violence can also 
be tied to growing armed conflict between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, 
although the worst of this internal conflict took place in a period beyond the bounds 
of the present examination.  
 
Figure 19: Hamas Symbolic Orientation Over Time 





Attack Frequencies, Red Army Faction 
 
 The birth of the Red Army Faction is a little less clear than that of Hamas. 
Variously given as 1968, 1969, and 1970, this paper accepts 14 May 1970, the date 
claimed by the RAF for its founding, as the beginning of the group. Emerging from 
the leftist student movement in German, the RAF was but one of a number of violent 
organizations seeking to spark a communist revolution to free the proletariat. To the 
early RAF ideologues, the German state was a thinly disguised legacy of the Third 
Reich, now beholden to the imperialist plans and aspirations of the United States. 
Even so, the early years of the RAF were highlighted by low-level violence revolving 
mainly around a few firebombings, armed robberies, and shootouts with police 
(Figure 20). By late 1970 and early 1971, the RAF had developed something of a 
“Robin Hood” reputation among the German left, earning the group the highest level 
of public popularity it would enjoy (Huffman 2000. See also Baumman 1977; Becker 
1977; Cook 1982; and Merkl 1995). 
By 1972, the RAF had begun using explosives, targeting police, the German 
judiciary, the German press, and U.S. Army facilities. The group’ sophistication also 
increased, with an attack in Heidelberg consisting of paired, near-simultaneous 
bombings on a U.S. military facility. In June (month 26), however, the founders and 
leaders of the RAF – Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof, Holger 
Meins, and Jan-Carl Raspe – had been captured by police, leaving the RAF to 
struggle for a short while as new leaders gained experience. Also during this 
transition period, another militant left group, the Socialist Patient’s Collective, 
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merged with the RAF, ultimately taking the group into one of its most well known 
attacks. In April 1975 (month 60), the RAF seized the West German Embassy in 
 
 
Figure 20: Red Army Faction Attack Frequency Over Time 
(attacks per month) 
    Source: Author’s construction 
   
         
Stockholm, Sweden, demanding the release of jailed RAF members. Neither the 
German nor the Swedish governments exhibited much inclination to comply, leading 
the RAF to execute several hostages and trigger an explosion on the first floor during 
an abortive rescue operation. Following the Embassy siege, the RAF resumed a more 
familiar pattern of activity in German, often relying on bombings and shootings to 
convey its messages.  
 RAF prisoners in Germany’s Stammheim prison remained a focus for RAF 
efforts through 1977. As the trials of Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof, and others 
progressed, RAF attacks were undertaken to direct attention to the claimed inhuman 
 209 
 
conditions under which RAF prisoners were held and were often accompanied by 
demands for the prisoners’ release. Beginning in July 1977 (month 87), RAF violence 
escalated considerably, leading the next eight months to be referred to as the “German 
Autumn.” During this period, the RAF killed Dresdener Bank Director Jürgen Ponto 
during a botched kidnapping attempt, kidnapped then executed Hanns-Martin 
Schleyer, were the intended beneficiaries of an airline hijacking by the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine,67
 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the RAF began to take a more noticeable 
internationalist position, striking against high profile American and NATO targets, 
such as NATO’s Commander, General Alexander Haig (June 1979, month 110, in 
Mons, Belgium), the U.S. Army commander in Germany, General Frederick Kroesen 
(September 1981, month 137), and at military facilities including Ramstein Airbase 
(August 1981, month 136), Oberammergau (December 1984, month 176), and Rhein-
Main Air Base near Frankfurt (August 1985, month184).  This renewed emphasis on 
foreign targets coincided with the RAF’s strategic alliances with France’s Action 
Directe and Italy’s Red Brigades in an effort to form and international revolutionary 
front and position itself as the vanguard in the march toward communism. Perhaps 
ignorant of prevailing social norms and expectations, and perhaps dismissive of them, 
the RAF murdered an American soldier, Edward Pimental, simply to obtain an 
identification card that was subsequently used to gain base access for the Rhein-Main 
 and witnessed the jailhouse suicides of Baader, 
Ensslin, and Raspe. 
                                                 
67 Following less than a year after the successful rescue of hostages from an Air France flight 
in Entebbe, Uganda, by Israel, this incident was resolved when German commandos successfully 
assaulted the aircraft and its hijackers in Mogadishu, Somalia. The PFLP commandos had demanded, 
in part, the release of RAF prisoners on trial at Stammheim. 
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Air Base bombing. Pimental’s murder was widely seen as callous and unnecessary, 
even by other leftists and militant organizations in Germany, leading to a storm of 
criticism directed at the RAF (Arm the Spirit 1994). The combination of sharp 
criticism, deep self-examination and criticism by its leaders, and the cumulative 
effects of effective German police and security actions undermined the RAF’s will to 
continue. While the group did carry out additional attacks culminating in the bombing 
of a new high security prison in June 1993 (month 278), the RAF’s credibility and 
operational effectiveness declined precipitously following the Pimental murder, never 
to recover. 
Symbolic Orientation, Red Army Faction 
 
 The symbolic impact of RAF actions (Figure 21) exhibits a varied picture, 
with considerable variations over time. Many of these variations can be attributed to 
changes brought about by new leaders stepping up to replace those captured or killed 
by police or by efforts of the group to affect the release of their imprisoned comrades. 
The Stammheim trial period and a corresponding wave of prisoner-staged hunger 
strikes, from November 1974 (month 55) through July 1977 (month 87) shows the 
RAF employing a variety of means, including assistance from Palestinian groups, in 
an effort to achieve its goals. One prominent hunger-striker, Holger Meins, died as a 
result of his refusal to accept nourishment in November 1977, triggering a spate of 
efforts, both inside Stammheim and outside, to bring the plight of RAF prisoners to a 





Figure 21: Red Army Faction Symbolic Orientation Over Time 
    Source: Author’s construction 
 
      
 
months 86 to 92), and the group’s alliances with French and Italian terrorists (months 
175 to 180), the RAF’s symbolic orientation metric shows a more concentrated 
pattern of flux, perhaps reflecting an internal conflict over scope and direction of 
activities by group leaders.   
Attack Frequencies, Symbionese Liberation Army 
 
 Compared to Hamas and the Red Army Faction, the SLA had an exceptionally 
short lifespan, lasting from the summer of 1973 to September 1975 (Figure 22). 
During this period, the SLA authored only13 acts of violence and ultimately suffered 
the deaths of more members than injuries caused to others. Founded by an escaped 
California prison inmate, Donald DeFreeze, the SLA tried to position itself as a 
liberating organization established to fight for and free peoples of all races and ethnic 
backgrounds from oppression. Although espousing harmony of all peoples, the SLA 
undertook as its first overt act of revolution the murder of Oakland, California, 
schools superintended Marcus Foster in November 1973 (month 4). When the Foster 
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murder failed to generate the support and sympathy the group expected, it chose as its 
second act the February 1974 (month 7) kidnapping of Hearst Corporation heiress 
Patricia Hearst from her Berkeley, California, apartment.  The group contented itself 
to a series of bank robberies for the next few months, increasing its operational tempo 
to two events in May 1974 (month 10) only by happenstance. On May 16, two SLA 
members were shopping in a Los Angeles sporting goods store when one decided to 
shoplift a pair of socks. When a security guard intervened, the SLA’s waiting driver, 
reportedly Hearst, fired on the store’s exterior signage in order to affect the release of 
her comrades. The following day, six members of the group died during a shootout 
and fire at their safe house in a confrontation with Los Angeles police. 
The survivors, Bill and Emily Harris, along with Hearst, spent the better part 
of the next year attempting to rebuild the group, eventually recruiting a small number 
of individuals.  In 1974 and 1975, the SLA again resorted to bank robberies as their 
primary means of expression until a last spasm of violence,  in August 1975 (month 
25), when the group attempted to kill police officials in California using explosive 
devices, most of which failed to detonate. The SLA ceased to exist after September 















Figure 22: Symbionese Liberation Army Attack Frequency  
    Over Time (attacks per month) 
    Source: Author’s construction 
 
 
Symbolic Orientation, Symbionese Liberation Army 
 
 The display of calculated symbolic orientation for the SLA (Figure 23) shows 
marked ebbs and flows in SLA violence, peaking during two significant points in the 
organization’s life. The murder of superintendent Foster in November 1973 (month 4) 
appears as the high point in SLA activities, followed closely by the near decimation 
of the group in May 1974 (month 10) in Los Angeles. Following a rebuilding period 
by the survivors, the group’s operational capabilities were essentially ended, with the 
remaining upticks in symbolic orientation reflecting more intent than actual 
capability, notably in a spasm of bombing attempts in August 1975. The group’s 
deviations, however, are even fewer than that, since the Los Angeles shootout was 






Figure 23:  Symbionese Liberation Army Symbolic Orientation 
    Over Time 




 Hamas, the RAF, and the SLA also exhibit noticeable differences in their 
patterns of symbolic orientation, both from each other and from their established 
patterns of attack frequency. These differences are most likely attributable to the 
unique aspects of each organization, its resource availability, and its operational 
context. Since each has a specific group of people it presumes to be its constituency, 
each must deal with a unique set of audience norms, expectations, and interpretive 
tendencies. With differences in interpretive context, each group could be expected to 
attempt to reach its presumed audience in a manner expected to have both relevance 
and meaning to that audience. Given the uniqueness of each group’s situation and 
audiences, differences observed between groups are not remarkable, although within-




 The complex interplay of terrorist actions and rhetoric help dictate the degree 
to which a targeted audience is affected by the terrorist’s message and the degree to 
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which that message holds resonance among the members of that audience. For an 
organization attempting to generate support and sympathy such that it can improve 
operational effectiveness and grow into a more powerful and compelling claimant to 
standing and power, it must find a way to successfully establish a connection to its 
targeted constituency. The degree to which these efforts are predicted to succeed is 
measured by expected affinity, a combination of adoption and application of the 
rhetorical elements critical for effective persuasion, and the symbolic aspects of 
unintentional and intentional meaning associated with an action. The more a terrorist 
group succeeds in establishing a mutually reinforcing relationship with an audience, 
the higher the value of expected affinity forecast.  
Hamas Expected Affinity 
 
 Hamas exhibits fairly sharp increases in expected affinity over the October 
1998 (month 131) to January 2002 (month 170) period for which both communiqués 
and records of attacks are available (Figure 24). The flattening of the graph after 
January 2002 is more reflective of a lack of data than a change in Hamas activities. 
The increases in the 1998-2002 period are consistent with the record of escalation of 
Hamas attacks on both Israeli and Palestinian Authority targets, incorporating 
changes in tactics, weaponry, and target selection. These increases are also consistent 
with changes in the tone and texture of Hamas statements during the period. In 
October 1998, a significant portion of Hamas’ statements were devoted to analysis 
and criticism of the Wye Memorandum, a statement of intent signed on the 23rd by 
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Arafat. In the 
Wye Memorandum, the PA and Israeli governments outlined a series of steps each 
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side agreed to take in the expectation that the cumulative impact of implementation 
would advance the cause of a permanent peace. Hamas, however, objected on 
ideological grounds to any concession, or appearance of concession, to the Israelis. At 
this point, however, Hamas leaders felt a need to explain to their targeted audience 
the shortcomings and hidden dangers of cooperation with Israel: 
In view of the dangers of this agreement and its negative consequences 
to the Palestinian Cause and to the present and future conditions of the whole 
region, we, in the Islamic Resistance Movement, would like to introduce this 
memorandum directly to our People and Nation as part of our duty to 
enlighten and warn them. In addition, we strongly encourage everyone to play 
their role in defending Palestine’s Cause, its people and its holy places, as 
well as to work seriously to prevent the expansion of the Zionist project at the 
expense of the Nation’s interests now and in the future. (Hamas 1998) 
 
In seeking to inform the Palestinian people, Hamas chose a reasoned approach, taking 
care to explain the provisions of the Wye Memorandum and explaining how, as 
interpreted by Hamas, the agreement exclusively acknowledged Israeli concerns and 
expectations while abrogating Palestinian rights and aspirations. Hamas also took 
pains in its critique to paint the Wye accord as a creation of the Israelis and the 
United States, suggesting that Arafat was too weak willed to resist the demands of 
those opposed to Palestinian self-determination and independence and noting that 
“…Netanyahu has obligated the Palestinian negotiators to nullify specific provisions 
of the Palestinian National Charter in a humiliating manner.” (Hamas 1998)  
As Hamas sought to foster not only a sense of common cause with its targeted 
audience, it worked to portray itself as the only organization holding steadfast to the 
interests of the Palestinian people. At the conclusion of its criticism of the Wye 
Memorandum, Hamas authors noted its “keenness to preserve National unity,” 
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suggesting explicitly that the Palestinian Authority had failed in its obligations to 
place the interests of Palestine first. 
 
Figure 24: Hamas Expected Affinity Metric Over Time 




By the beginning of the 2nd Intifada (September 2000, month 154), the tone 
and tenor of Hamas communications had taken on an increased stridency and 
militancy. Less than one month after Sharon’s visit to the Western Wall, a Hamas 
communiqué elevated Islam and the belief that Islam demanded sacrifice by 
announcing: 
 
  Our souls and blood sacrificed for the sake of the Aqsa. 
 Let the Aqsa Intifada continue and let the confrontations progress and 
let the ground turn into fire and volcanoes under the feet of the usurpers. 
Our Mujahid Palestinian people: “If ye are suffering hardships, they 
are suffering similar hardships; but ye have hope from Allah, while they have 
none.” In these blessed days . . . the days of Jihad and martyrdom . . . the days 
of Jihad for the cause of Allah, in defense of His religion and in revenge to 
Al-Quds [Jerusalem], sanctities and the Aqsa . . . and in support of the Arab 
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and Islamic Nation’s dignity, the precious Palestinian blood continues to be 
shed for the sake of the Aqsa . . . in these days you, our people prove again 
and ever again that you are the people of sacrifice, martyrs, pride, dignity, 
patience and steadfastness . . . . (Hamas 2000) 
 
Israel is painted in Hamas statements as a government of “criminal Nazis” intent on 
massacring Palestinians and using advanced weapons against unarmed civilians. 
Israelis are continuously dehumanized in Hamas statements, while Hamas and the 
struggle against Israel are consistently painted in the most heroic terms. Absolutist 
language began to dominate Hamas communications, with the Palestinian Authority 
regularly condemned for ceding Palestinian rights, holding the Authority to an 
exceptionally high standard for conduct, one that the realities of peace negotiations 
could not allow: 
[W]e affirm the decisive fact that no Palestinian, Arab or Muslim leader has 
the right of approving any agreement or treaties that reduce our people’s rights 
in Al-Quds, the Aqsa, the whole land of Palestine, return of refugees, 
dismantling settlements, liberating our lands and establishing a real sovereign 
state. Any such agreements would not represent our people or their free will 
and they would not be binding on us or our people who will tear apart any 
humiliating agreement through blood of their martyrs and struggle and Jihad 
of their sons. (Hamas 2001) 
 
 The anniversary of the 2nd Intifada’s start in September 2001 brought a 
reinvigorated stridency, exacerbated perhaps by the growing conflict between Hamas 
and the Palestinian Authority. As Qassam attacks escalated, particularly the growing 
deployment of suicide bombers against Israeli targets, the language used in Hamas 
statements took on an even greater reliance on heroic imagery, celebrating the 
martyrdom of their suicide bombers. These messages took full use of both religious 
language and amplified the religious iconography prominently displayed in Hamas-
dominated areas of Gaza and the West Bank. Martyrs were lionized, held as an 
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example of the best Palestine could offer as young men chose to make the ultimate 
sacrifice for the ultimate welfare and well-being of others. Appropriate passages from 
the Koran dominated many messages, particularly those released by the Qassam 
Brigades, asserting by association a divine approval of Hamas actions. Most Qassam 
messages, for example, began with a passage not only glorifying the killing of non-
believers but also the transfer of ultimate responsibility to Allah -- “It is not ye who 
slew them; it was Allah: when thou threwest, it was not thy act, but Allah’s…” and 
ending with the exhortation that “… it is a Jihad until either victory or martyrdom.” 
(See, for example, Qassam 2001) 
 Fitting a regression curve to the expected affinity metric for Hamas, with 
expected affinity as the dependent variable and elapsed time as the independent 
variable, between October 1998 and January 2002 (Figure 25) suggests Hamas found 
increasing success in gaining and maintaining a supportive audience, thereby 
decreasing its need to emphasize problem recognition, need for involvement, or 
constraint recognition in its messages. Over a 220-month period, Hamas’ textual and 
symbolic messages exhibited a relatively steady decrease in expected affinity 
measures. Observed values deviate from the regression line to a noticeable degree 
around the beginning of the 2nd Intifada, but then quickly settle to levels closer to the 
predicted trend. This suggests Hamas’ may have tailored its messages at the 
beginning of the 2nd Intifada in order to wrest initiative and sympathy from rival 
claimants among the Palestinian population.  The observed tendency in expected 
affinity may not, however, be the direct result of Hamas communications and any 
meaning attached by Palestinian observers to Hamas’ actions. Instead, the rapidly 
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changing environmental context presented a situational ground-truth that changed 
daily, leaving all actors as reactive to events as proactive in deciding which course of 
action to take. 
Figure 25: Curve Estimation, Hamas 
    Source: Author’s construction 
        
 
 
  Analysis of variance in the Hamas expected affinity metric (Table 1) offers 
several results at a statistically significant level. In this case, analysis of variance 
suggests that some of the observed variance may be a product of the passage of time, 
with something less than half the variance potential attributable to time (R2 = .388). 
The observed variation in the model is not likely the product of chance, given an F- 
statistic of 28.586 at a statistically significant level. The slope of the fitted regression 
line is a statistically significant negative, -.057, suggesting the observed trajectory in 
expected affinity is attributable in part to the passage of time. This also suggests that 
message repetition, particularly when consistent, positively contributes to observed 
growth in affinity between Hamas and its targeted audience. Whether the largest 
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portion of that contribution can be attributed to Hamas messaging or to some other 
factor cannot at this point be determined.  
 
Table 1:  Analysis of Variance, Hamas Expected Affinity 
































Other contributing factors may be adjustable by Hamas or its actions, or may 
be equally immune to Hamas activities. Obvious potential factors, however, relate to 
the ability of Hamas, its rivals in the Palestinian Authority and Israel, and the 
population of Gaza to act freely and in accordance with its own goals and objectives. 
Model Summary 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
.623 .388 .375 1.352 
The independent variable is telapsed. 
ANOVA 
 Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Regression 52.286 1 52.286 28.586 .000 
Residual 82.308 45 1.829   
Total 134.595 46    






t Sig.  B Std. Error Beta 
telapsed -.057 .011 -.623 -5.347 .000 
(Constant) 12.556 1.924  6.525 .000 
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The Palestinian Authority’s freedom to act was limited by several factors, not the 
least of which were geographic diffusion of power and authority, the declining health 
of Arafat, Israel’s increased tempo of military actions against Palestinian militants, 
Arafat’s isolation in his headquarters by Israeli action, and continued anger among 
the Palestinian people over both Israeli actions and the ineffectualness of the 
Authority. Israel was constrained, too, largely by a perceived need to temper actions 
enough to avoid too harsh criticism from the United States. Hamas, however, enjoyed 
a bit more freedom than the Palestinian Authority in that its area of influence was 
geographically compact, largely limited as it was to Gaza, although it, too, was 
constrained by the pace and accuracy of Israeli strikes and the weight of opposing the 
long- standing icon of Palestinian autonomy struggles. Nevertheless, by remaining 
steadfast in active opposition to the Israelis and by effective use of both rhetoric and 
symbolism, Hamas gained overwhelming standing among its claimed constituency, 
leading to its landslide victory in Palestinian general elections in January 2006. 
 
Red Army Faction Expected Affinity 
 
 Like that for Hamas, available data for the Red Army Faction varies 
considerably over time. Like all terrorist groups, the ability to operate effectively 
depends not only on organizational capabilities and preparedness, but also on the 
professionalism and preparations undertaken by the group and the impact of 
government counter-operations. While the RAF exhibited periods of frequent activity, 
it also experienced extended periods in which activities were largely limited to hunger 
strikes by imprisoned RAF members and self-reflection, often when new leaders 
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emerged to replace those lost to death or arrest. Much more than Hamas, the RAF 
emphasized ideological reflection, with considerable time and effort devoted to 
ideological development and discourse rather than persuasive communications. RAF 
expected affinity over time (Figure 26) reflects the sporadic nature of both RAF 
actions and RAF communications to a targeted audience. Significant decreases in 
expected affinity are noted in several periods, corresponding to the influence of actors 
external to the RAF itself. In the fall of 1971 (around October 1971, month 18), the 
RAF enjoyed considerable popular support, largely through romanticized notions of 
RAF banditry held throughout the German left.  Shortly thereafter, in June 1972 
(month 26), the RAF suffered a devastating blow when its leaders were arrested. A 
second significant trough in RAF expected affinity is found around November 1974 
(month 55) and April 1975 (month 60), when RAF leader Holger Meins died during a 
prison hunger strike and the RAF seized the German embassy in Stockholm 
respectively. Other notable dips in RAF expected affinity are found immediately prior 
to the group’s alliance with French and Italian terrorists (months 130 to 145) when 
the organization seemed a bit directionless, and the months following the murder of 
Edward Pimental (August 1985, month 184). The only notable peak, when expected 
affinity took on a positive value, is found in June 1993 (month 278), when the RAF 
bombed Germany’s newest high-tech prison. This act would also prove to be the 









Figure 26: Red Army Faction Expected Affinity Metric Over Time 
    Source: Author’s construction 
 
 
 RAF messages took a hostile tone early on, using statements to outline its 
interpretation of communist theory and attempt to establish itself as a leader in anti-
imperialist action. The statement released after the RAF freed Andreas Baader from 
custody in September 1974, for example, asserted that: 
The struggle against imperialism, if we want it to be more than an empty 
slogan, has as its goal to annihilate, to destroy, to smash the system of 
imperialist domination on the political, economic and military levels, to smash 
the cultural institutions by which imperialism gives a hegemony to the 
dominant elites and to smash the communications systems which assure them 
their ideological power. (RAF 1974) 
 
For the RAF, its struggle was not simply one of national liberation, it was “the 
struggle of the revolutionary classes, the liberation movements of the Third World 
and the urban guerrilla in the metropoles of imperialism.” That, according to the 
RAF, constituted their sense of place, of purpose, and of their destiny within the 
context of “proletarian internationalism.” (RAF 1974) RAF leaders sought to 
establish themselves as ideological interpreters for the revolutionary masses, yet 
appeared to have difficulty erasing sometimes subtle, sometime obvious self-
centeredness from their texts. Many of the RAF’s texts seemed as concerned with 
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convincing the left of the RAF’s place at the vanguard as with persuading a general 
audience to afford sympathy and support to the organization. To the group’s ultimate 
detriment, this preoccupation with their sense of place remained constant throughout 
the group’s lifespan, despite changes in leadership. 
 RAF leaders also exhibited a pronounced tendency not only to think in 
absolutist terms, but to assume their presumed audience did as well. Holger Meins, 
the RAF member who starved himself to death in October 1974 during a hunger 
strike in Stammheim prison chastised a comrade who had chosen to end his 
participation in the hunger strike. A mere five days before his death, Meins wrote: 
… if you don’t want to continue the hunger strike with us, it would be better if 
you said so; it would be more honest (if indeed you still know what honor is). 
In short, “I am alive. Down with the RAF. Long live the pig system.” 
  Either a pig or a human 
  Either to survive at any price 
  Or to struggle until death 
  Either part of the problem 
  Or part of the solution 
  Between the two there is nothing 
Victory or death say the people everywhere, that is the language of the 
guerrilla, even with our tiny size here. …. (Meins 1974) 
 
At the same time, the RAF displayed a persistent tendency to displace responsibility, 
blaming errors, mistakes, and often their own deliberate actions on authorities. The 
RAF’s execution of German military attaché Andreas von Mirbach during the April 
1975 Embassy seizure in Stockholm was explicitly blamed on the police, who 
“caused” von Mirbach’s death by their failure to heed the RAF’s deadline for 
evacuating the Embassy (RAF 1975). 
 The RAF’s announcements assumed an even greater militancy as it entered 
into alliances with French and Italian terrorists, focusing in the 1980s more on its call 
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to arms than on its previous indulgence in ideological musings. In claiming an attack 
on the U.S. Air Force base at Ramstein, the RAF’s communiqué began with a strident 
exhortation to arms: 
  WAR ON IMPERIALIST WAR ! ! ! 
 ATTACK THE CENTERS, THE BASES, AND THE STRATEGISTS 
OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY MACHINERY ! ! ! . . .  
The imperialist war of destruction is now returning from the Third 
World to Europe, from whence it came.  (RAF 1981a; RAF 1981b; see also 
RAF1982, RAF1985a, RAF1985b, and RAF1988) 
 
During this period, the RAF began to reformulate its sense of position in the armed 
struggle, placing itself in the forefront not only of armed struggle, but also assuming 
the responsibility of enlightening Western audiences on revolutionary “praxis.” A 
May 1982 strategy paper released by the RAF explicitly announced this new stage in 
the group’s existence, where guerrilla and resistance were now seen as a united 
international front rather than a collection of national liberation movements. The 
German Autumn of 1977 was now explained as a mistake born of the limitations of 
ideological development that prevented the previous generation of RAF leaders from 
understanding their proper roles in revolutionary struggle: 
 
The struggle between the guerrilla and the State in [19]77 led to a 
reversal of the political situation here. Within the dialectic of attack and 
reaction the conditions of struggle have been transformed. So, in these new 
conditions the forms of struggle could and should change. After 77, nothing 
could be like it was before; not the State, not the left, not the role of West 
Germany in international politics, not the role of armed struggle in the 
international class struggle. We committed errors in 77 and the offensive was 
turned into our most serious setback. We will return to this later [in the paper] 
in detail. 
The offensive of 77 ended the struggle we had been waging since 70 
and introduced a new stage. The entire period of struggles that gave birth to 
the RAF and allowed it to grow was concentrated on the question of power. . . 




RAF explanations, however, could be quite torturous, raising concerns about both 
actual intended audiences and the likelihood that any targeted audience could be 
effectively reached. In explain the new stage of the revolution,  the 1982 strategy 
paper continued by explaining: 
 
Around the world, the struggle for liberation, which is part of the 
guerrilla project, has become a concrete reality that everyone is discussing. It 
is now necessary to become totally implicated in the situation here and to 
proceed in an inverse movement taking resistance in the metropole to the front 
line of international class warfare. (RAF 1982) 
 
 By the mid-1980s, the RAF had resumed a preoccupation with self-reflection, 
turning much of its communications toward a more philosophical bent akin to that of 
its early years. The criticism generated by the group’s murder of Edward Pimental in 
August 1985 prompted the RAF to attempt to justify its actions while simultaneously 
chastising the German left for its criticisms and for its failure to understand 
revolutionary necessity. In countering the criticism directed at it, the RAF 
demonstrated convincingly that its focus lay not with persuading the German worker 
or student, but in convincing the German left that the RAF’s program of armed 
struggle was the correct and appropriate course of action. In doing so, the RAF 
revealed clearly that its targeted constituency was an even smaller sub-population 
than generally assumed, one composed of people already in general agreement with 
the RAF’s goals and aspirations if not their strategy and tactics. 
 The criticisms of the RAF by fellow leftists appeared to have an effect, 
however, in that statements in the early 1990s began to take a more self-critical tone. 
In April 1992, the RAF announced a halt to attacks against German businessmen and 
the German state. (RAF 1992b) In making such an announcement, the RAF signaled 
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its resolve to continue the struggle was crumbling, leading one authority to conclude 
the group had issued its own obituary (Pluchinsky 1993). Five years later, the RAF 
announced its end, declaring an end to its armed struggle. Acknowledging errors in 
the course of its nearly 30-year history, the RAF continued to maintain the 
correctness of its purpose, tying its failure to affect the political and social change it 
sought in part to its own mistakes and in part to a German proletariat ill-prepared to 
understand and fulfill their role in the revolutionary process. Noting that it had 
“overestimated the support” for its latest reconceptualization of the struggle, the RAF 
admitted it realized as early as 1992 that its efforts were a lost cause. Tellingly, the 
RAF realized that decisions of its earliest leaders to focus on building an armed 
organization at the expense of a legal movement doomed the group to failure: 
It was a strategic mistake not to build up a political-social organization 
alongside the illegal, armed organization. 
In no phase of our history was an outreaching, political organization 
realized in addition to the political-military struggle. The concept of the RAF 
knew only the armed struggle, with a focus on the political-military attack. . . . 
. . . The lack of a political-social organization was a decisive mistake 
by the RAF. It wasn’t the only mistake, but it’s one important reason why the 
RAF could not become a stronger liberation project, and in the end the 
necessary preconditions were lacking to build up a fighting counter-movement 
searching for liberation, one which could have a strong influence on social 
developments. (RAF 1998) 
 
Fitting a regression curve to the RAF data (Figure 27) using ordinary least 
squares offers a few additional insights into the RAF’s failure to grow and develop 
over time. The regression line shows a fairly flat trajectory, consistent with the 
organization’s evolution over 30 years. The group exhibited very little variation in its 
efforts to persuade its audience to support the group, at least sufficient to generate 
more than the minimum necessary to maintain a generally consistent level of 
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operational capability. While German authorities can certainly claim considerable 
credit for hindering the RAF’s ability to thrive, the group unwittingly assisted by 
maintaining a rather arrogant and condescending tone in its communications. The 
regression lines suggests, by its slightly downward slope, that the RAF embarked on a 
rhetorical and symbolic course of action in the early 1970s and failed or refrained 
from altering its persuasive strategy in any significant way. 
 
Figure 27: Curve Estimation, Red Army Faction 
    Source: Author’s construction 
             
 
 
 Table 2, the results of the curve fitting exercise and analysis of variance, 
reinforce this vision of the RAF’s efforts, or lack thereof, to gain and maintain a 
supportive audience. While none of the result are statistically significant, they 
nevertheless suggest that the observed trend shown by the regression line may be 
consistent with the organization’s lackluster efforts to reach an audience beyond those 
already in opposition to the state. Where Hamas appears to have had a decent 
understanding of the values, expectations, and aspirations of its audience, the RAF 
appeared to assume its audience necessarily perceived the world in much the same 
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way as the group’s ideologues did. This suggestion is reinforced by the very low and 
non-significant F statistic. RAF efforts, as expressed by its expected affinity scores, 
show considerable consistency despite the changes in environmental conditions and 
attitudes among the German public. Very little of the observed variation in the RAF’s 
expected affinity scores, as little as four percent or less, can be accounted for by the 
simple passage of time. What variation there is may be more attributable to changes 
in RAF leadership. 
 
Table 2: Analysis of Variance, RAF Expected Affinity 


































R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
.032 .001 -.009 .215 
The independent variable is telapsed. 
ANOVA 
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression .005 1 .005 .105 .746 
Residual 4.621 100 .046   
Total 4.626 101    






t Sig.  B Std. Error Beta 
telapsed 7.450E-5 .000 .032 .324 .746 







The slope of the regression line is positive, but virtually horizontal, indicating 
further that the RAF’s effort to build and maintain a sympathetic and supportive 
audience over time tended to remain static. This finding is consistent with a 
qualitative assessment of RAF messages that noted an RAF proclivity to pontificate 
rather that attempt to persuade. As time progressed and the RAF found itself 
struggling more simply to maintain a relatively stable standing, RAF statements grew 
more strident in tone, focusing more on identifying ideological correctness than 
audience connection. Examination of RAF texts shows a somewhat surprising lack of 
effort on the part of the RAF to establish a connection, a common cause, with its 
audience.  
 Given the homogeneity of the RAF’s targeted audience, particularly in its 
focus on dialogue with radical German students and workers, the RAF did a rather 
poor job in constituency building efforts, just as its leaders finally acknowledged in 
its 1998 announcement of the RAF’s disbanding. Having a pre-existing support 
network in the German left, however, probably allowed the RAF to overcome its 
inability to persuade its targeted audience and afforded the group an opportunity to 
maintain minimal membership and capability over time. 
Symbionese Liberation Army Expected Affinity 
 
 The Symbionese Liberation Army enjoyed a very brief lifespan, barely two 
years, before collapsing of its own ineptitude. Enjoying its highest measure of 
expected affinity at the very beginning of the organization (Figure 28), the SLA 
quickly wasted any goodwill it might have enjoyed by its poor target selection. The 
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act that introduced the SLA to the world was the murder of Oakland school 
superintended Marcus Foster. According to the SLA,  
 
The action taken by the SLA combat unit in reference to the Oakland Board of 
Education was a specific response to political police state programs and the 
failure of the Board to heed the rights and demands of the people in the 
community. The specific program was one of photo identification (similar to 
the system of apartheid in South Africa), biological classification in the form 
of bio-dossiers which classify students according to race and political beliefs, 
internal warfare computer files, and armed police state patrols within the 
schools. Intensely through intelligence operations carried out by one of the 
SLA information units was able to obtain factual information that Foster’s 
signature was the first to appear on the Nixon Administration inspired 
proposal for armed police agents within certain Oakland schools and various 
forms of computer classification of students. Further intelligence revealed that 
Foster’s background included membership on the Philadelphia Crime 
Commission. Foster’s sideman, Blackburn [who was also shot], is a CIA 
agent. (Perry 1973) 
 
 
Accused by the SLA of collaboration with the police in a scheme to abrogate 
the rights of students by issuing identification cards, Foster enjoyed considerable 
support among Oakland’s minority population. Arguments by the SLA that the Foster 
murder served to help protect the people, particularly oppressed minorities, from the 
state apparently fell on deaf ears. As the Foster claims illustrate, SLA communiqués 
and announcements were characterized by pompousness, delusions of grandeur, 
ridiculous claims to exalted status, all mixed in with utopian ideals.  
In announcing its goals in one of its first communications (SLA 1973a), the 
SLA stated its role was to “unite all oppressed people into a fighting force and to 
destroy the system of the capitalist state and all its value systems.” The SLA would 
do this, it announced, by forming a “people’s federated council,” composed of one 
male and one female representative from each “People’s Council” or “Sovereign 
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Nation of the Symbionese Federation of Nations,” which would meet to form trade 
pacts and establish defense against any unspecified external threats. Showing their 
lack of ideological sophistication, the SLA stated its mission was to destroy the state 
in order to “give back to all people their human and constitutional rights” [italics 
added]. The SLA would bring about this new existence by seizing the state’s lands, as 
well as those held by the “capitalist classes,” and returning those lands to the people 
while establishing laws guaranteeing that no persons could own or sell land. The 
statement continued by asserting that “No one can own or sell the air, the sky, the 
water, the trees, the birds, the sun, for all of this world belongs to the people of this 
earth.” 
 
Figure 28: Symbionese Liberation Army Expected Affinity 
    Metric Over Time 
    Source: Author’s construction 
 
            
 
 Subsequent announcements, however, quickly abandon the utopian ideals of 
the group’s statement of goals, relying instead on grandiose claims of legitimacy and 
affectations of status. In a “Letter to the People,” Fahizah, nee Nancy Ling Perry, 
announced she was a “freedom fighter in an information/ intelligence unit of the 
United Federated Forces of the Symbionese Liberation Army” (Perry 1973).  Relying 
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also on blatant dehumanization and insult, the SLA also devoted considerable energy 
in its announcements disparaging the “San Quentin concentration camp,” 
“Amerikkka,” and “the Fascist Capitalist Class” (Perry 1973; SLA 1973b). By 
August 1973, SLA statements became more self-centered than explanatory, as 
evidenced by its “Declaration of War on the United States,” which devoted little more 
than one paragraph out of nine to the reasons for its war against the state or to the 
evils of the state which demanded such action. The bulk of the declaration is devoted 
to efforts to define itself and its beliefs (SLA 1973b). 
 Foster’s murder in November 1973 also corresponded to a significant change 
in SLA announcements. Whereas earlier statements sought to explain the 
organization, its purpose, and its vision of the future, the SLA’s “Western Regional 
Youth Unit Communiqué #1” (SLA 1973c) emulated the form and tone of an official 
execution warrant, in this case issued by “The Court of the People.”  The statement 
offered a specification of charges, identification of target, and an “indictment” of 
Foster. The same format served to announce the SLA’s kidnapping of Patricia Hearst 
(SLA 1974a), which it called an “arrest and protective” prisoner of war warrant. It 
was in this communiqué that the first use of the SLA’s slogan – “Death to the Fascist 
Insect that Preys Upon the Life of the People” – first appeared. The SLA continued its 
assertions of legitimacy as its leader, Donald DeFreeze, alias “General Field Marshal 
Cinque,” stated  
Today I have received an order from the Symbionese War Council, the 
Court of the People, to the effect that I am ordered to convey the following 
message in [sic] behalf of the SLA, and to insert a taped word of comfort and 




 The amateurishness of the SLA was readily apparent in its communiqués, 
particularly in those that carried the tone and tenor of a group that wanted to play war. 
In 1974, the group issued its “Codes of War of the United Symbionese Liberation 
Army” (SLA 1974b), laying out a serious of infractions for which a guerrilla could 
face the death penalty. Violating one of a list of specific of offenses would trigger 
action under which 
All charges that face a death penalty shall be presented to a jury trial made up 
of the members of the guerrilla forces. The jury shall be selected by the 
charged and the judge conducting the trial shall be selected by the charged 
also. The charge shall select his or her defense, and the trial judge shall select 
the prosecutor. The jury shall number at least 3/4ths of the remaining 
members of the cells, and the verdict must be unanimous. (SLA 1974b) 
 
Offenses, which could result in such charges, included surrender, leaving a wounded 
comrade, informing or spying for the enemy, and desertion. Disciplinary action, 
determined by the guerrilla in charge but less than death, was prescribed for lesser 
offenses in order to “aid the collective growth of the cell.” Noteworthy among the 
infractions is a rather lengthy injunction against the non-medicinal use of any drugs 
except marijuana or alcohol, in which specific conditions for use are laid out along 
with instructions that no more than half the members of the cell may be granted 
permission to use at any one time. 
 The SLA Codes of War also spelled out how its enemies were to be treated, 
with prisoners of war “held under the international codes of war” and given adequate 
food, water, exercise, and medical assistance. Acknowledging conscription, the SLA 
granted “rank and file” members of the military the right to surrender, guaranteeing 
that after they were disarmed and educated about the SLA’s struggle, they would be 
released “in a safe area.” (SLA 1974b) 
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 Perhaps due to the stress of loosing almost all its active members in a shootout 
with Los Angeles police in May 1974, the idealized world of the SLA began to 
collapse, leading to final communications that were considerably angrier and 
confusing. After bombing the Emeryville Police Station in August 1975 in long-
delayed retaliation for the death of a local youth brought on by police action, the SLA 
released a statement that read: 
  
August 13, 1975 
REAL DATE: 5 years, 6 days 
WE RECKON ALL TIME IN THE FUTURE FROM THE DAY OF THE 
MAN-CHILD’S DEATH 
The explosion at the Emeryville Station of Fascist Pig Representation is a 
warning to the rabid dogs who murder our children in cold blood. Remember, 
pigs: every time you strap on your gun, the next bullet may be speeding 
towards your head, the next bomb may be under the seat of your car. The 
people and the people’s armed forces will no longer quietly submit to the 
occupation of our communities and we will never forget the executions of 
Tyrone Guyton, Clifford Glover, Claude Reese, Alberto Terrones, and Derrick 
Browne. THERE ARE TO BE FUNERALS? LET THERE BE FUNERALS 
ON BOTH SIDES. LONG LIVE THE GUERRILLA. DEATH TO THE 
FASCIST INSECT THAT PREYS ON THE LIFE OF THE PEOPLE.
 (SLA 1975a) 
 
A complete psychic break, perhaps, could describe the SLA’s final communication, 
which was left written on the wall of a public bathroom: 
A. A Toilet Message WARNING ! 
To the FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA, NBC, and CBS: 
There are a few clues in this bathroom. However, you will have to wait 
until they are dry. An additional word of caution: ½ lb. of cyanide crystals 
has been added to this “home brew.” So, pig, drink at your own risk. There 
are many additional juicy SLA clues throughout this safe house. However, 
remember that you are not bullet-proof either. Happy hunting, Charles! 
B. Miscellany 
Da da, Oh my 
Books, once read, make good bullet-proofing. 





 Fitting a regression curve using ordinary least squares to the measure of SLA 
expected affinity (Figure 29) demonstrates quite well the SLA’s inability to connect 
with a targeted audience, consistent with both a qualitative assessment of its messages 
and an examination of its attacks over time. The regression line shows what appears 
to be a slight upward slope. This trend clearly describes the stasis in communications 
tone and focus, consistent with a long-term propensity by the group to indulge in 
fantasy about their impact on and place in society.  
 
 
Figure 29: Curve Estimation, Symbionese Liberation Army 
   Source: Author’s construction   
              
 
Analysis of variance between elapsed time and the SLA’s expected affinity 
measures (Table 3) helps reinforce the notion that the SLA’s ideologues were 
generally disconnected from popular concerns and interests, and that the disconnect 
became worse as pressure on the organization’s few remaining members increased. 
None of the measures are statistically significant. Correlation between expected 
affinity and elapsed time, even if it had been significant, is very low, as is the ability 
of the model to explain observed variance. This reinforces the notion that SLA 
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communications reflected less of reality or the concerns of its targeted audience and 
more of the grandiose revolutionary fantasies of its members.  
In the end, SLA messages and actions appeared more obviously at odds with 
the will and expectations of the public they claimed to represent. The fitted regression 
line generated using the expected affinity corresponds well with the organization’s 
brief history. Of Hamas, the RAF, and the SLA, the latter stands out for both the 
 
Table 3: Analysis of Variance, SLA Expected Affinity 
















R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
.064 .004 -.086 .066 
The independent variable is telpsd. 
ANOVA 
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression .000 1 .000 .046 .834 
Residual .048 11 .004   
Total .048 12    







t Sig.  B Std. Error Beta 
telpsd .000 .002 .064 .214 .834 
(Constant) .000 .033  .005 .996 
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rapidity and the effectiveness with which it squandered any sympathy and support it 
may have had initially. The RAF, by the same token, failed to reach the audience it 
needed to reach, but this was due more to poor decision making by the group’s 
leaders than it is to mistakes or ineptitude in communications efforts. Hamas, unlike 
the RAF and SLA, not only succeeded in transitioning from a conspiratorial terrorist 
group to mass movement, then government. Also unlike the RAF and SLA, Hamas’s 
communications and attacks exhibited growth in sophistication over time, addressed 
topics and issues in culturally and politically relevant terms, carried a clear 
conception of its targeted audience, and successfully learned to tailor its entire 
communicative and persuasive strategy – both the rhetorical and the symbolic – to its 
recruitment and growth needs.  
 Taken together, the expected affinity measures can be used to place all three 
organizations along the hypothesized evolutionary curve introduced in Chapter Three. 
Given its recognition of the importance of strong bonds to a supportive audience and 
its success in addressing all elements of expected affinity, Hamas can be placed at or 
near criticality, the fourth phase transition at which the future evolutionary 
development trajectory rests firmly in the group’s hands. For Hamas, expected 
affinity measures suggest a positive future evolutionary trajectory beyond the year 
2002, which has been borne out in subsequent events. The RAF also understood the 
need for a supportive audience, but failed to appreciate the need for a more expansive 
one than the German left. The RAF’s evolutionary trajectory would, as suggested by 
its expected affinity curve, be generally downward from an early high point, 
suggesting the organization never advanced far beyond the third phase transition. The 
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SLA, in sharp contrast to the RAF and Hamas, failed by all measures of expected 
affinity, suggesting the group never progressed far beyond the first phase transition 
and operational infancy. 
Expected Affinity Metric Redux 
 
 This question addressed in this paper is a simple one: how can the apparent 
strength of connection between a terrorist group and its claimed constituency be 
assessed in such a way that projections of likely growth, stagnation, or decline can be 
made? The expected affinity metric developed sought to evaluate the likelihood that a 
terrorist group’s messages, both rhetorical and symbolic, could empower and enhance 
that connection, thus allowing the terrorist to grow sympathy and support needed for 
continued organizational evolution. The apparent correspondence between 
organizational histories, trends and tendencies in attacks and messages, and 
calculations of expected affinity seems to suggest that the metric offers utility for 
such predictive assessments. Does this mean the expected affinity metric is indeed a 
useful, valid measure that can be applied to terrorism and terrorist groups as a way of 
assessing evolutionary trajectories? Perhaps. 
 Hamas has successfully transitioned from illegal violent actor to government 
in Gaza, a co-equal claimant to power and legitimacy with the recognized Palestinian 
Authority government in the West Bank. Since Hamas’ founding in 1987, it has 
established itself as a modern exemplar of integrating itself, its goals, and its 
perceptions with that of its targeted audience. It has shown an organization can 
establish a meaningful connection with that audience, play on that audience’s hopes, 
dreams, and fears, and establish with it not just a common bond, but a shared sense of 
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purpose and tolerance for risk. Hamas’s communiqués have clearly demonstrated a 
persuasive sophistication that may be unmatched among modern terrorist groups. The 
group has also clearly demonstrated the persuasive potential of violent actions, using 
is continued weaponry development and target selectivity to its advantage by 
reinforcing its rhetoric and using the symbolism of its actions to underscore its claims 
of legitimacy and status. The expected affinity scores generated through analysis of 
Hamas actions and communications reinforce and support the organization’s record 
such that real time assessment of Hamas words and deeds would be expected to 
indicate a fairly accurate projected evolutionary trajectory for the organization. 
 Similarly, the expected affinity measure appears to correspond well with the 
history of the Red Army Faction. The RAF operated in a more diversified 
environment than does Hamas, against state authorities that were clearly superior to 
the internal Palestinian authorities faced by Hamas, but perhaps inferior to Hamas’ 
Israeli opponents. Nevertheless, the RAF was able to construct a program of 
communications and actions addressing a very specific target audience, and the 
assessment of RAF activities indicates that despite considerable fluidity in leadership, 
the organization managed to maintain striking message consistency over its long 
lifespan. Yet the RAF failed to achieve mass movement status and despite its claims 
to be at the forefront of the revolutionary struggle, found itself unable to generate 
significant sympathy and support even from among fellow militants. This failure, 
however, was the result of decisions made early in the RAF’s existence, condemning 
the organization to a path offering little opportunity for evolutionary development. 
The expected affinity measure generated for the RAF agrees, showing a remarkable 
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consistency in both rhetorical and symbolic message content over the years, but with 
a slow decline as the organization found its natural constituency shrinking. Using the 
expected affinity measure as presently constructed in a real-time analysis of the RAF 
could consequently be expected to offer accurate general predictions of evolutionary 
trajectory. 
 The Symbionese Liberation Army presented a slightly different picture, 
primarily due to its exceptionally short lifespan and small size. A the height of its 
notoriety, the SLA numbered fewer than ten active members, six of whom died on 
live television is a shootout with authorities. During its existence, the organization 
never numbered more than a dozen or so and its operational capabilities reflected 
both its members’ lack of sophistication and the organization’s resource scarcity. 
Although the SLA made national and international headlines, particularly with its 
kidnapping and co-option of Patricia Hearst and its decimation at the hands of Los 
Angeles police, operationally the group remained weak and amateurish. Despite the 
revolutionary fervor claimed or adopted by its members, the SLA presented a portrait 
of spoiled, bored, would-be revolutionaries more in tune with an idealized and 
romanticized fantasy world than with the harsh and gritty realities of the streets. The 
SLA never made a connection with an audience and, indeed, their communications 
raise doubts about whether the group ever had a clear conception of whom besides 
themselves they represented. Communications quickly degraded from explanation of 
purpose to stridency and irrationality, likely alienating any presumed audience early 
in the organization’s life. In the same way, the SLA’s target selection either ran 
counter to public opinion, as with the Foster murder, or carried the aura of publicity 
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stunt as with the emergence of “Tania,” Hearst’s nom de guerre in the Hibernia Bank 
branch robbery. The group started out on a downward trajectory, in both words and 
deeds, and maintained a steady course throughout its existence. The expected affinity 
measure mirrors that steady descent, suggesting that it would offer effective 
predictive capacity for assessing likely SLA evolutionary trajectories in real time. 
The apparent correspondence between the metric and organizational histories, 
however, does not necessarily mean expected affinity as currently constructed is 
ready for widespread application. It does suggest, however, that there may be a place 
in counterterrorism analysis for the measure, but only after additional work needed to 
refine the measure, to improve its analytic and predictive capacities and explanatory 
power, is conducted. The measure needs to be able to explain more variance than it 
presently does, and to be capable of doing so at acceptable levels of significance. In a 
seemingly contradictory way, the measure needs to be both more generalizable and 
more culturally and environmentally sensitive. The correspondence observed with the 
measure as presently constituted does, however, seem sufficient to conclude there is 
















Chapter 7: Assessing Expected Affinity 
 
 
Why terrorism begins, and how terrorism ends, are two of the most frequently 
addressed questions in terrorism studies. Despite the time and attention afforded each, 
there have been very few satisfactory answers offered. Many studies addressing 
questions of terrorism’s growth, evolution, and decline focus attention on intra-group 
dynamics, leadership, and decision-making. Failure to develop operationally, to grow, 
and to achieve objectives are often seen as a result of internal dissention, 
incompetence, or bad decision-making. Other studies emphasize external factors, 
from the actions of other actors to changes in the operational environment of the 
terrorist group. In these studies, failure to develop is often explained by the 
effectiveness of counter-terrorist operations, competition among militant groups, 
resource scarcity, or the lack of a reliable state sponsor. Rarely do terrorism studies 
examine terrorism in the context of relational dynamics between actors in a complex 
interconnected system. 
 Terrorism studies typically focus on selected aspects of terrorism, the terrorist, 
or the terrorists’ actions. By focusing on unique characteristics, entities, and 
activities, such studies begin from a restrictive perspective, one limited by the 
parameters set forth in the problem conceptualization used. These studies, whether 
acknowledged or not, portray terrorist groups and their members not as independent 
actors acting to manipulate other actors and their environment, but as tractable 
entities beholden to the decisions and actions of others. Terrorist groups are, in effect, 
assumed to be isolated, at least for purposes of scholarly examination, such that 
causal factors might be clearly identified and examined. While there are valid reasons 
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for taking a reductionist approach to the study of terrorism, the approach effectively 
ignores a critical component of the dynamic social and political landscape of 
terrorism, that is, the reciprocity of actions among actors in the system. 
 This examination took that overlooked perspective as its starting point, 
considered terrorist groups independent actors, the potential equals of all other actors 
in a system, struggling to find an optimal fitness in a highly complex, coevolutionary 
environment. This environment is viewed as a fitness landscape, where every actor 
behaves in ways intended to lead to ever-greater relative fitness and where the actions 
of every actor change the fitness landscape encountered by every other actor. As but 
one of many actors in a highly interconnected network, a terrorist group is subject not 
simply to its own resources and decisions, but to the consequences of resource 
availability, resource use, their own decisions, and the decisions of other actors.  
 Put in a network context, this investigation sought to develop a means for 
evaluating the ultimate efficacy and effectiveness of terrorist activities in their quest 
for greater relative fitness. Since at least 1877 (Martin 1985), terrorism has been 
characterized as either propaganda of the deed or violent political theater, or both, 
each of which implies conscious efforts to alter patterns of thinking and behavior. 
Terrorists use both violence and words in an attempt to define context, thus 
improving their chances of achieving higher levels. Consequently, terrorists use 
violence, supplemented by the statements they release, to target an audience, as an 
attempt to manipulate the environment. One reason these efforts are undertaken 
reflect a desire and intent to reduce the relative fitness levels of competing actors, 
thereby altering the fitness landscape in a way specifically detrimental to others. In 
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what may be called negative manipulation, terrorists use violence and threats of 
violence to weaken opponents, often by sapping the will to resist terrorists’ demands 
or by constraining the opponents’ ability to react effectively. This perspective lies at 
the heart of counter-terrorism literature and the literature addressing the impact of 
terrorist violence.  
 Terrorists may also engage in positive manipulation, where the terrorist group 
seeks to alter the landscape in a conscious effort to improve its own fitness levels 
without express regard for the impact on others. When positive manipulation is 
studied, it is most frequently seen in terms of terrorist funding, state support, 
recruiting, arms acquisition, and other resource-focused activities. This paper 
explored this positive manipulation process, albeit from the network perspective 
largely unknown in the literature. Here, emphasis is given to the deliberate efforts of 
terrorists to affect favorable landscape alterations through their communications with 
a targeted audience believed to represent some natural constituency of the terrorists’ 
and through the symbolic messages contained within its acts of violence. By 
manipulating both the content of messages and the expected interpretation of 
violence, terrorists seek to gain and maintain an increasing measure of sympathy and 
support in order to improve their fitness with respect to other claimants for public 
approval.  
 This research addresses fitness landscape manipulation from the terrorists’ 
perspective, specifically concerned with the terrorists’ efforts to use words and deeds 
to gain advantage by building sympathy and support among a targeted audience. The 
question the examination addresses, then, is of the intent to affect attitudinal change 
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in a targeted audience by leveraging both words and deeds. Borrowing from extensive 
literatures on marketing and the diffusion of innovations, this approach posits a 
population can be segmented, with the appropriate segment targeted for provision of 
tailored messages designed to find and address issues of common concern and shared 
value.  
 To explore this interaction between terrorist and audience, a series of 
measures were created to evaluate terrorists’ efforts and to assess the degree to which 
they appear successful in the design of their message and its delivery. These 
measures, culminating in one called expected affinity, place the terrorist group firmly 
in a small world context, and offer a means by which the potential for relative fitness 
gain, and subsequent evolutionary path, can be predicted. The results suggest 
expected affinity is a useful measure for predicting group evolutionary trajectories 
based on specific context manipulation efforts where no comparable metric or 
application exists. The results obtained demonstrate expected affinity’s suitability for 
continued development and refinement, tailoring the application to the specific 
operational environment under study. As such, expected affinity offers a needed 
complement to existing social network analysis tools, which are focused on the 
structural aspects of the system and the implications of changes to that structure. The 
expected affinity metric opens new doors for understanding the process of terrorist 
group growth by addressing one of the dynamic interaction aspects of networks. 
The Way Ahead 
 
 Given expected affinity’s demonstrated utility, continued refinement should 
emphasize a number of developmental opportunities. Expanding the scope of inquiry 
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by broadening the class of terrorist groups examined will offer useful insights about 
contextual variations, thus allowing for greater attentiveness to the unique cultural, 
political, social, and ethnic aspects of the environments in which terrorists operate. 
The measure’s generalizability can also be more thoroughly addressed in light of 
spatial and temporal variations through expanded application and validation. The 
present effort focused on assessing metric feasibility, therefore a broadly focused 
cross-generational approach was taken. Expanding and deepening single case studies, 
and including additional potential evolution direction determinants will offer more 
nuanced opportunities for evaluating the specific significance of individual factors. 
The detail and depth needed for this development far exceeded the design parameters 
of this study, yet are indicated as desirable exploration avenues for follow-on efforts. 
This study addressed the general feasibility of a newly created metric. As 
such, the lack of solid statistically significant results does not invalidate the study. In 
a complex coevolutionary system, the number of causal factors for any process is 
unlimited, making statistical reliance in a feasibility study such as this unrealistic. For 
this reason, the study was designed to rest squarely on visual analytics, allowing 
graphic representations to suggest linkages, relationships, and trends that would be 
unrecognizable otherwise. 
 Since there is enough in the results to suggest further exploration is warranted, 
it is important to consider opportunities for continued development and refinement. 
Some opportunities can be found in more detailed consideration of the nature of the 
specific system environment in which a given terrorist group operates. The 
environments in which the SLA, RAF, and Hamas operated may offer some general 
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similarities, but each is a unique combination of actors, linkages, and situations, and 
all have an impact on not simply the terrorist group, but on all other actors in the 
system and on interactions between actors. Gaza, quite simply, is quite different from 
Germany and California. Each environment undergoes constant change as well, such 
that Gaza of the 2000s is quite different contextually from the Gaza of the 1980s. The 
same holds for any given location, making the operational environment of every 
terrorist group unique from that of all others. Addressing these unique features 
through in-depth case studies will offer opportunities for improving understanding of 
the struggle for greater relative fitness specific to that system. 
Avenues for Environmental Exploration 
Causal Multiplicity 
 
  The environmental arena in which terrorism takes place is not well 
represented by models of interactions. Models are generalizations, incorporating the 
most salient factors and excluding those less relevant factors. The real world context 
for terrorism is not neat and stable like the models created to understand it, but messy, 
complex, and ever-shifting.  Which factors are the most salient factors cannot be 
easily known or understood with a high degree of certainty. Even were a more 
comprehensive list of salient causal factors of terrorism dynamics possible, that list 
would vary considerably with time and geography.    
 Developing more detailed, more nuanced case histories allows greater depth 
in examinations, but reduces general applicability with each refinement. Efforts to 
create a more generalizable and more widely applicable model force the examination 
in the other direction, where nuance and specificity are increasingly lost. While little 
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can be done to effectively and conclusively resolve the tension between the case 
studies and generational studies, recognition of the limitations imposed by the 
approach taken offers future opportunities to specify more explicitly the limits to any 
set of findings. 
Agency 
 
 Terrorists do not operate in vacuums. Nor do their opponents or other actors in 
the system. Each actor possesses the ability to act at any time and for any reason. In 
large part, actions of actors in a system are limited only by the resources available to 
the actors and the rules under which they operate. Rules can generally limit behavior, 
but with terrorists, rule breaking is the norm, thus limiting the extent to which societal 
norms and values constrain actions. Terrorists act in ways suited to their purposes and 
intents, and their actions affect the perceptions, resources, and opportunities to act of 
other actors. By the same token, the actions of other actors – whether by intention or 
not – change the operational landscape of the terrorist, thereby opening new 
opportunities for the terrorist and imposing new constraints. Even so, the direction 
and scope of changes wrought by even the most inconsequential actor can be both 
profound and devastating to others. More frustrating still, these changes cannot be 
reliably predicted.68
                                                 
68 In a scale-free system, where most nodes, or actors, are poorly connected to other nodes, a 
few nodes are highly connected, the distribution of nodes generally follows a power law. Societal 
settings are, due to the preferential attachment rules governing actor connections and interactions, 
scale-free networks. In such networks, actions of actors will most often result in minor system changes, 
but can, and do, at times yield far-reaching changes. Predicting which will generate which outcome, 
however, is impossible. 
 Given the mutability of the environment at the hands of every 
actor, scholars face an environment that not only changes continuously, but changes 
in unpredictable ways and at unpredictable frequencies. Thus, the agency of actors 
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within the system introduces a degree of uncertainty that cannot be readily resolved. 
A more in-depth knowledge of each specific system to which the expected affinity 




 This examination was limited by design to textual messages found in 
published statements and communiqués, yet neither exhausts the range of media 
outlets available to terrorists. In different contexts, and among different groups, 
transmission of messages and demands can take a wide variety of forms, from word-
of-mouth, to handbills, posters, graffiti, television, radio, the Internet, etc. Each form 
of communication can be expected to yield different reception rates and different 
perceptions. Visual imagery, such as that found on television, movies, posters, and 
handbills, can and often does generate a visceral reaction, particularly when graphic 
images address or suggest highly emotional themes. Purely textual communications, 
such as the print media, offer a degree of permanence, allowing for study at much 
later dates, but typically have a lesser impact than oral communications found in 
word-of-mouth, public speeches, radio broadcasts, and similar communications 
forms. Similarly, the emotional impact of visual imagery can be expected to lessen 
over time and distance as its unique and intimate tie to context weakens. 
 The authorship of a given passage can also have profound effects on the way 
the message is received and interpreted. Messages created and delivered by the 
terrorists themselves offer a more credible and genuine transmission of the terrorists’ 
message than do messages filtered through intermediaries, regardless of how 
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unbiased that filter. Filtered messages can, and often do, carry some bias that would 
be expected to affect not only the message but also the way in which that message is 
interpreted. Where media outlets lack a tradition of independence and neutrality, the 
message of the terrorist is certainly to be biased, altered, or interpreted before it 
reaches its intended audience. 
 Message delivery immediacy may also affect the way in which messages are 
interpreted. The more time between an act of violence and receipt of a message 
explaining the terrorists’ rationale, the more likely members of the targeted audience 
will have an opportunity to form their own opinions of the act and its authors. This 
may work in favor of the terrorist, but is equally like to be detrimental to his cause. 
Different message delivery paths also affect both message diffusion and event 
coverage. For a message to be effectively delivered, means of transmission must 
match the intended recipients’ means of reception. If a targeted population cannot 
receive the terrorists’ message, for any reason, a critical portion of the intended 
interaction between terrorist and audience is irretrievably lost. Detailed case studies, 
when incorporated in expected affinity application, will allow consideration of the 
unique media presentation and delivery factors that may be operative.  
Proximity 
 
 Being at or near the site of a violent act carries significant consequences for 
the way in which that act is interpreted. The closer one is to violence, the easier it is 
to personalize the acts witnessed or suffered. The immediacy and nearness of the act 
create a sense of greater potential risk than do acts witnessed at a safe, comfortable 
distance. Distant acts of violence, no matter how devastating, offer the observer 
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greater opportunities to dissociate from the act. As a result, distant witnesses and 
audiences should feel a lesser emotional impact and would be expected to react less 
strongly than those closer to the violence. Even so, with time and proximity, 
observers may become more hardened, more adapted to an elevated sense of risk, 
such that they become a bit more tolerant of the uncertainty generated by violent acts. 
For these observers, greater levels of violence or risk would be needed to generate the 
same emotional impact as acts of violence might otherwise produce. To use examples 
from the groups examined here, Gaza is much smaller than either Germany or 
California. Gazans typically live in denser communities, and exist in greater 
proximity to regular acts of violence, authored either by Hamas or in retaliation to 
Hamas violence, than did Germans and Californians. Violence, consequently, has an 
immediate, likely personal, impact on the typical Gazan, while relatively few 
Germans, and very few Californians, were personally touched by RAF or SLA 
violence. Proximity to violence, and an understanding of the length of time in closer 
proximity to violence, would be needed to better understand the degree to which 
spatial diffusion and separation might affect a terrorist’s targeted audience. Proximity, 
then, is another area in which detailed case studies can beneficially supplement 
expected affinity application. 
Audience Heterogeneity 
 
 Gaza’s population is largely homogeneous, offering Hamas a consistent 
demographic against which it applies its persuasive efforts. Most Gazans are Muslim, 
responsive to some extent to messages leveraging the language or tenets of Islam. 
Hamas can, consequently, create and transmit messages with immediate cultural, 
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religious, and social relevance, appealing to a prevailing sense of justness and 
obligation that permeates Palestinian society. The Red Army Faction and the 
Symbionese Liberation Army, on the other hand, faced more heterogeneous 
populations. For the SLA, and to a lesser extent, the RAF, the targeted audience was a 
conglomerate of beliefs, values, and expectations not easily amenable to a single 
standardized message. The RAF, in limiting its audience to the German left, targeted 
a more specific population segment than did the SLA, but even then, the RAF’s 
audience exhibited considerable ideological variability, making connections and 
persuasion more tenuous than the RAF assumed they would be. The extent to which, 
then, a terrorist group can either effectively segment a population or enjoy a largely 
homogeneous population can be expected to have a significant effect on the ease at 
which a suitable and consistent message can be crafted and delivered. Audience 
demographics add additional flavor to the expected affinity metric, but demands 
detailed case development for effective incorporation. 
Future Refinements to Expected Affinity 
 
 Beyond incorporating case studies to leverage unique environmental and 
contextual factors of relevance, the expected affinity metric’s applicability and 
generalizability can be expanded. In no small measure, metric improvements reflect 
the need to tailor any such instrument to the time and context of terrorist operations.  
Content Categories 
 
 The content categories constructed for this investigation were broadly based, 
addressing very broad contextual categories and designed to capture many of the 
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highest frequency words associated with basic concepts of community, involvement, 
and risk. These categories do not, however, address the nuances of language 
associated with terrorism, such as the typical effort to dehumanize opponents. Based 
on broadly defined content categories, the expected affinity metric is tailorable, 
allowing narrowing or modification of categories to address very specific emotional 
and perceptual themes. Just as audiences can be segmented and targeted for 
persuasive efforts, the expected affinity measure can be further segmented and 
targeted to specific questions or aspects of the persuasive manipulation effort.   
 In much the same way, further tailoring could also consider and incorporate 
language more consistent with specific cultural, social, religious, or political contexts. 
The language of Islam, for example, is prevalent in Palestinian society, even among 
the less devout. Regardless of the degree of devotion present in Palestinian 
populations, Islam maintains direct cultural and historic relevance that could be 
explicitly addressed by modifying content categories. In secular societies, like those 
of Germany and the United States, religion would be expected to have much less of 
an impact on message recipients. Content dictionaries tailored to those contexts, then, 
would exhibit lower religious orientation in order to maintain fidelity with the 
applicable context of discourse. Depending on specific research purposes, the 
expected affinity metric can be modified to reflect better prevailing standards and 
norms in the appropriate environmental context. 
 The use of translated materials, except for SLA communications, also should 
be expected to affect findings. No matter how much fidelity is assumed in translated 
materials, the cultural and linguistic nuances present in native language 
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communications can be lost, altered, or distorted in a translation. This study used 
translations bearing a high degree of fidelity, yet idioms, colloquialisms, and 
subtleties were most assuredly tempered, yielding a series of findings reasonably 
expected to be at variance with findings generated through use of native-language 
texts. Transitioning content dictionaries to appropriate native tongues, then ensuring a 
high degree of suitability through review by native speakers, will also help preserve 
much of the emotional content likely lost in translated materials.  
Action coding 
 
 The symbolic content of terrorist attacks is, in the absence of confirmation of 
intent from the terrorists themselves, rather speculative. Even taking the message 
recipient’s perspective, the measure of impact is subjective. How an individual 
interprets an act of terror depends on a host of other factors affecting how and when 
the act was perceived, the emotional and intellectual impact other attacks may have 
had, the degree to which the act’s impact on others might diffuse to third parties, even 
emotional stability and mood at the time of perception. Inferred and intended 
symbolism, consequently, may diverge widely. Even then, perceptions of symbolic 
content may vary in the same individual over time. Given the subjectivity and 
variability of interpreting or inferring symbolic content, detailed case studies can 
allow coding modifications, where necessary, based on past reactions to terrorist 
violence. In instances where there is no relevant history of terrorism, frequent coding 
revisits may be necessary. The record of any revisions, however, will add important 






 Some terrorist groups include non-violent acts in their repertoires, adding an 
additional element through which the thoughts and actions of intended audiences 
might be modified and guided. Hamas, for example, built a foundation of support by 
providing essential services to the people of Gaza, services that the Israelis would not 
and the Palestinian Authority could not deliver.  Hamas has a long history of 
establishing schools,  health clinics, and social welfare offices, primarily in Gaza, for 
the benefit of its targeted audience. When these services are not otherwise provided, 
as is the case in Gaza, the organization responsible enjoys a tremendous advantage 
over real and potential rivals for public sympathy, support, and loyalty. The 
Symbionese Liberation Army sought to affect similar programs, demanding extensive 
food distribution efforts in exchange for the release of Patricia Hearst, but unrealistic 
expectations, poor foresight and planning, and poor preparations by both the SLA and 
authorities doomed the effort from the start. The RAF never did affect public service 
efforts, relying instead on the simple message of violence and the more convoluted 
message in its ideological pronouncements to convey its messages. The impact of the 
intended and inferred symbolic message content in non-violent acts thus offers an 
exciting avenue for additional research and exploration. 
A Fuzzy Future 
 
 No terrorist group is tractable; all seek change. Indeed, the rationale of every 
terrorist group rests in some manner on a demand for, and expectation of, change. For 
the committed revolutionary, of whatever ideological stripe, radical change is the 
primary goal, the reason for action. How much change is enough change, however, is 
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much more difficult to identify, even for the terrorists themselves. How much 
sympathy and support is needed to evolve and effectively advance the cause is 
sensitive to contextual, spatial, and temporal differences and thus beyond 
generalizable predictive capacity. Future development can move expected affinity 
forward by addressing each of these issues. 
 Given established traditions in terrorism research, opportunities for such 
refinement seem quite distant. By bringing newer ideas to bear, and making full use 
of the tools and techniques developed in other disciplines such as social network 
analysis, terrorism studies can advance beyond the descriptive and move more firmly 
into the predictive. Generational-based research offers some opportunities, given its 
effort to generalize across a range of examples, searching for those potential 
explanatory factors held in common by the subjects included. Such broadly defined 
efforts typically lack the depth necessary for determining the subtleties and nuances 
of an on-going interactive dynamic. The other common approach, in-depth case 
studies, lacks the generalizability of generational studies, limiting the extent to which 
any findings might be applied to additional situations. Network-based approaches, 
while representing the newest approach to the study of terrorism, remain firmly 
rooted in the structural consideration of networks, leaving the causal factors behind 
link attachment unaddressed. 
 Advances in the study of terrorism and of terrorism’s dynamics must venture 
in bold new directions, try new approaches, and risk failure if it is to offer additional 
insights and understanding. One promising approach that offers the opportunity to 
bridge the differences between the generational and case study approaches lies in the 
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field of fuzzy logic (see Zadeh 1965; Kosco 1986; Zadeh and Kacprzyk 1992; Ragin 
2000; and Ragin 2008), where variables are not forced into artificial bivalent 
categories but rather addressed as the multivalent variables they are. Terrorist attacks 
are not simply severe or not severe, a bivalent approach, but vary across an infinite 
range of shading of severity, depending on the perspective and orientation of the 
observer. Weapons choices, while seemingly compatible with discrete categories, also 
holds considerable variability. The SLA for example, assassinated Oakland school 
superintendent Marcus Foster using handguns, loaded with bullets containing 
cyanide. Whether such an act is properly considered a chemical weapon attack is an 
open question. How to consider an attack using a highly advanced explosive that does 
little damage and causes few casualties, compared to a crude mixture of fertilizer and 
fuel oil, like Timothy McVeigh’s bomb in Oklahoma City, offers another perspective 
on the difficulty of categorizing even the seemingly mundane in terrorism studies. 
When the perspective shifts to that of the observer, potential categories become 
significantly more difficult to separate. Expected affinity was developed with fuzzy 
logic applications firmly in mind and is intended to leverage multivalence across a 
range of factors. 
 By allowing for ranges of meaning and value across a defined spectrum, 
terrorism studies such as this one can better harness the smoothness of a host of 
continuous variables, using degrees of measure rather than a set and limiting series of 
predetermined values. Adding visualization, and visual analytics, further advance the 
study of terrorism by providing a ready opportunity to understand findings intuitively, 
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particularly where data is overwhelming or where results offer few interpretive 
opportunities or insights.  
 Terrorism is a highly emotional phenomenon, one for which very little beyond 
casualty rates and frequency of activities can be easily quantified and operationalized. 
Disagreements over foundational aspects – such as whether a given act is indeed an 
act of terrorism – undergird the study of terrorism, leaving the entire field mired in a 
subjectivity often rejected as unacceptable elsewhere. Subjectivity colors, in one way 
or another, virtually every study of terrorism in ways that make objective comparison 
between terrorist groups, terrorism conflicts, or any select aspect difficult. By moving 
the study of terrorism away from the bivalence of constructed categories and 
measures into a protocol more amenable to the nuances of a multivalent phenomenon, 
and by moving it away from a reductionist and structuralist perspective into a 
network-centric system perspective, the discipline can be advanced in ways 
unimagined a few years ago. This study takes a first, small step along that path, taking 
the prudent approach of asking whether this direction is a feasible one to pursue. 
While the goal of greater insight may be years distant, this study demonstrated the 















Statements and Communiqués Used in Analysis 
 
 
Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 





27 Oct  “The Wye River Memorandum of 23 October 1998: Its Indications 
and Consequences” 




2 Feb  “Sparing the Palestinian Blood is a Responsibility of the Palestinian 
Authority” 
20 Mar “Press Release” 
5 May  “The Zionist Enemy Continues Campaign of Settlement and 
Judiazation: The Palestinian Authority Arrests the Nobles” 
18 May “A New Terrorist Assumes Power in the Zionist State” 
5 Jun  “Latent Elements of Victory Waiting to be Stirred” 
22 Sep  “An Open Message from Khaled Mishaal to the Jordanian Monarch” 
22 Sep  “Press Release on the Arrest of the Movement’s Leaders: Khaled 
Mishaal, Ibrahim Ghoushe, and Deportation of Dr. Mousa Abu 
Marzouk” 
31 Oct  “Statement on Mauritania’s Promotion of Full Diplomatic Ties with 
the Zionist Regime” 
2 Nov  “A New Conspiracy at Oslo Summit” 
9 Nov   “Press Release: The Arrest of Ezzat Rasheq” 
24 Nov “Statement: Deportation of Hamas Leaders” 
30 Nov “Press Statement: The Arrest of Several National Figures by the 
Palestinian Authority” 
2 Dec  “Statement on the Wicked Assault Against Dr. Muaweya al-Masri” 





3 Feb  “Press Statement by Hamas Concerning the Stockholm Conference 
on the Alleged Holocaust of the Jews” 
5 Feb  “Statement on the Recent Meeting Between Barak and Arafat and 
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on the Resolution of the Central Council on the Declaration of 
a State Next September” 
9 Feb  “Press Statement on the Treacherous Acts of Zionist Aggression 
Against Lebanon” 
25 Feb  “The Wave of Arrests of Mujahideen Will Only Increase the 
Fighters’ Determination to Continue Their Resistance, and on 
the Threats of the Zionist Entity’s Leadership Against the 
People of Lebanon, its Land and Children” 
27 Feb  “Press Statement Concerning the Palestinian Authority’s Campaign 
of Arrests of Bir Zeit University Students” 
10 Mar “The So-Called Breakthrough in the Zionist-Palestinian Talks, a 
New Deception” 
11 Mar “Declaration Concerning the Arab Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 
Beirut” 
9 Apr  “New Wave of Arrests Takes Place in Jenin and Nablus by PA 
Security Apparatus” 
10 Apr  “Press Statement Concerning a Fabricated News Report Carried by 
Reuters” 
17 Apr  “Statement by Khaled Mishaal, Hamas Political Bureau Chief, to the 
Palestinian People and the Arab and Muslim Ummah on the 
Occasion of the Palestinian Prisoner’s Day – 17 April” 
21 Apr  “Urgent Appeal to Our People and Ummah to Back the Heroic 
Detainees and Adopt Their Cause.” 
3 May  “Urgent Press Release” 
14 May “On the Anniversary of the Establishment of the Usurping Zionist 
Entity” 
15 May “Congratulations to Our People Over the Release of the Mujahid 
Leader Salah Shehade” 
15 May “On the Anniversary of the Nakba and for the Sake of Detained 
Heroes” 
15 May “The PA Commits Another Crime by Arresting the Mujahid 
Commander Mohammed Daif” 
24 May “Today Lebanon . . . Tomorrow Palestine” 
4 Jul  “Press Release by Hamas on Results of the PLO Central Council 
Meeting” 
10 Jul  “The Doomed Camp David Summit” 
15 Jul  “There is No Justification for Arab and Islamic Silence towards the 
Camp David Conspiracy” 
23 Jul  “Urgent Statement by Hamas: Palestine and al-Quds are the Sole 
Property of the Nation” 
27 Jul  “All Conspiracies Crash at the Gates of al-Quds” 
30 Jul  “Press Statement on the Arrest of Dr. Abdul Aziz Ranteesi by PA 
Security Men” 
3 Aug  “Press Release on Arafat’s Statements Surrendering the Buraq 
Wall to the Jews” 




10 Aug “Important Appeal to the Arab and Islamic Nation: Al-Quds is in 
Danger” 
16 Aug “Press Release Commenting on the Assassination of the Mayor of 
Sarda Village, Mohmoud Abdullah, at the Hands of the Zionist 
Occupation Soldiers” 
19 Aug “Our Souls and Blood will be Sacrificed for the Aqsa” 
27 Aug “Heroic Battle by Mujhaid Mahmoud Abu Hannoud Against Zionist 
Occupation Forces” 
2 Sep  “Trial of Majahid Mahmoud Abu Hannoud: Shameful Spot in 
Records of the Palestinian Authority” 
27 Sep  “Statement on Terrorist Sharon’s Declared Intention to Visit the 
Haram al-Sharif” 
29 Sep  “New Massacre by Enemy Forces Against Our Unarmed People in 
the Aqsa Plaza” 
29 Sep  “Hamas Calls for an All-Out Strike and Popular Confrontations 
Tomorrow, Saturday, and for Three-Day Mourning for the 
Souls of the Martyrs” 
1 Oct  “Communiqué no. 4: Let the Aqsa Intifada Continue and let the 
Confrontation Progress and let the Ground Turn into Fire and 
Volcanoes Under the Feet of the Usurpers” 
3 Oct  “Communiqué no. 5: Jihad is Our Way. . . and Death for the Cause 
of Allah is Our Noblest Goal” 
4 Oct  “Communiqué no. 6: The Seventh Day of the Aqsa’s Intifada” 
7 Oct  “Communiqué no. 7: Blood of Martyrs Hoists the Palestinian Flag 
over the Dome of the Rock” 
7 Oct  “The Holy Aqsa Intifada: Statement on the Occupation’s Defeat at 
Mosque of Yousef’s Tombstone in Balata” 
8 Oct  “The Holy Aqsa Intifada: From Lebanon to Palestine. . . One People 
Who Do Not Capitulate” 
9 Oct  “The Holy Aqsa Intifada Communiqué no. 8: Herds of Armed 
Settlers Backed by Enemy Soldiers Attack Our People 
Everywhere” 
12 Oct  “The Holy Aqsa Intifada Communiqué no. 9: Our Mujahid People 
Do Not Fear Warplanes, Missiles, or the Enemy’s Nuclear 
Arsenal” 
14 Oct  “The Holy Aqsa Intifada Communiqué no. 11: Statement on the 
PA’s Approval to Attend the Sharm al-Sheikh Summit with 
Criminal Barak” 
14 Oct  “The Holy Aqsa Intifada Communiqué no. 10: Press Release” 
15 Oct  “Statement on the Jews’ Attempt to Lay Down the Foundation 
Stone of the Alleged Temple Tomorrow on the Date of the 
Notorious Sharm al-Sheikh Summit” 
15 Oct  “The Holy Aqsa Intifada: Appeal to Support the Aqsa” 
17 Oct  “Hamas Rejects Sharm al-Sheikh Resolutions” 
25 Oct  “Press Release Commenting on Terrorist Barak’s Plan the 
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Segregate and Isolate Palestinian Areas, and Clinton’s 
Invitation to both Arafat and Barak to Meet Him” 
26 Oct  “The Holy Aqsa Intifada Communiqué no. 12: The Intifada Will 
Persist” 
31 Oct  “More Escalation, Confrontations, and Days of Rage” 
2 Nov  “The Holy Aqsa Intifada Communiqué no. 13: Whatever was Taken 
by Force Would Only be Regained by Force” 
2 Nov  “Press Release Issued by the Islamic Resistance Movement – 
Hamas” 
9 Nov  “The Holy Aqsa Intifada Communiqué no. 14: The Intifada Will 
Persist Until al-Quds is Liberated” 
12 Nov “An Appeal from Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Founder of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement, Hamas, to Leaders and Peoples of the 
Arab and Islamic Nation on the Occasion of Holding the 
Islamic Summit Conference in Doha” 
21 Nov “The Holy Aqsa Intifada Communiqué no. 15: The Intifada Will 
Persist Until End of Occupation” 
23 Nov “Press Release on the Zionist Assassination of Mujahid Ibrahim 
Abdul Karim, One of the Qassam Brigades’ Commanders” 
27 Nov “The Month of Ramada. . . the Month of Seeking Ta’at and 
Closeness to Allah through Jihad and Escalation of Resistance” 
27 Nov “Press Release on the Assassination of the Five Hamas Elements 
in Qalqilya” 
2 Dec  “The Holy Aqsa Intifada: An Intifada to Defeat Occupation. 
Communiqué no. 16” 
9 Dec  “Press Release: The Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, 
Announces the Martyrdom of Hamdy Arafat Ansyo, 
Commander of the Teyba Operation and Marine Rafah 
Martyrdom Operation” 
10 Dec  “Here is the Truth. . .Let the World Listen” 
13 Dec  “Press Release: The Mujahid Dr. Abdul Aziz Ranteesi Declares a 
Hunger Strike” 
13 Dec  “Press Release on the New Massacre in Khan Younis” 
15 Dec  “Press Release: The Declaration of Resumption of Negotiations 
Between the PA and Zionist Camp” 
14 Dec  “Holy Aqsa Intifada Communiqué no. 17: On the Anniversary of its 
Outbreak; Hamas – Resistance Until Victory” 
16 Dec  “Press Release: Martyr Hero Noor Mohammed Safi, Martyr of the 
Hamas Anniversary” 
26 Dec  “Our Eid is Decorated with Revenge” 
31 Dec  “Press Release on the Assassination of Fatah Official and the 









4 Jan  “Important Communiqué by the Islamic Resistance Movement 
(Hamas) on PA’s ‘Conditional!’ [sic] Approval of the 
American Proposals and the Arab Follow-up Committee’s 
Cairo Meeting to Discuss Them” 
7 Jan  “Press Release on the Security Coordination Meeting Between the 
PA and Zionist Enemy in Cairo” 
15 Jan   “Communiqué by Qassam Brigades (Special Unit 103): The First 
Reprisal Against Assassinations” 
21 Jan  “Military Communiqué Issued by Qassam Brigades Unit “103”: 
Retaliation to Kidnapping Palestinian Girl” 
21 Jan  “Communiqué no. 19: Taba Negotiations Will Not Deceive Our 
People and Will Not Halt Resistance or the Intifada” 
28 Jan  “Military Communiqué by the Qassam Brigades Unit 103: 
Retaliation to the Killing of Two of Our People in Rafah” 
1 Feb  “Hamas Statement Commenting on PA Officials’ Calls Asking Our 
People in Occupied Palestine 1948 to Elect Criminal Barak” 
13 Feb  “Press Release: On the Escalation of Terrorism and Assassination 
Against Our Mujahid People” 
22 Mar “Military Communiqué Issued by Qassam Brigades for Shelling . . . 
and Zionists Will Not Go Unpunished” 
27 Mar “Press Release: Zionists Commit a New [Wave] of Crime” 
27 Mar “Memo from the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, to the Arab 
Summit in Amman, Jordan” 
27 Mar “Qassam Brigades Military Communiqué” 
3 Apr  “Hamas Communiqué: Assassinating Mujahid Mohammed Abdel 
Aal: New Cowardly Crime by Coward People” 
6 Apr  “Hamas Communiqué: The Criminal Terrorist Sharon Provokes the 
Nation in its Religion and Desecrates its Holy Shrines” 
10 Apr  Hamas Communiqué: The Aqsa is Appealing to You . . . Will 
Anybody Respond?” 
11 Apr  “Hamas Communiqué: On the Martyrdom of Fadi Atallah Yousef 
Amer” 
11 Apr  “Hamas Communiqué: Zionist Criminals Demolish Houses on its 
[sic] ,Inhabitants” 
16 Apr  “Hamas Communiqué: ON the Zionist Aggression Against Syrian 
Military Positions in Lebanon” 
19 Apr  “Press Release on the Serious Injury of One of the Movement’s 
Mujahideen” 
18 Apr  “Qassam Brigades Military Communiqué” 
27 Apr  “Qassam Brigades Military Communiqué” 
1 May  “Hamas Communiqué: Dangerous Stage in Zionist Aggression 
Against Our People” 
12 May “Hamas Communiqué: Support Our People’s Intifada” 




4 Jun  “Qassam Brigades’ Military Communiqué” 
5 Jun  “Qassam Brigades’ Military Communiqué” 
5 Jun  “Press Clarification” 
5  Jun  “Hamas Communiqué” 
13 Jun  “Hamas Press Statement on PA’s Acceptance of George Tenet’s 
Proposals” 
14 Jun  “Hamas: Political memo on Western/American Pressures” 
16 Jun  “Hamas Urgent Press Release” 
19 Jun  “Memo on Jordanian Authorities’ Insistence on Detaining Brother 
Ibrahim Ghoushe in Amman Airport”  
20 Jun  “Press Release on the Health Condition of Eng[ineer] Ghoushe 
Detained in Amman Airport” 
22 Jun  “Qassam Brigades’ Military Communiqué” 
23 Jun  “Hamas Press Release” 
24 Jun  “Urgent Press Release on Developments of Mr. Ibrahim Ghoushe’s 
Case” 
28 Jun  “Press Release on the Return of Mr. Ibrahim Ghoushe” 
30 Jun  Press Release on the Post of Mr. Ibrahim Ghoushe in Hamas” 
1 Jul  “Press Release on the Return of Mr. Ibrahim Ghoushe” 
2 Jul  “Press Release on the Israeli Aggression Against Lebanon and 
Syria” 
8 Jul  “Military Communiqué Issued by the Qassam Brigades” 
13 Jul  “Qassam martyrdom of Atef Mohammed Tafesh” 
13 Jul  “Military Communiqué Issued by the Qassam Brigades” 
17 Jul  “Hamas Communiqué on Zionist Massacre in Bethlehem” 
19 Jul  “Hamas Communiqué on Zionist Aggression” 
24 Jul  “Press Release: Occupation Crimes Against Our People Continue” 
28 Jul  “Hamas Communiqué on Zionist Plans to Desecrate al-Aqsa” 
31 Jul  “Hamas Communiqué on the Nablus Massacre” 
31 Jul  “Hamas Communiqué: On the Nablus Massacre – Our 
Condolences Will be in Revenge” 
31 Jul  “Hamas Communiqué: ON the Nablus Massacre – Qualitative Leap 
in the Struggle” 
9 Aug  “Military Communiqué Issued by the Qassam Brigades” 
20 Aug “Hamas Communiqué: To Confront Sharon’s Massacres” 
5 Sep  “Qassam Brigades’ Military Communiqué” 
18 Sep  “Hamas Communiqué on American and International Moves” 
26 Sep  “Qassam Brigades’ Communiqué” 
28 Sep  “Hamas Communiqué on the Anniversary of Aqsa Intifada” 
2 Oct  “Qassam Brigades Communiqué” 
3 Oct  “Hamas Appeal” 
14 Oct  “Qassam Brigades Communiqué” 
15 Oct  “Hamas Communiqué” 
19 Oct  “Hamas Communiqué” 
21 Oct  “Hamas Communiqué” 
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23 Oct  “Qassam Brigades Communiqué” 
24 Oct  “Hamas Communiqué on the Massacre” 
26 Oct  “Qassam Communiqué” 
3 Nov  “Hamas Communiqué on American Offensive” 
13 Nov “Hamas Communiqué on Sharon and Peres Plan” 
24 Nov “Hamas Communiqué of the Assassination o Abu Hannoud by 
Zionist Occupation” 
24 Nov “Qassam Communiqué” 
26 Nov “Qassam Communiqué”  
25 Nov “Hamas Communiqué” 
27 Nov “Qassam Communiqué” 
2 Dec  “Qassam Communiqué” 
4 Dec  “Hamas Communiqué” 
11 Dec  “Hamas Press Release on EU Foreign Ministers’ Statement” 
11 Dec  “Hamas Press Release on Powell’s Statement” 
12 Dec  “Qassam Communiqué” 
17 Dec  “Hamas Communiqué on Arafat’s Speech” 
21 Dec  “Qassam Communiqué” 
17 Dec  “Hamas Communiqué” 
21 Dec  “Hamas Communiqué” 
23 Dec  “Hamas Communiqué Condemns Attack on Journalist” 




8 Jan  “Hamas Communiqué” 
9 Jan  “Qassam Communiqué” 








1 Apr 1971  “The Urban Guerrilla Concept” 
14 May 1972  “For the Victory of the People of Vietnam” 
16 May 1972  “Commando Thomas Weisbecker” 
20 May 1972  “Expropriate Springer” 
20 May 1972  “Fight Fascism” 
25 May 1972  “Attack on the American Armed forces Headquarters” 
28 May 1972  “Communiqué to the West German Press” 
29 May 1972  “About the Fascist Bomb Threats in Stuttgart” 
1972 – 1973  “Ulrike Meinhof Writes from the Dead Wing” [compilation of  




13 Sep 1974  “Statement Regarding the Freeing of Andreas Baader” 
31 Oct 1974  “Holger Meins’ Last Letter” 
24 Apr 1975  “Statement of Commando Holger Meins” 
18 Jun 1975  “Andreas Baader’s Statement at the Stammheim Trial” 
4 May 1976  “History of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Old 
Left: Fragment from an Intervention in the Stammheim 
Trial” 
11 May 1976  “Fragment Regarding Structure” 
11 May 1976  “Statement of Jan-Carl Raspe at the Trial in Stuttgart 
Stammheim” 
July-August 1976 “The Structure of the RAF” 
July 1976  “Interview with Le Monde Diplomatique” 
Late 1976  “The October Revolution and the Third International: 
Summary of the Discussion in Stammheim in 1976” 
8 Aug 1977  “Statement Regarding the Execution of Ponto” 
3 Sep 1977  “The RAF Attack on the Federal Prosecutor’s Office in 
Karlsruhe” 
6 Sep 1977  “Second Communiqué Regarding the Schleyer Kidnapping” 
13 Oct 1977  “Ultimatum” 
13 Oct 1977  “Final Communiqué Regarding Schleyer” 
13 Oct 1977  “Operation Kofr Kaddum” [regarding PFPL hijacking in 
support of RAF prisoners] 





6 Feb 1981  “RAF Hunger Strike Statement” 
31 Aug 1981  “Attack on the USAFE in Ramstein” 
May 1982  “The Guerrilla, the Resistance, and the Anti-Imperialist Front” 
Dec 1984  “Statement Regarding the Association of Political Prisoners” 
Dec 1984  “Hunger Strike Statement” 
Jan 1985  “For the Unity of Revolutionaries in West Europe” 
1 Feb 1985  “RAF Attack Against Ernst Zimmerman” 
Mid-Feb 1985  “The Prisoners’ Statement Regarding the End of the Hunger 
    Strike” 
Apr 1985  “Interview with Comrades from the RAF” 
8 Aug 1985  “RAF and Action Directe Attack Against the Rhein-Main Air
     Base: Communiqué # 1” 
25 Aug 1985  “Communiqué # 2: Regarding the Action Against the Rhein 
Main Air Base and the Shooting of Edward Pimental” 
Sep 1985  “Interview with Comrades from the RAF” 
Jan 1986  “To Those Who Struggle Alongside Us” 
9 Jul 1986  “Attack on Beckurts” 
10 Oct 1986  “On the Attack Against Braumöhl” 
Sep 1988  “Statement of the Red Brigades and the RAF” 
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20 Sep 1988  “RAF Attack on Hans Tietmeyer” 
1 Feb 1989  “Hunger Strike Statement by Helmut Pohl on Behalf of 
Political Prisoners in West Germany” 
Early Feb 1989 “To the Revolutionary Prisoners in the Imperial Prisons of 
Western Europe” 
Mid-May 1989 “Statement by Karl-Heinz Dellwo” 
20 May 1989  “Statement by Eve Haule” 





4 Apr 1991  “Rohwedder Assassination” 
18 Jan 1992  “Letter from Günter Sonnenberg, RAF Prisoner” 
24 Jan 1992  “Red Army Faction Communiqué re: Nonne” 
10 Apr 1992  “To All Who are Looking for Ways to Organize and to Push 
Through a Human Life in Dignity Here and Worldwide on Really Concrete Issues” 
15 Apr 1992  “Statement by Irmgard Möller Regarding the RAF Cease 
Fire” 
18 May 1992  “Der Spiegel Interview with Irmgard Möller” 
June 1992  “ ‘They Want to Destroy Us,’ Interview with RAF Prisoners 
Lutz Taufer, Karl-Heinz Dellwo, and Knut Folkerts” 
[from Konkret, a magazine devoted to leftist theory] 
20 Jun 1992  “There is Much that United Us” 
29 Jun 1992  “Greetings to All Those Taking Part in Demonstrations and 
Congress Against the World Economic Summit in 
Munich!” 
Aug 1992  “We Must Search for Something New” 
Sep 1992  “Christian Klar’s Trial Statement” 
30 Mar 1993  “Statement Concerning the Attack on Weiterstadt Prison” 
29 Jun 1993  “A Letter from Birgit Hogefeld” 
30 Jun 1993  “Witness Statement Regarding the Shooting of Wolfgang 
Grams” 
22 Jul 1993  “The Treason of Klaus Steinmetz” 
15 Jun 1996  “ ‘Now We Must Find Ways to be Released. . . ‘ Interview 
with Political Prison Helmut Pohl on the Politics of the 
Red Army Faction (RAF)” 
Mar 1998  “ ‘The Urban Guerrilla is History . . .’ The Final Communiqué 
of the Red Army Faction (RAF)” 
 
 
Symbionese Liberation Army Statements and Communications 
 
 
1973   “A Letter to the People from Fahizah, to Those Who Would 
Bear the Hopes and Future of the People . . .” 
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 1973   “The Goals of the Symbionese Liberation Army” 
21 Aug 1973  “The Symbionese Federation and the Symbionese Liberation 
Army Declaration of Revolutionary War and the 
Symbionese Program” 
 6 Nov 1973  “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Youth Unit 
Communiqué # 1” [warrant order for Marcus Foster 
assassination] 
4 Feb 1974  “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Adult Unit 
Communiqué # 3” [warrant order for Patricia Hearst 
kidnapping] 
12 Feb 1974  transcript of tape recording received by Berkeley, California 
radio station KPFA 
19 Feb 1974  transcript of tape delivered to Reverend Cecil Williams 
Mar 1974  “Codes of War of the United Symbionese Liberation Army” 
3 Apr 1974  transcript of tape received by San Francisco, California radio 
station KSAN 
24 Apr 1974  transcript of tape addressed to WAPAC, but delivered to a 
private citizen 
13 Aug 1975  “Communiqué” [delivered under the name of New World 
Liberation Front] 
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